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ABSTRACT 
 
Budgeting is among the executive’s most important powers in a separated political 
system. The extent to which executive budget proposals are adopted by the legislature is 
an important measure of the executive’s political success. Scholarly literature on 
budgeting has emphasized how budgets are created but study of executive budget success 
and its causes is relatively rare. This work seeks to better understand success and the 
reasons it is achieved through an analysis of the 50 American states for a complete 
budget cycle. This approach advances the study of budget success by using multiple 
methods, including measuring success by major issue as well as agency budgets. A 
survey of budget participants revealed that governors were more successful with partisan 
support in the legislature, early in their terms, and in a biennial budget cycle. 
Respondents rated economic conditions, clearly stating and advocating an agenda, and 
offering popular issues the most important factors contributing to executive budget 
success. Quantitative analyses revealed that governors were more likely to achieve 
budget goals with a less professional legislature, legislative term limits, party support in 
the legislature, biennial budgeting, popular support, and earlier in their terms. Taken 
together, all analyses suggest that the most important factor in executive budget success 
is the time in service, followed by partisan support in the legislature,  an institutionally 
weak legislature, biennial budgets, popular support, control over a strong executive 
budget office, a weak economy, and when proposing large budget increases.  
1CHAPTER 1 
 
EXECUTIVE POWER AND EXECUTIVE BUDGETING 
 
The growing power of the chief executive is one of the most remarkable 
developments in American national government in the last one hundred years.  Writing in 
the middle of the Twentieth Century, legal scholar Edward S. Corwin characterized the 
history of the presidency as “…a history of aggrandizement…” (1948, 38).   While 
Corwin saw the growth in presidential power as long but discontinuous, later scholars 
dated dramatic jumps in presidential power to the administrations of Woodrow Wilson 
(Tulis 1998), Warren Harding (Sundquist 1981) or Franklin Roosevelt (see, for example, 
Greenstein 1978, Nelson 1998, Shull and Shaw 1999).  
Many external factors--wars and emergencies, public expectations of government 
action, the nation's expanding role in the world community, growth in the size of the 
executive branch, and more public attention--help explain the growth of presidential 
power (Nelson 1998, Burke 1998). Presidents themselves expanded the power of the 
office by taking the lead in setting the legislative agenda, expanding staff support 
capabilities, gaining more control over the executive branch, and cultivating their 
newfound public attention (Greenstein 1978). This modern interpretation confirmed 
Corwin’s judgment that the definition—and role—of the presidency depends both on the 
“…accumulated tradition of the office” and on the holder of the office (1948, 38). 
Like the President at the national level, governors rose within in the power 
structures of state governments during the Twentieth Century.  In the early stages, 
2executives were consciously given more power in order to create clear lines of 
accountability to voters (Clynch and Lauth 1991a). Over time, institutional power of 
governors grew thanks to longer terms of office, removal or loosening of limits on terms, 
administrative reorganizations, the reduction in separately elected offices and 
complementary increase in governors’ appointment powers, the creation of cabinet 
structures, veto powers, and, as with the President, increases in staff support (Epstein 
1978,  Beyle and Muchmore 1983, Beyle 1983a). As with the presidency, external 
factors, including a greater policy role for state governments, and growth in public 
contact, have helped build executive power of governors (Beyle 1983a). 
The growth of executive power has been intertwined with the creation and 
development of executive budgeting. In 1900, the Congress and all 50 state legislatures 
dominated the budget process. They appropriated funds to agencies on an intermittent 
basis and in lump sums, without considering the fiscal operations of the government as a 
whole (Schick 1971, 2000). Early critics found many faults in the legislative 
appropriations process. It had come to be dominated by “bosses” in the form of powerful 
committee chairs, who were not subject to popular control.  It was too easily dominated 
by special interests, even those who claimed to have the best humanitarian goals at heart 
(Cleveland and Buck 1920).  
Reformers advocated executive budgeting, in which the chief executive is either 
expected or required to begin the regular budget process by proposing a comprehensive, 
unified governmental budget. There were several purported advantages to such a system. 
First, the unified budget would act as a complete record and a comprehensive plan of 
3government action. As such, it informed voters and gave them an instrument of 
democratic control. Second, the chief executive was available throughout the fiscal 
period to enforce the legislative will and spending restraint upon agencies.  (Willoughby 
1918). Third, an executive might be more likely to control expenditures, which had 
grown quickly in the early 1900s at both the national and state levels (Schick 1971, 
2000). Fourth, citizens could hold a single official who was elected at large accountable 
for the efficient and effective execution of policies and programs (Clynch and Lauth 
1991a).  The municipal, state and federal governments, by adopting executive budgeting, 
not only responded to these calls for reform, but they changed the balance of power 
within government. The executive budget became an important tool of executive power. 
It set the stage for development of an annual or biennial budget, which often became the 
major issue of the legislative session. Richard Briffault (1996, 31) went so far as to say 
that the executive’s budget submission “dominates the debate.”   
At the national level, the executive budgeting power grew in several steps. The 
President was given the power to propose a budget in the Budget and Accounting Act of 
1921. This act gave the president a formal role in the budget process, attempted to end 
direct contact regarding budget issues between agencies and Congress and created the 
Bureau of the Budget to assist the President in reviewing agency funding requests and 
preparing the annual executive budget. In 1939 the Bureau of the Budget was moved into 
the new Executive Office of the President and was given the lead role in federal 
government management. It not only created the President’s budget; it developed the 
President’s legislative agenda and monitored legislation on behalf of the chief executive.  
4President Nixon strengthened executive budgeting in the 1970s by making the Bureau 
(now the Office of Management and Budget) more politically responsive and by 
involving it more in monitoring congressional fiscal activity (Schick 2000). President 
Reagan elevated the office again by having it propose and negotiate budgets with 
Congress without involving the agencies that originally proposed and would eventually 
implement the budgets (Rubin 2000).  
State governments embraced executive budgeting and strengthened executive 
budget offices in the same time period. Ohio was the first to give the governor the power 
to prepare the budget in 1910 (Guhde and Mustafa 1981). Every state made significant 
budget reforms between 1911 and 1926, though less than half had true executive 
budgeting by the end of this period. The fiscal difficulties of the Great Depression shifted 
budgeting power toward the governor in most states; the budget became more an 
instrument of executive intent and control, thanks to more detailed appropriations, larger 
gubernatorial staffs, and constant monitoring of agency activities (Schick 1971).  By the 
mid-1970s, governors of 34 states had sole responsibility for preparing budgets (Epstein 
1978). By the end of the 1990s, all 50 governors offered unified proposed budgets. Some 
still competed with comprehensive legislative proposals and many were subject to 
statutory limitations regarding revenue forecasts and balanced budgets.  
As at the national level, growth in specialized budget offices helped governors 
consolidate and take advantage of the executive budget power. The number of states with 
offices of management and budget doubled in the 1970s (Beyle 1983b). In 2001, 
governors in every state except South Carolina had significant appointment power over 
5the budget director; these appointees managed executive budget staffs totaling nearly 
1800 employees (National Association of State Budget Officers 2002). Governors have 
gained additional powers to enforce their budget will through other means, including 
balanced budget requirements, line item veto power, and the power to reduce a budget 
after it is adopted (Briffault 1996).  
As one would expect in a separated system of government with branches 
competing for power, legislatures reacted to the growth of executive power in the late 
Twentieth Century by building their own budgetary powers. In 1972, House Ways and 
Mean Committee member Al Ullman lamented that executive budget power had grown to 
the point that his colleagues had “…lost the capacity to decide our own priorities in this 
nation of ours” (quoted in Sundquist 1981, 210). Later, Congress addressed the perceived 
imbalance with the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 
(BICA), which created the Congressional Budget Office. This office gave Congress the 
ability to create its own fiscal policy, independent of the President’s policies (Rubin 
2000). It also made budgeting at the federal level considerably more contentious and 
made the two budget-making branches more interdependent (Shull and Shaw 1999, 
Schick 2000).  
State legislative fiscal staffs blossomed in the same time period. These staffs 
assisted legislators in regaining some control over the states’ budgets by independently 
forecasting revenues, reviewing agency budget requests, analyzing new program 
requests, estimating the impact of tax and expenditures decisions on members’ districts, 
and monitoring agency implementation of legislative intent (Guhde and Mustafa 1981, 
6Grizzle 1991, Cope 1991, Chadha, Permaloff and Bernstein 2001). Perhaps most 
importantly, they gave the legislature budgetary information that ended their reliance on 
the executive branch (Abney and Lauth 1998). Legislative budgeting power also has been 
bolstered by the trend toward higher professionalism, as manifested in the shift toward 
annual sessions, longer sessions, and higher pay (Rosenthal 1990, Fisher 1997). Abney 
and Lauth (1998), based on the latest of several surveys of budget participants, declared 
that the era of executive dominance in state budgeting was over. Budget scholar Irene 
Rubin (2000) agreed, describing the current budget arena in most states and at the 
national level as one of balance between the executive and legislative branches. 
In an era of balanced powers between the branches of government, studying 
budgeting outcomes is an effective way to study the roots and uses of executive power. 
Budgeting has become both a means for executives to extend their power and a test of 
their ability to use that power. Aaron Wildavsky, long recognized as the leading 
budgeting scholar, was among the first to make the case for the budget as a legitimate 
arena for studying politics: 
Perhaps the “study of budgeting” is just another expression for the “study 
of politics”; yet one cannot study everything at once, and the vantage point 
offered by concentration on budgetary decisions offers a useful and much 
neglected perspective from which to analyze the making of policy (1961, 
190). 
 
Regulating and resolving conflict is, arguably, the primary function of government. The 
budget process is thus an institution in which the central purpose of government is carried 
out annually or, in some states, biennially.  
Budgets simultaneously accomplish many political functions. They are records of 
7past conflicts, mechanisms to allocate limited resources, signals of what matters to a 
government and a statement of strategies and hopes for the future of the nation 
(Wildavsky 1975). The political importance of budgeting helps explain why the annual 
American budgeting ritual has become the site of “epic battles” between the President 
and Congress (Kiewiet and McCubbins 1985, 182). Both branches recognize that control 
over the budget equates to control over policy outcomes.  Indeed, one budget scholar 
suggests budgeting has supplanted legislation as “…the most important instrument of 
governance” (Lehan 1996, 4).  Nor is the political importance of budgeting limited to the 
national government. In state government, budgeting is “...the vehicle whereby most state 
policy priorities are clearly delineated” (Gosling 1985, 459). The budget for a state 
determines how much will be available, which policies will be implemented, and which 
social values will prevail (Clynch and Lauth 1991a). Budgeting, in other words, is 
politics.  
The adopted budget is a summary of the political struggle; Ohio budget director 
Howard Collier characterized the final state budget as “a political scorecard’ (quoted in 
MacManus 1991, 31). Rubin (2000) agreed, suggesting that “Budgets reflect the relative 
power of different individuals and organizations…” (p. 2). This study compares the 
governors’ budgetary goals with the budgets finally appropriated by the legislature.  By 
doing so for a budget process in all 50 states, it goes well beyond a simple scorecard. It 
offers a season’s worth of box scores. Analyzing those box scores, it attempts to answer 
what must ultimately be one of political science’s essential questions:  “Who won and 
why?” 
8Budgeting Theories in the Literature
A review of the literature on the political aspects of budgeting suggests six 
reasonably coherent theories of budgeting. These are the incremental, bargaining, 
comparative, economic, institutional, and ideological theories.  Each of the six theories 
informs the proposed dissertation in some way, as summarized in Table 1. 
One of the earliest and still most important theories is that budgeting will be 
incremental--that is, that each agency's budget will be a marginal adjustment from its 
budget in the previous year. Wildavsky (1964) developed this idea in his studies of the 
American national budgeting process. Fenno (1966) found the same dynamic in his study 
of the congressional appropriations process. According to incremental theory, the 
executive and legislative budget processes touch only the tip of the iceberg, while the 
remaining nine-tenths float along below the surface. Budgets are incremental because 
they embody the decisions of all prior years' budgets; nobody wants to revisit every 
decision and risk the loss of important programs. Even if they did, the limited time to 
prepare and review budgets makes it impossible to meaningfully consider every part of 
every agency's budget. An essential reason for and result of incremental budgeting is an 
unspoken agreement that all agencies (and leaders who are responsible to the 
beneficiaries of agency programs) are willing to take a “fair share” of budget changes 
rather than risk a large decline while a rival agency manages a large increase (Wildavsky 
1964).  
Several early budgeting studies documented the incremental nature of budgeting. 
Wildavsky and colleagues used Fenno’s data on 56 federal agencies to develop models of 
9the various budget participants’ strategies and to show that the vast majority of agency 
requests, budget bureau recommendations, and congressional appropriations were 
explained by the agency’s prior budget (Davis, Dempster and Wildavsky 1966). 
Sharkansky and Turnbull (1969) demonstrated in a study of budgeting in two states that 
the increment from last year’s budget, not the overall budget, was the focus of agency 
budget requests, governors’ recommendations, and legislative spending decisions. 
Sharkansky (1968) concluded from a more extensive study of budgeting in 19 states that 
incrementalism explained budgeting inputs and outcomes.  
 
Table 1.—Role of the Major Budgeting Theories in this Study. 
Theory Principle Argument Use in this Study 
Incremental Most budget activity centers 
on marginal changes from the 
previous budget. 
Study measures governor’s 
goals and budget outcomes as 
change from the previous 
budget. 
 
Bargaining Budgets are developed 
through mutual 
accommodation between the 
executive and legislative 
branches. 
Study identifies budget issues 
throughout the budget process, 
so that governor’s issues may 
include some initiated by the 
legislature.  Study also 
measures relative strengths of 
the two branches to determine 
impact on budgeting outcomes. 
 
Comparative Budget outcomes depend on 
wealth and scarcity of 
resources. 
Study incorporates economic 
conditions and budget growth 
as explanatory variables. 
 
Economic Incumbent governments 
manipulate budgets to create a 
favorable economy for 
reelection. 
Study tests whether incumbent 
governors are more successful 
with unified government and 
an upcoming election. 
 
Ideological Conservative governments Study tests legislative party 
10
spend less and budget success 
depends on ideological 
agreement between branches. 
support and other partisan 
arrangements as explanatory 
variables. 
 
Institutional Mechanisms that divide 
power among the branches of 
government affect budget 
outcomes. 
Study tests several variables of 
power distribution within and 
among the branches as 
explanatory variables. 
Many challenged the incremental theory of Wildavsky and others. Bailey and 
O’Connor (1975) used Fenno’s data to show that federal agency budgets often varied a 
good deal more from year to year than might be encompassed by the term “increment”; 
they made the same conclusion in reviewing additional federal budgets as well as agency 
budgets from Virginia and Colombia. Other scholars indicated that agencies requesting 
larger appropriations would get them, contrary to the expectations of incremental theory 
(Sharkansky 1968, LeLoup and Moreland 1978). LeLoup (1975) criticized studies that 
supported the incremental theory for concentrating on agency budget totals rather than 
programs, for looking at a single year’s budget in isolation from multi-year trends, and 
for looking at budget totals rather than nominal or percentage changes. According to 
Rubin (2000), incrementalism is not applicable in modern budgeting because participants 
are no longer bound by the norms of fair share and moderation, because the rise of 
interest groups has disrupted the formerly closed and cozy process, and because budget 
processes have a strong role in structuring interactions among the budget participants.  
The incremental approach, however, remains valid in explaining some budgets 
decades after it was first conceived (Kiewiet and McCubbins 1985, Patashnik 1999). 
Jones, True and Baumgartner (1997) found that the American national budget has 
11
become more incremental in nature. This is partly due to growth in the budget--more of it 
is judged by policy makers to be “off limits”--and partly due to the prevalence of divided 
government, which makes it difficult to change budgets in any direction. State officials 
are believed almost universally to look at budgets incrementally (Rubin et al. 1991, Lauth 
1991, Whicker 1991, Clynch and Lauth 1991b).  
 Bargaining theories of budgeting posit a similar outcome to incremental theories--
minor changes in annual budgets--but for different reasons (Rubin 1997). Kiewiet and 
McCubbins (1985) agreed with Wildavsky that Congress and the President view budgets 
in terms of their change from the previous year's spending level. From this common 
departing point, however, they saw a dynamic quite different from Wildavsky's. They 
conceived of the budget process as a game between the President and Congress, which 
both adopt “accommodative” strategies. Both branches mutually and continuously adjust 
their budget proposals based on the anticipated reaction of the other side. A President will 
propose a larger budget than preferred if he believes Congress wants a higher budget. He 
will conversely lower his proposal if he believes Congress wants to cut. Congress will 
similarly adjust its preferred position to avoid a presidential veto. Budgeting is thus a 
“rational strategy of accommodation,” not a predetermined process governed by inertia 
(p. 197).   
Several budgeting studies have confirmed the dynamic approach to budgeting 
suggested by bargaining theories.  Cox, et al. (1993) found that democratic presidents 
lower budget recommendations when republicans control Congress, and republican 
congresses increase spending more with a democratic President than with a republican 
12
one.   Kiewiet and McCubbins (1985) found that presidents and Congress both 
considered the preferences of the opposite branch in determining their budgets. The 
Reagan administration turned the budgetary approach on its head. President Reagan set 
his budget proposals only after considering what changes Congress would make (Heclo 
1984). Rather than increasing budgets because he expected Congress would want higher 
budgets, he lowered them in anticipation that Congress would increase spending but only 
to his desired level (Peterson 1985). 
 While the literature of comparative budgeting is primarily descriptive, Wildavsky 
(1975) elaborated on his incremental theory to develop a comparative theory of budgeting 
dynamics. Incremental budgeting is limited to settings with both wealth and economic 
certainty. Where there is wealth but not certainty, the original budget will be relatively 
unimportant, with the real decision-making taking place in discussions of supplemental 
budgets during the year. Where there is certainty but no wealth, as in American cities in 
the 1970s, the budget will be determined solely by the available revenues. In areas 
lacking both certainty and wealth, mainly in less developed countries, budgeting will be 
repetitive. By this term Wildavsky meant that an adopted budget will have little meaning 
because the system must include multiple controls and approvals before budgeted funds 
could actually be spent. States, according to Wildavsky, vary in budget circumstances 
and thus in the nature of budgeting. When revenue growth slows, the governor must find 
new revenue sources and the legislative emphasis shifts away from the expenditure side. 
When growth returns, however, the emphasis of both branches shifts toward 
expenditures. With ample revenues, all parties are more likely to achieve their budget 
13
objectives. Except for Wildavsky's theory and the institutional theory described below, 
the literature of comparative budgeting is disappointingly descriptive and not well 
unified.1
Incremental, bargaining, and Wildavsky's comparative theories concentrate on 
how budgeting works and why. Other theories pay more attention to the result --whether 
budgets grow or shrink and why. These theories can loosely be organized as economic, 
ideological, and institutional approaches. 
 Economic theories of budgeting are often related to the idea of an “electoral 
business cycle.”  Scholars of this persuasion argue that economic conditions at the time 
of an election are an important determinant of the incumbent party's chances of being 
reelected.  As a result, scholars say, executives will manipulate the budget process to 
provide favorable economic results as elections approach (Tufte 1975, Nordhaus 1975, 
McRae 1977). The incumbent party is thus a “winner” in the budget process if it succeeds 
in reducing unemployment or increasing economic growth in the short run and if it is 
reelected as a result. In its purest form, this theory implies that there is a built-in bias 
toward higher spending any time an election is approaching. There is enough doubt about 
whether the economy actually affects election results and whether governments 
intentionally manipulate the economy that this idea should be considered more a 
plausible hypothesis than an accepted explanation (see, for example, Lessmann 1987).  
 Ideological explanations of budgeting are disarmingly simple but still empirically 
effective. These explanations are based on the assumptions that governments of the right  
 
1See, for example, Guess 1983, Premchand and Burkhead 1984 , Caiden 1985, Young 1999. 
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will spend comparatively less and have smaller deficits while governments of the left will 
have higher budgets and larger deficits. In the United States, the relationship is 
reasonably clear. Mayer (1999) noted that party is not a perfect proxy for activism, but 
Democrats historically are more inclined to favor expansive government. At the national 
level, Democratic presidents request higher budgets and Democratic congresses 
appropriate more than republican counterparts (Auten, Bozeman, and Klein 1984, 
Kiewiet and McCubbins 1985, 1991). Democratic presidents, do, however, make deeper 
cuts in defense budgets (Ostrom 1978). Peterson (1985) found that for a 40-year period, 
Congress increased budgets beyond the proposals of Republican presidents but decreased 
them from Democratic proposals. Heclo (1984) showed that, even as President Reagan 
proposed massive increases in defense spending, the Democratic Congress routinely 
appropriated more than the President requested. The same relationship holds true in many 
states. (See, for example, MacManus 1995 on Florida, Kleine 1995 regarding Michigan, 
Luce 1995 on Minnesota, and Alt and Lowry 2000 for 33 non-southern states.)   The 
partisan division of power in the competing branches of government may also affect 
budgeting outcomes. Executive party support in the legislature makes it more likely that 
the executive can act to reduce the government's deficit. Executive budgeting power, in 
this view, is strengthened by legislative party support. This relationship has been 
documented in a wide range of countries (Roubini and Sachs 1989, Schick 1993). 
Similarly, legislative party support is an important variable in the success of governors 
(Sigelman and Dometrius 1988, Gross 1991).  
 Institutional models are the most common type of budgetary theories, and the 
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most important to this dissertation. While institutional models focus on several different 
aspects of government structure or process, all suggest that specific institutional 
arrangements can affect the budget outcome. The arrangements of power within the 
executive branch are important to the resulting budget. State executive power often is 
shared by the governor with several other elected officials and sometimes with appointed 
officials who are outside the governor’s immediate control. Evidence is mixed as to 
whether this arrangement affects policies or budget outcomes (Sharkansky 1968, Dye 
1969, Patterson 1983, Gross 1991). Executive control over a budget office also may be an 
important element in budget outcomes. Efforts have been made at the national and state 
levels as well as in other countries to improve the chief executive’s budgeting powers by 
strengthening his control over those who formulate the proposed budget. While scholars 
have provided a review of these efforts and their desired effects (see, for example, Schick 
1971, 2000, Greenstein 1978, Moe 1982, and Weber and Brace 1999), few have 
examined whether there is any actual effect on budget outcomes. Other scholars question 
the impact of executive power in budgeting outcomes (Dye 1969, Salanick and Pfeffer 
1977). 
 Legislative institutions also affect budget results. Decentralizing  the legislature, 
usually by creating specialized committees and subcommittees for budget review, 
reduces the likelihood the chief executive's budget will be adopted. Committees serve as 
veto points for change and thus thwart executive programs unless there is a crisis or an 
all-out “blitz” by the executive (Shepsle and Weingast 1984).  Legislative fiscal staff also 
plays a role in enhancing the budget powers of the legislative branch and thus 
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diminishing the powers of the executive (Balutis and Butler 1975, Guhde and Mustafa 
1981). Gross (1991), however, suggested that it is inappropriate to view institutions in 
isolation. Incremental, bargaining, and comparative theories of budgeting address the 
process of creating budgets. Economic, ideological, and institutional approaches explain 
outcomes of budgeting. All six approaches offer theoretical concepts that are essential to 
the proposed dissertation. 
The Literature of Executive Budget Success
The scholarly literature on budgeting emphasizes process and desired outcomes to 
a much greater degree than it does actual outcomes. Of the studies that attempt to 
measure and explain budget outcome, only a small subset compare the executive’s 
desired outcome and the actual budget that results from the process.  Of these, many 
address executive budget success only as a sidelight to larger or related issues. 
 Aaron Wildavsky and Richard Fenno, the originators of the incremental theory of 
budgeting, were among the first to track budgets from their conception to adoption. 
Neither set out to consciously compare the executive budget recommendation to the 
legislative appropriation, but both shed light on the outcome for the executive and 
established important methodological precedents for studying change over the budget 
process. Each used the total budgets of federal agencies or bureaus as the unit of analysis 
and compared budget outcomes over multiple years.  
Wildavsky and his colleagues (Davis, Dempster, and Wildavsky 1966) viewed 16 
years of budgetary data for 56 agencies and bureaus. They measured budget outcome as 
the annual budget for the agency, both in total and as a percentage change from the 
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previous year. They found that the President most often proposes, and Congress 
approves, budgets that are a predictable percentage above the previous appropriation for 
the agency. The President and Congress both act incrementally, according to their 
findings, and the President’s proposal is an important factor in determining congressional 
decisions. Because these researchers’ goal was to document the incremental nature of the 
process, they offered neither a detailed assessment nor an explicit explanation for the 
President’s success in achieving his budgetary goals. They did find that changes in the 
presidency or in the partisan makeup of Congress increase the deviation between the two 
branches’ budget preferences and make for less success for the executive.  
Fenno (1966) was more interested in describing changes in budgets as they were 
developed by Congress than in comparing the result to the President’s recommendation.  
Indeed, like Wildavsky, he provided no direct comparison between presidential 
recommendations and congressional appropriations. He did note, however, that, in the 
same time period and agencies studied by Wildavsky, the House Appropriations 
Committee approved budgets that were within five percent of the President’s 
recommendation over two-thirds of the time. The committee was more likely to deviate 
from the President’s recommendation in times of changing party control in either branch, 
in programs that had high levels of public support, and in wartime. Both of these studies 
were important because they were among the first to study budgets quantitatively and to 
explain rigorously the results of the various parts of the budget process. Yet, neither 
attempted nor achieved a comprehensive look at budgeting outcomes from the point of 
the view of the chief executive. 
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Fenno’s and Wildavsky’s work inspired a number of quantitative studies of 
budgeting. Ira Sharkansky, for example, extended the analysis to state governments and 
agencies. In a study of four to five years of agency budgets in Georgia and Wisconsin, he 
found high levels of agreement between the governor’s budget and the legislature’s 
appropriations, which he described as “normal budget procedures” (Sharkansky and 
Turnbull 1969, 644). He found that governors are more successful in the budget arena 
when they have intense policy preferences, are assisted by a strong budget office, face an 
institutionally and politically weak legislature, have budget preferences that are not too 
far from those of the legislature, and are willing to reduce agency budget requests. 
Sharkansky (1968) later extended his study to budget totals and increments for every 
agency in 19 states in a single fiscal year.  He found executive budgeting success (the 
correlation between the governor’s recommendation and the legislature’s decision) to be 
higher in states where the governor has high tenure powers and in relatively higher 
spending states, but lower where there are many independently elected executives.  
Anton’s (1966) study of budgeting in Illinois also explained executive budget success in 
terms of the governor’s institutional powers, including control over the central budget 
staff and responsibility to reduce the budget in the event of a shortfall. Wildavsky’s 1975 
study of budgeting outcomes across states determined that governors are more influential 
in the process when there is a surplus, giving them the policy initiative, and when they 
limit spending growth. 
Many studies of budgeting in the 1980s confirmed that executives are largely 
successful in achieving budget goals but most failed to explain why. In studying 58 
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agency budgets in a single year in West Virginia, Hedge (1983) determined that 
executive recommendations and legislative appropriations for an agency are closely 
related, a conclusion confirmed for two later years in the same state by Berry (1986). 
Berry noted that the success of the governor could be explained either by some unnamed 
factors specific to the budget under study or by an incremental process that forces the 
governor and legislature toward the same budget level for an agency. Gosling (1985) 
came to a similar result in evaluating 538 specific budget “decision items.” Of the 179 
decision items offered by the budget office, representing the governor, 73 percent were 
included in the eventual budget. Rosenthal (1990) agreed after reviewing several studies 
of state budgeting that executive success likely resulted from similar priorities among the 
two branches of government. 
Lauth (1984) found in a study of all agency budgets in a seven-year period in 
Georgia that the governor’s recommendation was a powerful predictor of the legislature’s 
appropriation, even for agencies headed by a separately elected official. Thompson and 
Felts (1992) reached the same conclusion when they extended Lauth’s analysis to 16 
states. None of these studies, however, attempted to determine why and in what 
circumstances executive proposals were successful.  
The relatively few scholarly efforts to explain why governors are successful in 
achieving their budgetary goals have yielded important results. Moncrief and Thompson 
(1980) used Sharkansky’s state data to determine that legislatures are considerably more 
likely to follow governors’ budget recommendations when both branches represent the 
same political party. Thompson confirmed that result when he updated the study to 1979-
20
80 budgets. He also found that executive budget success had declined since the 1960s; 
more legislatures were willing to depart from the governor’s recommendations. He 
attributed the decline to more aggressive budget requests from agencies that grew in 
professionalism as a result of federal grants and requirements, as well as to increased 
professionalism and capabilities of the legislature. Revenue sources matter as well; 
governors are more successful in achieving budgetary goals for agencies with federal or 
earmarked state funding rather than a general fund dependency (Thompson 1987).  
Clarke (1998) measured disagreement between the executive and legislative 
agency budgets in 22 states for a ten-year period. Like Thompson, he found that divided 
government reduces executive budget success. Split party control of the two houses, 
however, has no impact. Governors are further more likely to meet with success when 
they have strong formal powers and  when revenues are increasing; they also are more 
successful with large agencies than small ones.  They are less successful when budget 
conflict was high in the previous year and when there is a large ideological difference 
between political parties. Clarke also found statistically significant differences in 
budgeting success for over one-third of the states in the study, suggesting that cultural, 
institutional and personal factors outside the range of his study play a large part in the 
budget outcome. 
Studies of presidential budget success have been even rarer. Kiewiet and 
McCubbins’ (1985) study of total federal budgets from 1948-79 found that Congress and 
the President accommodate each others’ budget priorities.  They also found that the 
President was most successful in achieving budget goals in the first year. They further 
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found that presidential success is greatest in the first year in office.2 Shull and Shaw 
(1999) studied presidential budget success in the context of other struggles between the 
executive and legislative branches. They compared the President’s proposal and 
Congress’ appropriation for the total federal budget, finding the President to be more 
successful in achieving his budget goals since the 1974 budget reforms. Popular approval 
and high government spending levels also contribute to presidential budget success. This 
study was surprising for all the factors that did not affect success. The President did no 
better or worse with Congress in any particular part of the term, with variations in size of 
the Office of Management and Budget or congressional staff, with party support in 
Congress, or with changes in economic conditions. Finally, LeLoup and colleagues 
(1998) examined budget outcomes for all federal agencies in a single budget in the 
Clinton administration. They found the President to be fairly successful, even with both 
houses of Congress controlled by the opposing party. 
Table 2 summarizes the results of previous studies on budget success. From this 
review, it is clear that the study of budgeting could benefit from more attention to 
outcomes, particularly from the point of  view of the chief  executive.  Previous studies 
have given us a great deal of information about how budgets move from agency requests 
to legislative appropriations and the circumstances that help shape agency budget results. 
Table 2.—Previous Studies of Executive Budget Success 
Authors Setting Factors Making Executive More 
Successful 
Anton (1966) Total budgets, Illinois, 
1951-64 
Ability to reduce budget after 
adoption, control over strong 
2 Kiewiet and McCubbins’ later study (1991) found that Congress considers the President’s proposal but 
that the President does not anticipate congressional changes when developing the proposal. 
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executive budget office 
Davis, 
Dempster and 
Wildavsky 
(1966) 
 
Selected agencies of the 
United States, all budgets, 
1947-63 
 
Continuity in partisan control of 
branches 
Fenno (1966) 
 
Selected agencies of the 
United States, all budgets, 
1947-75 
 
Continuity in partisan control of 
branches, agencies without public 
support, peacetime 
Sharkansky 
(1968) 
 
All agencies in 19 states, for 
a single budget for each 
state, 1963-68 
 
Tenure power of governor, few 
elected executives, high total 
expenditures 
Wildavsky 
(1975) 
 
Meta-analysis of previous 
studies 
 
Tenure power of governor, veto 
power, few elected officials, 
partisan support in legislature, 
proposing small budget increases 
Moncrief and 
Thompson 
(1980) 
 
Selected agencies in 11 
states for two budgets, 
1966-74 
 
Party support in legislature 
Kiewiet and 
McCubbins 
(1985) 
 
Selected agencies of United 
States, 1948-79 
 
Party support in legislature, first 
year of administration 
Thompson 
(1987) 
 
All agencies in 18 states for 
a single budget, 1978-80 
 
Agency dependence on earmarked 
funds, less professional legislature 
Clarke (1998) 
 
Selected agencies in 20 
states for 10 budgets, 1985-
94 
 
Higher formal power, party control 
of one or two houses in the 
legislature, large agency 
Shull and 
Shaw (1999) 
 
Total United States budget, 
1949-95 
 
1974 budget reforms, popular 
approval, high total expenditures 
They also have identified several important political and institutional factors  that  affect 
budget outcomes.   None of these studies, however, has 1) examined the role of all of 
these factors at once, 2) in a setting that provides substantial variation across its subjects 
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but holds constant the effects of time, 3)  comprehensively measured the differences 
between executive preferences and legislative decisions, 4) used more than one way of 
measuring budget outcomes, or 5) measured budget outcomes at the more detailed and 
politically salient level of major issues instead of agency or government spending totals. 
This study attempts to do so. 
An Overview of the Dissertation
This dissertation studies a single budget approval process in all 50 states in order 
to better understand the extent to which budgets adopted by the legislature incorporate 
the recommendations of the chief executive and to explain variations in budget decisions. 
The research question for this dissertation is:   What factors explain governors’ success in 
achieving their budgetary goals? Governors face many of the same obstacles as all chief 
executives in democratic states–fear of strong executive power, legislatures with multiple  
veto points, and economic and political limitations. The states show a wide range of 
institutional arrangements of the executive and legislative branches, distribution of 
political power among parties, economic conditions, and personal traits and choices of 
executives. The results of the study can improve our understanding of the politics and 
institutions of budgeting in the states. Because executive budgeting is also the prevalent 
model in many national and local governments, the results may have applications in those 
political arenas as well. 
 This study extends the previous work on executive budget success in three 
important ways. First, it studies budget deliberations during the same period in 50 
jurisdictions. Studies described earlier have examined only budget totals or a subset of 
24
agencies, either for the American national government over a period of years or for 
selected states and state agencies.  Second, it uses multiple methods to measure and 
explain budget outcomes. Prior research on budget outcomes has focused on numerical 
comparisons between the executive’s desires and the legislature’s decisions; each study 
has compared only one measurement of the budget, usually budget totals or agency 
budgets. This dissertation incorporates two different ways of measuring budgets and 
conducts statistical analyses on both. It supplements these results with a survey of 
participants and observers in the budget processes. Third, this study measures the 
difference between executive proposals and legislative decisions not just for the total 
state budget or for the total budget of selected agencies, but for specific budget issues that 
formed the centerpiece of each governor’s budget program. This innovation provides a 
way to evaluate budgeting the way that participants, media and the general public do so, 
by identifying the governor’s preferred policies and comparing them to the adopted 
policies.  
 Chapter 2 of the dissertation describes the three methods of measuring executive 
budget success, including the value and limitations of the new issue method of measuring 
budget success. It describes and defines the explanatory variables. It also summarizes the 
expected relationships between those explanatory variables and the degree to which 
executives meet their budget goals. It concludes with a research plan that describes the 
different analyses applied to the question of executive budget success. 
 Chapter 3 summarizes the findings of a survey of participants in the state budget 
processes. Respondents, who represented both the executive and legislative branches, 
25
were asked to identify the governor’s major budget proposals, to assess the degree to 
which the legislature agreed to those proposals, to rate the governor’s overall budget 
success, and to identify factors that were important in explaining budget outcomes. 
 Chapter 4 describes the results of quantitative analyses of executive budget 
success. Two different measures of executive budget success are used to determine which 
governors were most and least successful. Differences among these two groups are one 
way of identifying factors that affect budget success.  Another way of doing so, also 
described in Chapter 4, is to compare bivariate relationships between budget success and 
each explanatory variable.  Finally, this chapter describes a series of regression analyses 
that create two models of executive budget success. 
 Chapter 5 concludes the dissertation with a comparison and summary of results of 
the different research methods. It further discusses limitations and potential applications 
of the results and suggests additional research in the field. 
Conclusion
Within the separated systems of powers that define American democratic 
government, the executive and legislative branches of government constantly compete for 
supremacy in influencing government policies. While the first three quarters of the 
Twentieth Century were characterized by dramatic growth in the power of the executive 
branch, the last quarter saw a reaction from the legislatures that made inter-branch 
struggles for power more balanced. Budget outcomes provide an excellent forum in 
which to measure and explain the results of these struggles, both because budgeting is 
essential to the exercise of power and to the development of policy and because the 
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changes in inter-branch budgeting power over the last one hundred years have paralleled 
the broader relationships between the legislature and the executive.  
The scholarly study of government budgeting has been extensive and has 
generated a number of useful theories of budgeting. While the research has emphasized 
budget process and structure at the expense of budget results, several important studies 
have helped explain why executives succeed in achieving their budgetary goals. This 
dissertation seeks to expand upon those studies by studying one year’s budget process for 
all 50 states, by using multiple methods of measuring and explaining budget outcomes, 
and by looking not just at government and agency budget totals but at specific budget 
proposals and issues.  The political and scholarly communities can expect to gain greater 
insight into the nature of budgeting, the impact of inter- and intra-branch relations, how 
economic conditions and personal qualities affect budget outcomes, and the factors that 
contribute to successful budget outcomes for the chief executive. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
SETTING, METHODS, AND EXPECTATIONS  
 
Studying executive budget success in the states in a single budget process offers 
great promise for learning more about budgeting in states and in general. States have 
tremendous similarity in their structures and political settings, yet substantial differences 
within the basic shared framework. All have separate but interdependent legislative, 
executive, and judicial branches and each branch has the same function within the 
government of each state. Yet, each state has apportioned the power of government 
differently among the branches. Each state participates in and is dominated by the world 
and national economies, but each has a different economic base and faces different 
economic fortunes. Each state is dominated by the two major political parties, but they 
range from strong Democratic to strong Republican states, with many so divided that the 
parties must share control of the major institutions and some so open that third parties 
send governors or legislators to the capitol. All states have a similar mix of services and 
public expectations about those services. Governors and legislators, nonetheless, have 
wide latitude in proposing and adopting a mix of services that best meets their own 
perception of the appropriate size and role of government. Finally, and most importantly 
for the study of budgeting, each uses the framework of the national government in which 
the executive proposes a budget and the legislature considers that budget and other 
factors in appropriating funds. Still, the importance of the executive budget and the 
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relative strength of the two branches in the fiscal environment vary greatly. States thus 
exhibit variation across many dimensions within a broadly shared system of government 
and budgeting.  Thanks to this constricted variation, a study of budgeting is more likely 
to identify the institutional, economic, political, and personal factors that determine 
whether executives achieve budgetary success in the states than in virtually any other 
setting. 
There are drawbacks to studying executive budgeting success in a single state 
budget process as well. First, there are only 50 observations, restricting the number of 
variables that can be considered and the descriptive power of statistical results. Second, 
even one budget cycle takes two years to complete. This study observes the budget 
process in calendar year 2001 for 46 of the states, but four other state budget processes 
from 2002 must be included to cover the nation.3 Political and economic circumstances 
can change considerably in a year; there is no doubt that they did after terrorist attacks 
killed over 3,000 Americans in three states on September 11, 2001. Third, a single budget 
is at least to some extent unique. Political issues, economic circumstances, and the skill 
of elected officials never existed in exactly the same arrangement before 2001 and they 
never will again. While there are enough similarities in budgeting from year to year that 
results from this study may be generalized, that cannot be done without caution and 
restraint. Nonetheless, any other method of studying budgeting outcomes—longitudinal 
 
3 Kentucky, Virginia, and Wyoming adopt biennial budgets in even-numbered years only. New Jersey 
adopted an annual budget in 2001, but that budget is excluded in favor of the 2002 version. Governor 
Christine Todd Whitman resigned early in 2001. Under New Jersey’s Constitution, the President of the 
Senate assumes the role of interim governor in addition to his legislative duties. Such an arrangement 
makes it impossible to distinguish the preferences and powers of the executive and legislative branch, 
which is essential to this study. 
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or case study--has offsetting disadvantages. Further, studies of those types have been 
completed in the past. These weaknesses of the design of this study are at least partially 
offset by what its strengths can add to our knowledge of executive budgeting. 
The remainder of this chapter describes the setting of the budget process under 
study, the unique use of multiple and new methods to measure governors’ budget 
success, the variables used to explain that success, the expected relationships between 
those variables and the outcome of the budget process, and the plan of research. 
 
2001 Budgets in Context
States’ budgeting decisions in 2001 were clouded by economic conditions. The 
United States economy officially entered a recession in March 2001 (Conant 2003). The 
official announcement of the slowdown came after governors had proposed budgets, but 
before most legislatures had adopted them. Many states, of course, were well aware of 
the sagging economy before the national government reported it. Ten experienced growth 
in unemployment from 1999 to 2000 (U.S. Department of Labor 2005). Three saw real 
per capital disposable income fall in the same time period (U.S. Department of 
Commerce 2005). Thanks to interstate variations in economic bases and directions, as 
well as to differences in revenue and expenditure patterns resulting from the economy, 
there was a tremendous difference in state fiscal fortunes in this budget process. While 12 
states had revenues fall in the second quarter of calendar year 2001, 13 others were able 
to add to their reserves in the fiscal year that ended that quarter (National Conference of 
State Legislatures 2001b). Generally, states in the West, Northeast and Middle Atlantic 
regions showed strong revenue growth while the rest of the nation experienced stagnation 
30
or revenue loss (Eckl 2001).   As they entered the budget process for the fiscal period that 
began in July 2001, only half the states projected lower revenue in the coming year than 
the current one. Eighteen states, on the other hand, reported that the legislature would 
seriously consider cutting taxes during the session and fifteen states actually did so 
(National Conference of State Legislatures 2001a, National Association of State Budget 
Officers 2001).  
Program needs and conditions were just as important as revenues to 2001 
budgetary outcomes. Common issues facing many states included costs of election 
reform in the wake of the disputed presidential election of the previous fall, demands for 
more public school funding, and increasing Medicaid costs. “We're sort of seeing 
Medicaid become the Pac-Man of state budgets, gobbling up every additional dollar that 
comes into the state budgets,'' according to National Governor’s Association health 
lobbyist Matt Salo (quoted in Eckelbecker 2001). 
The four states whose 2002 budgets are the focus of this study faced these same 
issues and a few more, notably post-September 11 security concerns (National 
Conference of State Legislatures 2001a, 2002). The terrorist attacks and other economic 
problems made the revenue outlook in those states worse as well. Nationwide, real state 
budget increases in fiscal year 2003 (beginning July 1, 2002) were just 0.6 percent, down 
from 0.9 percent the previous year (National Association of State Budget Officers 
2002b). On balance, then, governors faced relatively tough times, but the impact of the 
economic downturn varied, as did the institutional and political circumstances facing the 
states.  
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Along with economic constraints and difficult political issues, the 2001 budget 
process was marked by unusually high turnover within the governor’s office. This began 
when George W. Bush (R-Texas) assumed the presidency. Before or in the early stages of 
legislative sessions, he appointed Governors Tommy Thompson (R-Wisconsin) and 
Christine Todd Whitman (R-New Jersey) to cabinet posts. Late in the Massachusetts 
budget process, Bush named Republican Paul Cellucci to an ambassadorship. Bush and 
Thompson both left early in the process and were succeeded by lieutenant governors who 
represented the same political party, shared many common goals, and had some time to 
shape their own budget priorities. Cellucci was succeeded late in the process by a 
lieutenant governor who ran on a ticket with him and supported nearly all of his original 
budget proposals. These budget processes are included in the study because 
circumstances suggest the outcome would not have differed much had the governors not 
moved on. As noted, the New Jersey case required studying the next budget year instead. 
The 2001 budget was interesting and contentious due to economic changes, thorny policy 
issues, and turnover in the governor’s mansions. This study measures how well governors 
did in this difficult setting. 
 
Measuring Executive Budgeting Success
This study uses three new methods of measuring executive budget success, which 
is the extent to which appropriated budgets incorporated the governors’ budget proposals. 
No other study of budgeting outcomes has used any of these methods individually and 
none has used more than one method to study budget outcomes. The methods are labeled 
throughout this study as the survey, agency, and issues methods. 
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The Survey Method
One method used in this study to evaluate both executive budget success and the 
reasons behind it is a survey of elected and appointed state budget participants. Surveys 
of budget participants have a long history in the scholarly literature, particularly at the 
state level. Many of the surveys have focused just on the executive budget office. 
Thurmaier and Willoughby (2001) placed budget offices on a continuum from a policy 
orientation to a control orientation based on budget office responses to questions about 
how important the governor’s agenda is to the budget review and development process. 
Their research extended the work of Gosling (1987) and Thurmaier and Gosling (1997), 
who studied budget office orientations in just three states.  Jordan and Hackbart (1999) 
used a survey to determine the extent and impacts of performance budgeting in the states. 
While the executive branch has had the most attention, legislative survey results have 
added to the understanding of the budget process as well. Chadha, et al. (2001) surveyed 
legislative fiscal offices; they found that the eight state legislatures with two fiscal offices 
had more staff and more functions than the predominant joint legislative fiscal office 
model. Bernick and Bernick (2001) surveyed North Carolina legislators on the 
effectiveness of the governor’s various formal powers, with special emphasis on the 
recently added veto power. Budgeting surveys have also been conducted at the federal 
level, most successfully when Berman (1978) traced the increasing politicization of the 
Office of Management and Budget.  
Most of the survey research has studied budget and related attitudes and 
processes. Surveys on budget outcomes are rare and none have asked the questions posed 
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by this study. Gosling (1985) asked Wisconsin budget office staff to assess the origin, 
constituency, level of controversy, and result of 538 items with financial or policy 
implications in the 1977-79 budget process. Abney and Lauth (1998) asked executive and 
legislative budget staff and former governors about the roles and preferences of 
governors and legislatures in the budget process. They found that legislatures tended to 
support higher spending levels while governors fought to limit budget increases.  The 
survey in this study goes beyond prior survery research by asking budget participants 
directly how well the governor did in achieving budgetary goals and what factors affected 
that achievement. 
The survey for this study was administered in the fall of 2001; respondents were 
asked to comment upon the budget process that took place in the 2001 legislative session. 
Surveys were mailed to the governor’s chief of staff, executive budget director, 
legislative appropriations chair(s), and legislative fiscal office(s) in all 50 states. 
Appendix A includes the four survey instruments. A separate survey was sent to each of 
the four groups, but each began with the same four basic questions. The first asked 
respondents to identify the governor’s four budget priorities in the 2001 session and to 
assess the governor’s success in each of the priority areas. The second question asked for 
an assessment of the governor’s overall success in accomplishing his budget objectives. 
The third listed 12 factors commonly believed to affect budget outcomes and asked 
budget process participants to evaluate the importance of each to the governor’s budget 
success or failure. Fourth and finally, each participant was asked to name any other 
factors that were important in to the outcome of the 2001 budget process.  
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Surveys included supplemental questions for each group except appropriations 
chairs. In addition to the basic survey questions, chiefs of staff were asked to describe the 
relationship between the governor’s office and the executive budget office and to give 
their opinions as to whether the budget office should be more accountable to the 
governor. The survey for legislative fiscal officers added questions about the distribution 
of legislative power and the process for budgeting. The survey for budget directors was 
the most detailed. Like chiefs of staffs, budget officers were asked to describe the 
relationship between the governor’s office and the budget office. They also were asked to 
evaluate the governor’s influence over various facets of budgeting. These supplemental 
questions were designed to inform the selection and measurement of certain explanatory 
variables used in analysis of the agency and issues methods. In all, 270 surveys were 
mailed. Appendix A includes the four survey instruments. 
 
The Agency Method
Like surveys, numerical analysis of agency budgets—last year’s approved 
amount, and this year’s agency request, executive proposal, and legislative 
appropriation—has been an important element of prior scholarly research on budget 
outcomes. The early studies of federal budgeting both studied a subset of agency budgets 
over long periods of time (Fenno 1966, Davis, Dempster, and Wildavsky 1966, 1974), as 
did later more direct studies of presidential budgeting success (Kiewiet and McCubbins 
1985, Shull and Shaw 1999). Agency budgets have been an important unit of analysis in 
most studies of state budgeting as well, ranging from Sharkansky (1968) to Thompson 
and Felts (1992).  
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Although agency budgets have been the focus of most outcome-oriented studies 
of budgeting, this study’s method differs from all previous studies in three ways. First, 
this analysis is limited to a single budget process. Previous studies have either examined 
agencies across jurisdictions or over time or both. Second, this study changes the research 
question and unit of analysis. Previous studies asked how much and why individual 
agency budgets changed during the budget process. This study asks, considering all major 
agency budgets, to what extent did the governor achieve budgetary goals and why. The 
unit of analysis thus changes from agency budgets to governor’s budget proposals. Third, 
this study is unique in its selection of agencies. Most prior studies of federal agency 
budgets used the same agencies, based on availability of data for agencies that maintained 
the same organizational form throughout the study period. Most prior studies of state 
agency budgets looked at all agencies in selected states or a subset of agencies in a single 
state. The agency method in this study evaluates budgetary activity for the ten largest 
agencies by dollar amount in each state. There is considerable consistency among states 
in the types of agencies this covers, including aid to public schools, one or more social 
service agencies, one or more units of higher education, the corrections system, the 
workforce development and employment agency, and transportation. Many states’ largest 
agencies also include one or more administrative units, aid to local governments, and the 
environmental agency.  
There are important reasons to study just ten large agencies rather than all 
agencies. First, the most agency budgets—from the House of Representatives through the  
Soil and Water Conservation Commission, to the Secretary of State—are rarely the 
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subject of meaningful policy debate. Second, balanced budget requirements and 
restrictions on revenue forecasting make many state budgets zero-sum games. The more 
agency budgets that are included in an analysis in this situation, the more likely the 
governor’s budget success averages out to the same result for every state. 
The measure of agency success creates an overall measure of the governor’s 
budget success by averaging budget success for each of the ten largest agencies, using the 
calculations shown in Table 3.4 The examples in Table 3 show four major characteristics 
of this measure.  First, the comparison is between the governor’s initial budget proposal, 
which is normally a comprehensive document delivered before or early in the legislative 
session, and the legislature’s appropriations at the beginning of the fiscal year.  For most 
states, the legislative session ends before the fiscal year begins. In these instances, the 
appropriation figures used in this study are those in place at the adjournment of the 
legislative session. In some states, the legislature continues to meet through the beginning 
of the fiscal year. Of this group, some complete the appropriations process before the 
fiscal year begins. In that case, the appropriation figures in this study are those in place 
the first day of the fiscal year. In those instances where the legislature has not completed 
appropriations until the fiscal year is underway, the study uses appropriations figures that 
are accepted by the governor, legislature, and media as the end of the budget negotiation 
and development process. This point is easily determined by indicators such as the 
governor’s signing of appropriation bills, executive and legislative budget offices 
 
4 Whenever possible, agency and total budgets in this calculation are for all funds and sources of revenue. 
For several states, however, these figures were not readily available at all stages of the budget. In these 
instances, either general fund or all state fund budgets are analyzed. The difference should not have any 
effect on the consistency of the agency success measure across states. 
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creating budget summary documents, and the end of media coverage of budget 
deliberations. 
 
Table 3.--Calculation of Governor’s Agency Success 
Step of calculation 
 
Example 1:  
Illinois 
Department of 
Higher 
Education 
Example 2:  
Georgia 
Department of 
Revenue 
Example 3:  
Oklahoma 
Health Care 
Authority 
1. Previous year’s budget 
 (in $000s) 3,003,314 273,319 362,805
2.  Budget proposed by 
 governor (in $000s) 3,186,008 365,502 387,342
3.  Increase proposed  
 by governor (2-1,  
 in $000s) 
182,694 92,183 24,519
4. Amount appropriated 
 by legislature (in 
 $000s) 
3,224,271 363,558 418,679
5.  Increase     
 appropriated 
 by legislature 
220,958 90,239 55,874
6. Absolute value of 
 difference between   
 governor increase and 
 legislature increase 
 (absolute value of  
 5-3, in $000s,    
 maximum of 100  
 percent) 
38,264 1,944 31,355
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7. If legislature 
 appropriates more 
 than governor 
 proposes, weight the 
 difference by one- 
 third (.33 x 6)  
12,754 1,944 10,441
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Table 3.—Continued
Step of calculation 
Example 1:  
Illinois 
Department of 
Higher 
Education 
Example 2:  
Georgia 
Department of 
Revenue 
Example 3:  
Oklahoma 
Health Care 
Authority 
8. Absolute value of 
 difference as a 
 percentage of  
 governor increase  
 (7/3 x 100, in percent) 
7.0 2.1 42.6
9. Percentage difference 
 subtracted from 100 
 so that a larger       
 number equals  
 greater success 
 for the governor  
 (100-8, in percent) 
93.0 97.9 57.4
The decision to compare executive proposals to initial legislative appropriations 
leaves out much of what normally is considered a “budget cycle,” such as supplemental 
appropriations, budget transfers, rescissions required by revenue shortages, and under- or 
over-spending of appropriations during the fiscal year. The study, thus, makes no effort to 
compare the governor’s budget proposal with the actual revenue and spending figures for 
the end of the fiscal year. There are important theoretical reasons for this decision. The 
purpose of the study is to determine budget success, not administrative success. The “epic 
battles” described by Kiewiet and McCubbins (1985) are about budget deliberation, not 
budget execution. Governors, legislators, agencies, the media, and the interested public 
all compare the governor’s budget position to the position embodied in legislative 
appropriations; they consider the battle to be over when the appropriation bills are signed. 
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All would grant that what happens afterward is important, but few would think of it as a 
reflection of the governor’s policy positions. 
Most events that require supplemental appropriations and other budget changes 
are outside the governor’s control and many have little policy content. They often are 
driven by changes in caseloads, prison populations, and school enrollments. They often 
respond to unanticipated increases or decreases in revenue. As time passes and 
circumstances change, the comparison between the governor’s initial proposal and the 
current level of revenue and spending have less to do with the governor’s policy agenda 
and more to do with chance. This helps explain why virtually all previous studies of 
budget outcomes use legislative appropriations as the end of the process. (See, for 
example, Dempster, Davis and Wildavsky, 1966, Sharkansky 1968, Moncrief and 
Thompson 1980, Kiewiet and McCubbins 1985, Jones, True and Baumgartner 1997, 
Clarke 1998, LeLoup, Long and Giordano 1998, and Shull and Shaw 1999). One 
weakness to this approach is that circumstances may change enough during the year that 
the governor was unsuccessful in achieving agency budget goals during the year, even 
though the legislative appropriation for the agency was close to the governor’s original 
proposal. 
The second important characteristic of the agency method calculations is that the 
governor’s success falls when the absolute value of the difference between the governor’s 
and legislature’s budget rises. A legislative increase or decrease from the governor’s 
proposal is an indication of disagreement and the measure of the governor’s success 
should reflect that disagreement (Clarke 1998).  
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A third major feature of the agency measure is that the difference between the two 
branches’ budgets is not allowed to exceed 100 percent. This suggests that there is some 
limit beyond which the governor fares no worse in not achieving his budgetary goal for 
the agency. If, for example, the governor seeks a 10 percent increase in the budget for 
higher education, the measure treats a 30 percent decrease by the legislature as no more 
detrimental to the governor’s goals than a 20 percent decrease. This element of the 
calculation also results in a more normally distributed variable, which promotes the 
reliability of statistical analysis.   
Fourth, the governor is considered more successful if the legislature appropriates 
more than proposed than if it appropriates less than proposed. When the legislature 
appropriates more to an agency than the governor proposes, the difference is weighted 
one-third (in step 7). When the legislature appropriates less than the governor proposes, 
the difference is weighted fully. The logic of this decision is illustrated by the 
Pennsylvania legislature’s decision to appropriate $30 million for Governor Tom Ridge’s 
school voucher program. Ridge, who proposed $15 million for this new program, was 
considerably happier with having twice the funding for it than he had it not been funded 
at all. The lower weighting assigned to higher legislative appropriations follows Shull 
and Shaw’s study of presidential budgeting outcomes (1999). They point out that an 
executive who is not satisfied with this type of over-expenditure is free to veto it. This is 
even more true at the state level, where the veto power is greater and allows governors to 
veto and sometimes change individual objects of appropriation. Except for Shull and 
Shaw’s, no previous studies have included this decision to weight budget differences 
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asymmetrically. The major reason is that the other studies have examined budget 
outcomes for agencies who had to live with legislative appropriations, not for executives 
who could lower the appropriations. Later analyses can employ sensitivity analysis to 
determine if the asymmetric weighting affects the outcome of models that seek to explain 
the budget outcomes.  
The result of the calculation is an index of executive budget success for each 
agency, which runs from 0 to 100.  Table 4 shows how differences in the success score 
compare to actual differences between the governor’s proposal and legislature’s 
appropriation. Once this index is calculated for each of the ten agency totals, these totals 
are averaged to create a single success index from 0 to 100. Once calculated in this 
manner, the measure of agency success is the independent variable in ordinary least 
squares (OLS) regression and other statistical analyses of its relationship with the 
explanatory variables described below. 
Table 4.—How Budget Differences are Reflected in the Success Index 
Legislative Appropriation as a Percentage of 
Governor’s Proposal Success Score 
Less than 0 (legislature changes budget in 
 opposite direction of governor)     0 
0 (legislature does not change budget when 
 governor proposed increase or decrease)     0 
25 25
50 50
75 75
100 (legislature adopts budget identical to 
 governor’s proposal) 100 
150 83
200 67
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400 or more (legislative change is 3 or more 
 times  larger than governor’s proposed change     0 
The Issue Method
Unlike the survey method and agency methods, the issue method is unique to this 
study. Governors are at least as concerned about specific programs, particularly new 
ones, as they are the total size of government and the general allocation of that budget 
among agencies (Schick 1971). The same is true of legislators, agencies, the media, 
interest groups and the public. Most are much less concerned about the growth in the 
budget of an education department than they are about the amount in it for raising teacher 
pay. Governors and others rate the governor’s effectiveness by ability to achieve policy 
outcomes. No prior study has undertaken this kind of evaluation; the issue method makes 
it possible to do so for the first time. Further, budget participants and observers are 
concerned with more than just expenditures. This is the first study of budget outcomes to 
look at both revenue and expenditure issues. While the issue method is subject to much 
criticism regarding construction and reliability, it makes it possible to ask new and more 
important questions about executive budget success and to start identifying answers to 
those questions. 
The measure of issue success is created by: 1) identifying budget issues advocated 
by the governor, 2) determining the governor’s budget issues, 3) creating an index of the 
governor’s success on each of four major issues, and 4) averaging together indices for the 
four major issues to create a single measure of budget success. 
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The first step, identifying the governor’s budget issues, is the most difficult. An 
analysis of relevant budget documents generated by the governor, the legislature, and the 
news media identifies the governor’s four major issues. First, all issues—changes in the 
funding level of a service or changes in a revenue item--advocated by the governor are 
identified from these sources. From this list, several types of issues are removed from 
further consideration.  These include issues with no impact on the current budget (new 
programs where costs are put off into future budgets), those with an effect in the current 
budget of less than $50,000, those where the governor’s position is simply to continue 
current programs at current levels (including full funding of programs that took effect 
part way through the previous budget), and those that move programs or funds between 
departments with no significant overall budget change. Proposals to not do something—
for example, no tax increases or no employee pay raises—are not considered issues 
unless the opposite position is already in current law (for example, a tax increase to take 
effect in the coming budget that was approved by the prior legislative session) or receives 
substantial support in the legislature (e.g., the house budget committee approves a five 
percent raise for state employees where the governor had not proposed one). Capital 
projects that are specific to a facility or location within the state are omitted, because 
legislators’ interest in local projects results in a different policy dynamic than in debates 
about public programs. Projects and programs the governor proposes to finance through 
bonds or other indebtedness also are left off the list of issues, because legal and political 
constraints for debt financing are different from those for current financing.  
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The result of these omissions is to identify a universe of the governor’s budget 
proposals that measurably change current program and/or funding levels, have statewide 
effects, and are financed from current revenues. Several concerns can be raised about this 
measure just from this first step. For example, including capital project proposals or only 
including more expensive proposals could change the issues that are considered. Omitting 
“no new taxes” and other status quo policy positions all together would similarly reduce 
the governor’s issues and possibly change the degree of success on issues as well. 
In the second step, documents are reviewed to determine the four issues that 
receive the most attention during the budget process. These are not necessarily the 
governor’s four highest priorities, which are rarely identified as such, but the four issues 
that receive the most attention in budget deliberations. Governors’ documents used in 
determining issue importance include state of the state addresses, budget addresses, 
written budget summaries and supporting detail, press releases, executive budget office 
analyses and presentations, and columns or letters written to newspapers by the governor 
or top executive staff. Legislative documents include legislative staff analyses of the 
executive budget, staff comparisons between executive and legislative budget actions, 
and minutes of budget committee meetings. Newspaper articles about budget issues from 
three newspapers in the state also are included in the analysis. Where more than three 
newspapers in a state are available, the newspaper published in the capital is reviewed 
along with two others that are published in large cities in different regions of the state. 
Once newspapers are selected, archives are searched from approximately two months 
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prior to the legislative session until a month following the session, using the governor’s 
name and the word “budget” as search terms.  
Each budget issue supported by the governor receives a weighted score for every 
time it is mentioned in one of the documents. Table 33, Appendix B, describes the 
weighting system. The weighting helps ensure that the issues are important to the 
governor by putting more weight on executive documents than on legislative documents 
or media reports. It helps ensure that the issue is important to the governor’s agenda 
rather than an afterthought or a reaction to another agenda by putting more weight on 
document mentions earlier in the budget process. Weighted scores range from five points 
for an issue mentioned by the governor in the state of the state address to one point for a 
newspaper article mentioning the governor’s support after the budget process has ended. 
After all documents are reviewed, the four highest scoring budget issues are selected for 
scoring.  
As with the first step, the issue weighting step is subject to criticism. Weighting 
documents differently might result in the governor’s top four issues being different. 
These issues, in turn, could have different levels of success than those that are selected by 
the weighting system used in this study. The different issues with different success would 
change the governor’s overall issue success score and possibly the models that explain 
governors’ success. This concern can be addressed in later studies that examine different 
years and levels of government through sensitivity analysis. Further, other issue 
identification and selection methods, such as including issues mentioned in the state of 
the state address or the issues with the largest dollar amounts, should be explored. 
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Because this study is the first to develop and use an issue-based analysis of budget 
outcomes, the literature provides no guidance on making decisions about what issues to 
study. The selection and weighting system employed in this study emphasizes issues that 
are important both to the government and to the larger political community of the state. 
As such, it is more in keeping with the goal of the study to evaluate success as much like 
budget participants and observers would evaluate it as possible. 
The third and fourth steps in determining the issue score are identical for those in 
the agency method.  The third step is to create an index of success for each of the four 
highest scoring budget issues, as described in Table 3.  As with the agency method, when 
the legislature appropriates more money for an issue than the governor proposed, the 
difference is weighted one-third. Like the agency method, this asymmetric weighting can 
be criticized and should be subjected to sensitivity analysis in later applications of this 
method. Like the agency method, however, the asymmetric weighting reflects political 
reality. A governor who is unhappy with a larger legislative appropriation can cut it, 
while a governor unhappy when the legislature appropriates less than proposed cannot 
increase the appropriation. The fourth step is to average those four indices into a single 
index of the governor’s issue success. As with the agency method, this score is then 
compared with the explanatory variables through OLS regression and other techniques. 
 
.Explanatory Variables and Expectations
This section describes the variables used to explain differences in governors’ 
budget success. It indicates why each variable is expected to be important, its expected 
impact on budget success, and its measurement. The section is organized around four 
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types of variables. These are discussed in order from those that are the most stable and 
out of the governor’s control to those that are unique to the governor or the budget year. 
Institutional variables—those that measure the legal and customary arrangements for 
distribution of power—are discussed first. These are followed by economic variables, 
political variables (such as electoral and legislative support for the governor) and 
personal variables (the governor’s circumstances and budgeting choices). The discussion 
of each variable includes a hypothesized relationship with budget success. This chapter 
concludes with a summary of the hypotheses and a research plan by which they are 
tested. 
 
Institutional Variables
The study incorporates seven institutional variables that should be important in 
explaining executive budget success. Three of the seven are variables within the 
executive branch—the governor’s formal powers, fiscal powers, and control over the 
executive budget office. Three are within the legislature—legislative professionalism, 
term limits, and veto points within the legislative budget process. The last is whether 
budgets are adopted annually or biennially. 
The formal power of the executive has long been thought important to 
governmental outcomes, including budgets. It is expected that a more formally powerful 
governor will have more budget success (Hypothesis 1), because legislators would risk 
more in challenging a more powerful executive (Punnett 1994). Some formal powers, 
such as potential for longer tenure and high appointment powers, have proven important 
in explaining governors’ budget success in earlier studies (Sharkansky 1968). Formal 
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powers are not universally considered helpful, however. Blair (1983) argued that 
appointment powers pose as much risk for a governor as they do reward. Wiggins (1980) 
found no relationship between governors’ veto powers and their actual vetoes, but others 
argued the threat of a veto is more powerful than the act itself (Rosenthal 1990, Joyce 
1998). The survey of budget participants asks about the importance of formal power to 
budget outcomes.  For the agency and issue methods, the formal power variable is an 
adaptation from the National Governors Association index (Beyle 2005a). See Appendix 
B, Table 34 for the calculation of the formal power variable. That index considers tenure 
potential, appointment power, veto power, and budget powers. While the original index 
included line-item veto power, this is considered part of a separate index of fiscal powers 
for the purposes of the study of executive budgeting success.  
Governors’ fiscal powers have grown immensely in the last one hundred years. 
They should be particularly important in explaining outcomes related to budgeting. The 
survey asks budget participants to rank fiscal powers as a factor in explaining the 
governor’s budget success. The agency and issue methods include as an independent 
variable an index of the financial powers of the governor. See Appendix B, Table 35, for 
construction of the fiscal power variable. The index is a composite of several items that 
the literature suggests can affect the balance of power between branches of government. 
The governor’s fiscal power is ranked higher if there are strict balanced budget 
requirements (Briffault 1996), if there are few limits on revenue forecasting (Hansen 
1983) or if the governor establishes the binding revenue forecast (Lauth 1991), if 
relatively little of the budget is constitutionally or statutorily earmarked (Anton 1966, 
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Beyle 1983a), if agency budget requests are kept from  the legislature (Rosenthal 1990, 
Jernberg 1991, Rubin 2000, Schick 2000), if the governor’s appropriation bill is the one 
introduced in the legislature (Jernberg 1991, Baldez and Carey 1999, ), and if the 
governor has extensive power to reduce the budget during the year (Anton 1966, Briffault 
1996),. The governor’s fiscal power   also is higher the greater the line-item veto power--
the highest power allows the governor to change numbers and language, while the lowest 
restricts him to crossing out numbers (Briffault 1996, Schick 2000). It is expected that a 
governor with strong fiscal powers will be more successful in budgeting (Hypothesis 2).  
Chapter 1 notes the importance that politicians at the state and national levels 
have placed on the executive budget office as a tool of executive budget success. The 
executive budget office, it is thought, more closely follows the governor’s program when 
it is organizationally closer to that office, as it will promote communication and 
understanding of the governor’s program and centralize budgetary decision-making 
(Lauth 1991). In addition to strengthening the governor’s hand in budgeting, such a move 
helps the governor get independent advice and develop policy options and provides him 
with more oversight in policy implementation and trouble-shooting programs that 
become problems (Cox 1991, Beyle 1983b). Governor’s powers in this regard are 
strongest when the central budget office is immediately within the governor’s control and 
the governor appoints the agency head (Abney and Lauth 1989). Even local governments 
have recently strengthened executive budgeting. Increasing mayoral control over the 
budget office was a key ingredient in Los Angeles’ mayor-strengthening charter reform 
of 2000 (Lynch 2001).  
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Control over a strong budget office, however, is not a panacea. Greenstein (1978) 
found no evidence that a more deferential Office of Management and Budget has led to 
presidential budget success. Shull and Shaw’s 1999 study of presidential conflict 
determined that the size of the Executive Office of the President, which includes OMB, 
helped explain the President’s legislative support, but not his budget success.  
Rubin (2000) suggests that budget actors constantly try to change the process to 
make it favorable to their own goals. Efforts to give the chief executive more control over 
the budget office, are efforts to strengthen the executive’s budget power and thus overall 
power. The survey of budget participants asks them to separately evaluate both the 
governor’s control over the executive budget office and the strength of that office as 
factors in budget outcomes. The agency and issue methods  incorporate a budget office 
variable that measures both the governor’s control over the executive budget office and 
the strength of the office. See Appendix B, Table 36, for construction of the budget office 
variable. The measure considers the breadth of budget agency functions, the number of 
budget analysts in relation to the total budget, whether the budget office is in the 
governor’s office or elsewhere within the organization structure, and the degree of the 
governor’s hiring and dismissal powers over budget office staff. It is expected that more 
control over a strong budget office will increase the governor’s budget success 
(Hypothesis 3).  
Institutions within the legislature also are important to the executive’s budgetary 
powers and success. Legislative professionalism often is credited with restoring the 
balance between the two branches (Guhde and Mustafa 1981, Rosenthal 1990, Rubin 
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2000). Many legislatures have grown more professional in the past five decades, as 
evidenced by longer tenure among members, higher legislative budgets, larger support 
staffs, longer sessions, higher pay and benefits and improved facilities. The trend toward 
professionalism may be reversing in the wake of term limits and similar tools of the 
“antipolitics era” (Clarke 1998, Brace and Ward 1999), but there remains great variation 
among states. A more professional legislature will have more time, staff, and incentive to 
examine the governor’s budget and develop and support alternatives. Accordingly, it is 
expected that higher legislative professionalism will result in less budget success for the 
governor (Hypothesis 4). Survey participants were asked to evaluate one aspect of 
professionalism—the legislative fiscal office—as a factor in budget outcomes. The 
measure of legislative professionalism for the agency and issue methods is member 
salary, in constant dollars from the Council of State Governments (2001)5. Squire (1997) 
indicated this measure was closely correlated with all other measures of professionalism 
found in the literature. 
 Legislative term limits help enhance gubernatorial power by reducing the 
experience of and support for legislative leaders (National Conference of State 
Legislatures 1999, Hershey 2001). It is expected that the presence of legislative term 
limits will increase executive budget success (Hypothesis 5). The study incorporates two 
separate term limit measures for use in alternate models to gain better understanding of 
how term limits affect outcomes. Both variables are dichotomous, one indicating that 
legislative terms are limited by constitution or statute and some members have reached 
 
5 In states where the legislative salary is per day in session, 2001 session length is calculated and multiplied 
by the per diem rate. Legislative expense reimbursements are not counted in this calculation. 
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the limits and the other indicating that limits are adopted but have not yet resulted in a 
member losing a position. Moncrief, Niemi and Powell (2004) found that term limits, 
even if not yet effective, increase legislative turnover. Data are from Peery 2000. 
 The governor’s budget success may be affected by the process by which the 
legislature adopts a budget, because the absence of veto points shifts power toward the 
executive (Shepsle and Weingast 1989, Seligman and Covington 1996, Young 1999). 
Creation of a new legislative fiscal staff, for example, can help the legislature’s incursion 
into traditional executive grounds (Guhde and Mustafa 1981). There is, however, 
evidence that legislative decentralization can help the executive by dispersing power 
across the competing branch (Thurber 1996a). In the survey, budget participants rated the 
importance of the legislature’s budget process in general to the governor’s success. The 
variable in the agency and issues methods is a count of the number of legislative staffs, 
committees, and floors through which a budget must pass (Grooters and Eckl 1998). The 
value ranges from 3 for Nebraska (one legislative fiscal staff, finance committee and 
house to pass the budget) to 22 for Minnesota (four fiscal staffs, sixteen budget 
committees, and two house floors).  It is expected that more veto points in the legislature 
will result in less budget success for the governor (Hypothesis 6). 
Some observers believe that a biennial budget increases the power of the 
executive by reducing legislative oversight and by making legislative budget decisions 
more cautious (Fisher 1997, Winters 1999). Thirty of the states adopt budgets annually, 
while the other twenty adopt them biennially (National Association of State Budget 
Officers 2002a). The impact on executive budget success is examined in the survey 
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method by comparing participants’ evaluation of success in annual and biennial states. It 
is tested in the agency and issue methods through use of a dummy variable. It is expected 
that governors will be more successful in biennial budgeting states (Hypothesis 7). 
 
Economic Variables
The economic environment often is a key factor in budget debates and  outcomes. 
The economy and its direction influence revenue availability and choices. They also 
influence decisions as to comparative funding level of programs. In the survey method, 
participants are asked to assess generally the impact of the state economy on the 
governor’s budget success. This assessment helps place the importance of economic 
factors in comparison to institutional, political and personal explanations of budget 
success.    The agency and issue success portions of the study incorporate two variables 
to test the impact of economic conditions on the success of the governor’s budget. These 
are the level of economic growth and the level of state spending. 
The first economic variable measures the impact of economic growth on budget 
outcomes. The literature in regard to economic growth and executive budget success is 
mixed. Schick (1988), Clynch and Lauth (1991b), and Kleine (1995) found executives to 
be more successful when budgets are tight, in part because legislators are usually happy 
to let the governor make hard decisions about increasing taxes or cutting services. Other 
scholars suggested that executives’ budget goals are favored when the economy is strong 
(Hartmark 1975, Wildavsky 1975, Clynch and Lauth 1991b, Wallin 1995, MacManus 
1995. Clynch and Lauth attribute this to executive budgeting powers–the governor 
captures the initiative by being the first to suggest how to spend new money. Dometrius 
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(1991) suggested that the relationship between economy and gubernatorial budget 
success may be curvilinear. Both slack resources and tight times give the governor the 
opportunity to wield influence; whether the governor is able to do so depends on political 
factors. Dometrius’ conception is the one hypothesized for this study. For the agency and 
issue methods, the measure of economic growth incorporates changes in unemployment 
and in income. Each state’s  annual change in real disposable personal income per capita 
is calculated from data from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (U.S. Department of 
Commerce 2005) for the calendar year prior to the budget decisions. Each state’s change 
in unemployment rate for the year prior to the budget deliberations is calculated from 
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics data (U.S. Department of Labor 2005). Both are 
converted to standardized scores and the two results added. The resulting measure of 
economic growth results in highly negative outcomes for states with slow economic 
growth and rising unemployment. States with higher economic growth and falling 
unemployment have highly positive scores. It is expected that the governor will be most 
successful in budgeting when the economy is much weaker or stronger than average 
(Hypothesis 8). Both the economic growth variable and its square are used as independent 
variables in order to determine if the relationship with budget success is curvilinear as 
hypothesized. 
The second economic variable is the size of the budget. At the federal level, 
Schick (2000) noted that budget growth has constrained both the executive and legislative 
branches. This could increase executive budget success by narrowing options for both 
President and Congress to the point there is little to disagree on. Shull and Shaw’s 1999 
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study of presidential budget success found that budget size does favor the President’s 
budgetary goals. At the state level, Sharkansky’s (1968) study of budget outcomes in 19 
states, Schick’s (1971) review of state budgeting, and Clarke’s (1998) study of agency 
budgets in 20 states all found that high expenditure levels produce more agreement 
between the governor and legislature. It is expected that the governor will have greater 
budget success when expenditures are higher (Hypothesis 9). In the agency and issue 
methods, the independent variable for budget size is the 2002 general fund spending 
(from National Association of State Budget Officers 2003) per capita. Higher spending 
per capita, regardless of state, suggests that the budget is reaching more constrained 
levels. 
 
Political Variables
Since budgeting is politics, political variables will have an important impact on 
the governor’s budget success. This study incorporates seven political variables. They are 
partisan support in the legislature, specific partisan arrangements of the government, 
changes in partisan control, popular support of the governor, interest group involvement, 
the time in the term of the governor, and efforts to influence upcoming elections through 
the budget process. 
Legislative party support has been a consistently important variable in explaining 
governmental results at the national level (Kiewiet and McCubbins 1985, Weaver and 
Rockman 1993, Punnett 1994, Rieselbach 1996, Schick 2000). While divided 
government is not a barrier to executive success with the legislature (Davidson 1996, 
57
Shull and Shaw 1999) it influences outcomes in several ways. In state government, the 
governor normally wields more influence when his party controls the legislature 
(Rosenthal 1990). Revenue and appropriations are among the policy issues in which party 
voting is most prevalent in the states (Patterson 1983). Divided government helps explain 
veto overrides (Wiggins 1980) and the speed with which budget levels change when the 
chief executive’s party changes (Alt and Lowry 2000). Clarke (1998) found that divided 
government leads to greater budget conflict between the governor and legislature and less 
success for the governor. It is expected that  partisan legislative support will result in 
more favorable budget outcomes for the governor (Hypothesis 10).  
This study measures the effect of legislative party support for the governor in 
several ways. The survey asks budget participants to evaluate the importance of party 
support in the legislature to the governor’s budget outcome. Survey results also are 
analyzed to determine if participants rated governors more successful in states where the 
governor’s party also controlled the legislature. The agency and issue methods include 
two measures of partisan support. The first is a pair of dummy variables for a divided 
government (both houses of the legislature held by a party other than the governor’s) and 
for a split legislature (one house held by each party). The second measure of partisan 
support is the proportion of each house held by the governor’s party. This variable, which 
is used in a different model from the first, is based on research suggesting that the 
proportion of partisan support may be nearly as important as the control of the legislature 
(Luce 1995, Davidson 1996). A narrow party margin may even result in a coalition 
government that leaves some of the party majority within an ideological minority 
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(Grizzle 1991), while a large party margin can be enough to override a veto (Luce 1995).  
A second political  variable measures interactive effects between a republican 
governor and democratic legislature. There is overwhelming evidence that Democratic 
officials support larger budgets than Republicans (Patterson 1983, Kiewiet and 
McCubbins 1985, Luce 1995, Kleine 1995,). Because legislatures often reduce 
expenditures below the governor’s recommendations (MacManus 1995), it is expected 
that Republican governors with Democratic legislatures will have more budget success 
than Democratic governors with Republican legislatures (Hypothesis 11). Due to the 
relatively small number of observations, this hypothesis is tested through bivariate 
relationships with budgetary success and analysis of residuals. The source for all 
legislative party support data is Council of State Governments 2001, 2002. 
Change in partisan control in either branch of government is the third political 
variable. Early studies of national budgeting outcomes found presidents to be less 
successful in achieving budget goals right after changes in party control of either the 
White House or Congress (Fenno 1966, Davis, Dempster and Wildavsky 1966). It is 
expected that governors will be less successful immediately following a partisan change 
in either branch of government (Hypothesis 12). Partisan change is measured by a 
dichotomous variable that is coded “1” if the budget is the first since an election changed 
the party in control of the governorship or either house of the legislature and “0” 
otherwise. The variable is examined in two ways.  First, survey respondents’ assessment 
of governors is compared for states that had partisan changes with all other states.  
Second, the residuals of the regressions of agency and issue success are analyzed to 
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determine if they differed in states with partisan change.  
 The fourth political variable is popular support for the governor. This can be 
measured either through election results or popularity polls. The concept of election 
mandate is ubiquitous in the popular press. Executives are supposed to get their policies 
adopted on the strength of a large electoral victory. The explanatory power of the 
mandate, though, is questioned more often than not in scholarly research. Jones (1994) 
attacks the concept most forcefully, demonstrating that major policy actions are as likely 
to be adopted when the message of an election is unclear as when a President receives an 
electoral mandate. State level results are similar. Gold (1995) noted that two of the most 
successful governors in the economic downturn of the 1990s, Massachusetts’ William 
Weld and Michigan’s John Engler, won election very narrowly. Hansen (1999) suggested 
election victories do not stand resonate for long; in a long-term study of California 
governors’ popularity, she found no relationship between election margin and popularity. 
The concept lives on, however, at both the national and state levels.  Some suggest the 
mandate creates a reserve of good will that legislatures respect, but no guarantee of 
programmatic victory (Sigelman and Dometrius 1988, Rosenthal 1990).   
Because of the persistence of the mandate as an explanatory concept, its value is 
tested again in this study.  In the survey method, budget participants were asked to assess 
both the importance of a governor’s popularity and an election mandate to his budget 
success. In the agency and issue methods, two models employ different measures of 
gubernatorial popularity. The first is the percentage of total votes received in the most 
recent election (from Council of State Governments 2001, 2002). The second is the 
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average of statewide approval polls for governors in the first six months of the calendar 
year, the time when budgets are debated (data from Beyle 2005b). It is expected that 
popularity, measured by election result or current approval levels, will result in more 
budget success for the governor (Hypothesis 13).
The fifth political variable is the structure of interest group involvement. Strong 
interest groups increase competition between the executive and legislature and thus 
reduce the power of the executive (Seligman and Covington 1996, Thurber 1996a, Rubin 
2000). It is therefore expected that a strong interest group environment will reduce 
executive budget success (Hypothesis 14). The interest group variable in the agency and 
issue methods is Thomas and Hrebenar’s (1999) assessment of the dominance of state 
interest groups in 1998. They rated the overall interest group landscape in states from 
“subordinate,” in which interest groups as a whole were much less powerful than parties 
and other major political participants, through “complementary,” in which interest groups 
must work together with parties and other participants, to “dominant,” in which groups 
have “overwhelming and consistent influence (p. 136). Because they rated many states as 
hybrids combining two systems, there are five possible values for this variable. It ranges 
from “1” for a subordinate interest group system to “5” for a dominant system. 
The sixth political variable is the time within the governor’s service. Much of the 
literature suggests executives will achieve their greatest policy victories in their first year 
(Jones 1994, Rubin 2000, Schick 2000). Kiewiet and McCubbins (1985) found 
presidential influence on the budget the greatest in the first year in office. Hansen (1999) 
found that governors’ popularity falls propitiously after the first year. On the other hand, 
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Shull and Shaw (1999) found the President no more likely to achieve his budget goals in 
his first year. Based on the preponderance of evidence, it is expected that governors will 
be more successful earlier in the term (Hypothesis 15). The study uses several alternative 
methods of measuring time in service in an effort to best understand the relationship. 
These alternatives are: 1) year in the governor’s tenure, 2) year in the current term, 3) 
square root of the year in term (as used by Hansen to demonstrate a drop in success that is 
steep at first and then gradual), and 4) a dichotomous variable for whether the budget is 
the first in the current term. 
The final political variable provides a test of economic explanations for 
budgeting. As noted, some scholars believe that governments spend more just before 
elections to increase their reelection chances. It would stand to reason, then, that if the 
legislature is of the same party as the executive it will support a (larger) executive budget, 
assuming that its adoption will increase their own chances of reelection as well as the 
governor’s. If, on the other hand, the legislature is controlled by the opposition, it is 
likely to fight harder to prevent executive budget success that might jeopardize their 
reelection. Hall (2002) found that in Georgia, opposition Republicans were much less 
likely to support Democratic Governor Zell Miller’s agenda in election years. If economic 
theories are correct, the governor’s budget will be more successful in the budget 
proposed just  before an election when the legislature is controlled by the governor’s 
party (Hypothesis 16). This variable is coded “1” in the budget just preceding an election 
when the legislature and executive are of the same party and “0” in non-election years or 
in cases of divided government or a split legislature. Because very few states in the study 
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have unified governments and are adopting the last pre-election budget, it is not 
appropriate to use this variable in OLS regression. Instead, it will be evaluated through 
bivariate relationships with budget success and through analysis of residuals of OLS 
regression on the more robust independent variables. 
 
Personal Variables
The exhaustive list of institutional, economic, and political variables that may 
affect budget success suggests that governors may have little impact on their own budget 
destiny. There is no doubt, though, that some personal factors contribute to budget 
outcomes. Five are tested in this study. They are political experience, limiting the budget 
agenda, maintaining agenda consistency, supporting popular issues, and proposing a 
conservative budget.  
Political experience may be helpful in achieving budgetary goals of the governor. 
Rosenthal (1990) suggests that prior service in the legislature or as governor will both 
improve the governor’s understanding of the office and build effective working 
relationships. Shull and Shaw (1999) suggest presidents improve in budgetary bargaining 
with time. It is expected that any experience in which one was responsible for preparing, 
proposing, or approving budgets would help a governor be more successful in achieving 
budgetary goals (Hypothesis 17). The measure of this independent variable in the agency 
and issue methods is the governor’s total years of service as a chief executive or 
legislator at the national, state, or local level plus years of service as a state agency head, 
whether elected or appointed. Data are from The Almanac of American Politics (Barone 
and Cohen 2000, 2002, 2004). 
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A limited agenda is thought to increase the governor’s chances of budget success. 
Schick (2000) suggested the President is successful in the budget process when he 
focuses on a small number of attainable issues. Rosenthal (1990) made the same 
observation for governors, cautioning that a longer agenda gives more bargaining power 
to legislatures. In the agency and issue methods, the concept of limited agenda is 
measured by determining the extent to which a governor concentrates on the top four 
budget issues, adjusted for the total number of issues in the budget process. The 
calculation of this index is shown in Appendix B, Table 37. It is expected that a limited 
agenda will result in increased budget success for the governor (Hypothesis 18).
Consistency also is important in executive budgeting. The governor must 
constantly deflect legislative diversions and call attention to the original budget agenda 
(Rosenthal 1990). Executives frequently use press releases, interviews with news media, 
and addresses to the legislature to remind legislators and the public of their priorities. It is 
expected that consistently supporting budget issues will result in greater budget success 
(Hypothesis 19). In the agency and issue methods, the consistency variable is the 
correlation between issue scores up to one month following the budget proposal with the 
issue scores for the remainder of the budget process.  
Sigelman and Covington lament that presidents have been reduced to “leadership 
by polling”, advancing only those issues that are popular (1996, 66).  No matter how 
lamentable, one should expect such behavior in a representative democracy. In the survey 
method, participants are asked to rate the importance of the popularity of the governor’s 
programs to budget success. In the agency and issue methods, the concept of issue 
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popularity is measured through the nature of the four top issues. A scale ranging from -4 
to +4 is developed by starting at zero, adding one point for each proposal that lowers 
taxes or advances teachers’ or business issues, and subtracting one point for each 
proposal that raises taxes or is opposed to teachers’ or business interests. The former is 
based on the well-known political dangers of increasing taxes (Wildavsky 1975, Hansen 
1999, Rubin 2000). The latter is based on the fact that teacher and business groups are the 
strongest lobbying groups in all state capitals (Thomas and Hrebenar 1999). While far 
from the perfect measure of issue popularity with the voters, favor with strong interest 
groups should increase legislative popularity. It is expected that proposing popular 
budget issues will result in greater budget success (Hypothesis 20). 
The final personal variable is the conservatism of the budget proposal. Wildavsky 
(1975) suggested that governors must propose modest budget increases to have any 
success with the legislature. Fenno (1966) noted that Congress gave more support to 
presidents who proposed small budget increases. Shull and Shaw (1999) suggested 
Congress expects the President to reduce budgets and will avoid doing so themselves 
unless the President fails.   The measure of conservatism in the agency and issue methods 
is the governor’s proposed percentage increase over the previous budget. It is expected 
that a governor proposing a smaller budget increase will be more successful (Hypothesis 
21).  
 
Research Plan
Table 5 summarizes the independent variables and hypotheses of the study. The 
table and this section also describe how each hypothesis is tested in the remainder of the 
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study.  
The survey method identifies important relationships in two ways.  First, 
participants were asked to evaluate the importance of twelve factors that are often 
thought to affect budget outcomes. Hypotheses that are tested this way are labeled “Q” in 
the “Survey” column of  Table 5.   Second, respondents’ evaluation of budget success can  
be compared across states with the values of dependent variables. If, for example, survey 
participants rated governors more successful in states with legislative term limits than in 
states without term limits, it suggests term limits may contribute to executive budget 
success. Hypotheses tested in this way are labeled with a “C” in the “Survey” column of 
Table 5.  
The agency and issue methods are analyzed in several ways in Chapter 4. First, 
the values of independent variables are compared for the most and least successful 
governors. Second, bivariate relationships between each independent variable and the two 
measures of success are evaluated. All of the hypotheses listed in Table 5 are tested in 
these two ways. 
The last three ways to study relationships between budget success and the 
independent variables employ ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. First, all variables 
of a given type (institutional, economic, political, personal) serve as variables in four 
separate OLS regression analyses. These four analyses are refined to identify the “best 
model” for the variable type,  which is the one employing only variables that help explain 
budget success. If a variable is included in the best of type model and shows a 
relationship in the expected direction, there is some support for the hypothesis. Second, 
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these most important variables of each type become independent variables in combined 
models of agency and issue success. These models are refined to create a best overall 
model of each success measure. Inclusion in these models adds further support for the 
relevant hypothesis. Hypotheses that are tested in this manner are labeled “O” in the 
“Agency” and “Issue” columns of Table 5. 
 
Table 5.—Summary of Variables, Relationships, and Testing 
Method 
Hypothesis and Variable 
Expected 
Relation-
ship* Survey# Agency# Issue# 
Institutional
1. Governor’s formal  
 power + Q O O
2. Governor’s fiscal 
 power + Q O O
3. Executive budget 
 office power 
 and control 
+ Q O O
4. Legislative  
 professionalism - Q O O
5.   Legislative term 
 limits + C O O
6. Legislative veto points - Q O O 
7. Biennial budget + C O O 
Economic 
8. Economic growth ** Q O O 
9. Size of budget +  O O 
Political
10.   Legislative party  
 support + Q O, M O, M 
11. Republican governor 
 with Democratic + C R R
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legislature 
12.   Partisan change - C R R
13.   Governor popularity + Q, M O, M O, M 
14.   Interest group strength - O O
Table 5.—Continued
Method 
Hypothesis and Variable 
Expected 
Relation-
ship* Survey# Agency** Issue** 
Personal
15.   Year in service - C O,M O,M 
16.   Upcoming election with
unified government + C R R
17.   Political experience + O O
18.   Limited agenda + O O
19.   Consistency + O O
20. Popular issues + Q O O 
21. Conservative budget +  O O 
* + budget success is expected to increase as variable increases 
- budget success is expected to decrease as variable increases 
**  budget success is expected to increase as variable departs from the mean 
# Q variable is addressed by a survey question 
C survey ratings of governor success are cross-tabulated with this variable  
M multiple variables are used to measure the concept 
** O variable is used as an independent variable in OLS regression     
R variable is tested by analyzing residuals of OLS regression 
M multiple variables are used to measure the concept  
Some hypotheses cannot be tested through OLS regression because only a few 
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states exhibit the characteristic of interest. In the third method of testing hypotheses 
through regression, residuals from the best political model are compared for states that 
have the characteristic to residuals from states that do not. The political model is the 
appropriate tool in this case because all of the variables of interest are political. If the 
residuals are markedly different for states with the characteristic than for those without, 
the hypothesis receives some support. Hypotheses tested in this way are labeled “R” in 
the “Agency” and “Issue” columns of Table 5. 
Table 5 and the foregoing discussion indicate that the study employs multiple 
methods for testing the hypotheses and that all extend the analysis of budgeting outcomes 
to date.  Because the methods employed are new, it is all the more important to employ as 
many as possible to seek “triangulation” of results. Chapter 5 concludes the study by 
comparing results of all of these methods. Each hypothesis is restated and evaluated 
based on how much supporting evidence is offered by the results. Variables can then be 
arrayed from those that most clearly affect executive budget success to those that had no 
explanatory value. 
 
Conclusion
This study offers an opportunity to better understand how executives achieve their 
budgetary goals and why. It does so by asking different questions, offering different 
methods, and suggesting new explanations. The new questions are about how and why 
governors are successful in achieving budgetary goals, not how or why agency or total 
budgets change. The new methods evaluate the governor’s overall success, not success on 
individual agency budgets.  This is the first study of a single budget process across the 
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fifty states and it incorporates a broader range of institutional, economic, political and 
personal explanatory variables than any previous study. This leads to new answers about 
the factors that make governors, on the whole, more or less successful in getting their 
policies adopted through the budget process. These answers are thus about fundamental 
questions of politics and government. They are, like any work of research, subject to 
question and reevaluation, particularly because they are based on new and innovative 
questions and methods. They are not the answers to these important questions, merely the 
first steps toward an answer. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
A SURVEY OF BUDGET PARTICIPANTS 
 
This chapter describes the results of the 2001 survey of elected and appointed 
state budget participants. The survey assessed what governors accomplished in the budget 
process, as compared to their objectives. It also sought insights into factors budget 
participants believed were important in determining whether a governor met with budget 
success. 
 
The Survey
The survey was administered in the fall of 2001 and asked respondents to address 
the budget adopted earlier that year. Surveys were mailed to 270 individuals. Sixty-nine 
of the 270 survey recipients (26 percent) responded. The response rates were 22 percent 
for governors’ chiefs of staff, 44 percent for budget directors, 18 percent for 
appropriations chairs, and 32 percent for legislative fiscal officers. See Appendix C, 
Table 39, for detailed statistics on surveys mailed and returned. The small response can 
be attributed to the reluctance of some appointed executive budget officers to declare 
winners and losers in the budget process, to some offices’ policy not to respond to 
surveys due to their volume, and to a reduced likelihood legislators would respond after 
returning home at the end of the session. 
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The response rate suggests that results of the survey should be considered as 
supplemental to other parts of this study, rather than definitive in themselves.  Low 
participation limits the ability to make inferences. Further, it is possible that there is a 
bias due to non-response; those who did not return the survey may have different 
opinions than respondents. Responses appear to be representative, however, since they 
cover 39 states that are well distributed by size and by location and since return rates are 
similar between the two branches of government See Table 40, Appendix C, for a report 
of surveys returned by both office and state. 
 
Rating Governors’ Budget Success
Most participants viewed governors as successful in the budget process. The 
survey asked respondents to assess how successful the governor was in accomplishing 
budget objectives on a five-point scale from “not very successful” to “very successful.”  
Table 6 indicates that just 16 percent rated governors as either not very successful or 
somewhat unsuccessful. Fully three-fourths of respondents rated governors as successful. 
Forty percent said governors were somewhat successful in meeting their budgetary goals, 
while 36 percent said governors were very successful. 
The party of the governor did not appear to make any difference in the governor’s 
budget outcomes, as shown in Table 7. For this and the remaining analyses of  governor’s 
budget success,  neutral responses were omitted  and rates  of success combined into a 
dichotomous variable. This allowed for clearer delineation of patterns. Democrats were 
rated slightly more successful than Republican governors.   
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Both independent governors, Minnesota’s Jesse Ventura and Maine’s Angus 
King, Jr. were judged to be very successful. In part, this may be because both faced 
legislatures where partisan control was split. One respondent identified this as 
“tripartisan” government and suggested that the lack of a unified legislative program 
helped the governor get his budget proposals approved.  
 
Table 6.—Overall Rating of Governor’s Budget Success 
Rating of Governor’s 
Success N Percent 
Not very successful   5      8 
Somewhat unsuccessful   5      8 
Neutral   6      9 
Somewhat successful 27    40 
Very successful 24    36 
Total 67  100 
Note:  Two responses not rating overall governor success are omitted. 
Table 7.—Overall Rating of Governor’s Budget Success, by Party 
Rating of Governor’s Success 
Party of Governor 
Not Very 
Successful or 
Somewhat 
Unsuccessful 
(%) 
Very or Somewhat 
Successful 
(%) 
Democrat (N=27)   11    89 
Republican (N=31)   23    77 
Other (N=3)    0  100 
Total  10    51 
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Note: Excludes two missing and six “Neutral” responses. 
 
Neither the governor’s gender nor the method of achieving office affected ratings 
of budget success. Female governors were rated very of somewhat successful by 83 
percent of respondents and male governors by 84 percent. Budget participants said 84 
percent of governors who were elected in their own right were very or somewhat 
successful. In the five cases where governors succeeded to office, they were rated 80 
percent successful.  
Views on governor’s budget success depended on where one sat in the budget 
process. Table 8 indicates a very strong relationship between office held and views on 
budget success, with executive branch participants rating governors more successful than 
their legislative counterparts. Budget directors rated the governor’s success highest  (90 
percent very or somewhat successful), followed by governors’ chiefs of staff (80 
percent).  Most appropriations chairs thought the governor was very or somewhat 
successful (70 percent). Legislative fiscal officers were less positive, but like the other 
three offices, a majority (62 percent) rated the governor very or somewhat successful in 
accomplishing budgetary goals. The reader is cautioned however, that while these results 
may confirm expectations, there are no more than 21 respondents from each position 
group. A slight increase or decrease in the number of respondents could change these 
results substantially. 
 
Explaining Budget Success: Institutional Variables
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The survey results are mixed on the impact of institutional factors on the budget  
success of governors.  Table 9  indicates respondents rated  governors equally successful 
in states with legislative term limits as in states without limits.  Budget cycles, however, 
do appear to affect success. Table 10 compares budget success for governors in states 
with  annual budget  processes to  those with biennial budgets.   In  their study of  the link  
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Table 8.—Overall Rating of Governor’s Budget Success, by Position 
Rating of Governor’s Success 
Office Held 
Not Very 
Success-
ful 
(%) 
Somewhat 
Unsuccess
-ful 
(%) 
Neutral 
(%) 
Somewhat 
Successful 
(%) 
Very 
Successful 
(%) 
Chief of  
 staff 
 (N=11) 
 18    0    0 36 46 
Budget  
 director 
 (N=21) 
 10    0    0 33 57 
Appropria-  
 tions   
 chair 
(N=18) 
 6 18 6 41 29
Legislative   
 fiscal 
 officer  
 (N=17) 
 0 11 28 51 11
Total    8  8   9 40 36 
Note: Excludes two missing responses 
Table 9.—Overall Rating of Governor’s Budget Success, by   
 Presence of Legislative Term Limits 
Rating of Governor’s Success 
Term Limits 
Not Very 
Successful or 
Somewhat 
Unsuccessful 
(%) 
Very or Somewhat 
Successful 
(%) 
Yes (N=24)  17   83 
No (N=26) 16   84 
Total 17   83 
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Note: Excludes two missing responses and six “Neutral”   
 responses. 
 
between budgeting and policy in 11 states, Thurmaier and Willoughby  (2001) suggested 
governors were  more  successful in states with biennial budgets  because they  had  more 
time and latitude both to plan and to implement programs. The survey results confirm 
that suggestion; 25 of 26 (96 percent) respondents in biennial budget states rated the 
governor a budgetary success. The results for governors in annual budget states were less 
favorable, but 74 percent still were rated somewhat or very successful. 
 
Table 10.—Overall Rating of Governor’s Budget Success, by   
 Budget Cycle 
Rating of Governor’s Success 
Budget Cycle 
Not Very 
Successful or 
Somewhat 
Unsuccessful 
(%) 
Very or Somewhat 
Successful 
(%) 
Biennial (N=26)   4   96 
Annual (N=35) 26   74 
Total 17   83 
Note: Excludes two missing and six “Neutral” responses. 
Explaining Budget Success:  Political Variables
Political variables help explain the assessments of budgetary success, but only to 
a limited degree. Table 11 shows that, while all governors were generally successful in 
the budget process, those with partisan majorities in both houses (“unified government”) 
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were more successful than those where both houses were controlled by the opposite party 
(“divided government”). Governors whose parties were in control of only one house of 
the legislature (“split legislature”), however, were most successful of all. This probably is 
the result of the same party controlling two-thirds of the budget-making institutions.  
Partisan support in the legislature made a difference in outcomes for many governors, as 
suggested by much of the literature (Sharkansky 1968, Wiggins 1980, Moncrief and 
Thompson 1980, Gross 1991, Steger 2000, Thurmaier and Willoughby, 2001).  
 
Table 11.—Governor’s Overall Budget Success, by Partisan 
Status of Legislature 
Rating of Governor’s Success 
Partisan Status of 
Legislature 
Not Very 
Successful or 
Somewhat 
Unsuccessful 
(%) 
Very or 
Somewhat 
Successful 
(%) 
Unified government 
 (N=26)  15 85
Divided government 
 (N=17)  35 65
Split legislature 
 (N=14)  0 100
Total   17   83 
Note: Excludes two missing responses, 6 “Neutral” responses, 
three responses where governor is independent, and one 
response with an evenly divided house in the legislature. 
Table 12 indicates divided government was more of a stumbling block for 
republican governors than for democrats. Republican governors were nearly three times 
more likely to achieve their budgetary goals if their parties controlled the legislature than 
if democrats were the legislative majority. Democratic governors actually were more 
successful with divided government or a split legislature than with unified government. 
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This might be due to the increased likelihood of factions appearing in the governing party 
under unified government. 
 
Table 12.—Governor’s Overall Budget Success, by Party and Partisan Status of  
 Legislature  
Percent Somewhat or Very Successful 
Governor’s 
Party 
Unified 
Government 
(%) 
Divided 
Government 
(%) 
Split Legislature 
(%) 
Republican 
 (N=30) 92   33 100 
Democratic 
 (N=27) 77 100 100 
Note:  Excludes 6 “neutral” responses, 3 responses where governor is independent, 
and 1 response where one house of legislature is evenly divided. 
Table 13 adds evidence for a governor’s “honeymoon period” in the realm of 
budgeting. All governors in the first year of their current term were judged successful. 
Success rates declined for governors elected thereafter. This result is consistent with 
Steger’s (2000) study of American presidents from 1860 through 1998. He found that 
presidential agenda-setting and policy-initiating opportunities have always been greater 
in the first year of each term. Hall (2002) found that legislators, particularly those of the 
opposite party, supported Georgia Governor Zell Miller’s program more in the first year 
of his term than any others.  Among the studies cited in Table 2, Chapter 1, however, 
only Kiewiet and McCubbins (1985) found that executives were more likely to achieve 
budgetary goals in the first year of the term. The finding from this survey, combined with 
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results of the agency and issue methods described in Chapter 4, suggest that executives 
need to act early in the term to increase their chances of budget success. 
While the small number of cases requires the results be taken with caution, survey results 
provide no support for three additional political hypotheses. Indeed, results were the 
opposite of expectations.  Table 14 shows that Republican governors with Democratic 
legislatures had less success (33 percent very or somewhat successful) than all other 
combinations (92 percent). All governors in the first budget since a change in partisan 
control of the statehouse or legislature were successful, as opposed to 82 percent very or 
somewhat successful in situations of partisan continuity. Finally, governors with unified 
governments and an upcoming election were less successful (67 percent very or 
somewhat successful) than all others (84 percent). 
 
Table 13.—Governor’s Overall Budget Success, by Year in Term 
Rating of Governor’s Success 
Year in Term 
Not Very 
Successful or 
Somewhat 
Unsuccessful 
(%) 
Somewhat or Very 
Successful 
(%)  
First (N=15)                  0              100  
Second (N=3)                33                67  
Third (N=39)                23                77  
Total                18                82  
Note:  Excludes 2 missing responses, 6 “neutral” responses  
 and 4 cases in which governor succeeded to the office 
 without election. 
Explaining Budget Success:  Personal Variables
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The survey provided an opportunity to test for one variable that is within the governor’s 
control, which is choice of budget issues. The survey showed only limited support for the 
idea that a governor’s success depends, in part, on the issues she selects to champion. 
Besides assessing overall budget success, survey respondents also rated governors’ 
success on up to four major issues raised by the governor. The survey asked the budget 
participant to name these four issues and evaluate the governor’s budget outcome on a 
four-point  scale from  “Not very successful”  to “Very successful.”  No  neutral response  
 
Table 14.—Governor’s Overall Budget Success, by Selected 
 Political  Variables 
Rating of Governor’s Success 
Variable 
Not Very 
Successful or 
Somewhat 
Unsuccessful 
(%) 
Somewhat or 
Very Successful 
(%)  
Republican governor with 
 Democratic legislature  
Yes (N=9)             67            33  
No (N=52)               8            92  
Partisan change    
Yes (N=5)               0          100  
No (N=56)             18            82  
Upcoming election with 
 unified government 
 
Yes (N=3)             33            67  
No (N=58)             16            54  
Total             16            84  
Note:  Excludes two missing and six “Neutral” responses 
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was  needed  for individual issues. Issues raised by respondents are organized into nine 
major issue categories. Common education issues were the most prevalent; they 
accounted for 26 percent of total issues mentioned by respondents. Finance issues, which 
included employee pay raises and efforts to control expenditures, were the next most 
common issues. State administration issues, such as technology and information 
technology initiatives, were the least common.  
Asking respondents both to select the governor’s major issues and to rate success 
on each issue creates the possibility they will bias the results by selecting issues to make 
the governor look better or worse. Tables 42 and 43, Appendix C, test for the possibility 
of selection bias. Table 42, Appendix C, shows that, as with overall success, legislative 
branch participants tended to rate the governor less successful on individual issues than 
their executive counterparts. There is considerable variation among the different types of 
issues, however. The table also indicates that executive participants were more likely to 
raise economic development proposals and rated success on these issues much higher. 
Legislative respondents raised more infrastructure issues, but success ratings differed less 
on this issue type.  
Table 43, Appendix C, compares the survey responses on issues to the governors’ 
top four issues as determined through the issue method and as discussed in detail in 
Chapter 4. It is important to bear in mind that there are only 30-40 respondents in each of 
the two groups, suggesting the results may not support any broader inferences. The 
results show that legislative respondents were slightly more likely to raise issues that 
were also identified by the issue method. Thirty-two percent of legislative issues were 
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among the top four in the issue method, as opposed to 28 percent of executive issues. 
Legislative participants selected issues with slightly lower issue success scores (a mean 
score of 56, versus 59 for executive issues). Legislative success scores were somewhat 
more closely correlated with issue success scores (Pearson’s r=0.57) than were their 
executive counterparts (r=0.48). Taken together, the data suggest a slight tendency for 
executive participants to pick issues that were more favorable for the governor and to rate 
success higher than might be justified. The differences, however, are minor and do not 
change the interpretation of the survey data in any meaningful way. 
Table 15 summarizes frequencies and success rates for various issues, with 
success again compressed to a simple yes/no measure. On all 251 issues together, 
governors were successful 77 percent of the time. Success in major issue categories 
ranged from 92 percent for criminal justice issues to 65 percent for infrastructure issues,  
Table 15.—Governor’s Success on Major Initiatives, by Type of 
 Issue 
Rating of Governor’s Success 
Issue Area 
Not Very 
Successful or 
Somewhat 
Unsuccessful 
(%) 
Somewhat or 
Very Successful 
(%)  
Criminal justice 
 (N=12)  8 92
Economic  
 development 
 (N=23) 
 13 87
Common education 
 (N=64)  18 82
Social services 
 (N=29)  24 76
Higher education 
 (N=20)  25 75
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State administration 
 (N=8)  25 75
Finance (N=45)  27 73
Taxation (N=20)  30 70
Infrastructure 
 (N=26)  35 65
Total            23             77  
Note:  Excludes 3 responses for which the issue type could not be  
 determined.  
including transportation and growth management initiatives. Economic development and 
common education issues fared well. Finance issues and taxation proposals were among 
the less successful the governors offered, but still very successful. Note, however that the 
difference between issues are relatively small. From this survey, one cannot confidently 
conclude that governors’ choice of issues affected their budget success in the 2001 
budget process. As noted, previously, the score for economic development issues may be 
inflated by the tendency of executive respondents to identify these as important issues 
and to rate governors as successful. Conversely, infrastructure issue scores may be 
artificially lowered because more legislative participants identified these issues as 
important to the governor and rated the governor as less successful. Correcting for this 
bias would reduce the difference in success rates for issue types even more than shown in 
Table 15 and would support the conclusion that governor’s budget success was not 
closely tied to specific types of budget issues. 
 
Explaining Budget Success:  Participants’ Views
Budget participants also gave their opinions on why governors succeeded or 
failed in the budget process. This information is more important, both to practitioners and 
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to scholars, than level of success experienced by a few governors in just one budget 
process. Budget process participants evaluated 12 factors that commonly are thought to 
affect budget outcomes. Each was placed on a four point scale from being “Not important 
at all” to “Very important” in determining the governor’s success in accomplishing 
budget objectives. Table 16 organizes the responses into four major categories of 
analysis—institutional, economic, political and personal variables--described in Chapter 
2. In the survey itself, there was no such order or organization. The majority of 
participants rated all but one factor—an election mandate—as somewhat or very 
important to budget outcomes. Economic conditions were considered the most important, 
followed by personal factors.                
 
Institutional Factors
Six institutional factors that might affect budget results were addressed by the survey;  
four  of  these  are  in  the  executive  branch.  Survey  respondents  generally agreed that 
each was an important element in budget results, though none were among the most 
important.  
Survey participants rated the legislature’s budget process as the most important 
institutional factor to a governor’s budget success. Eighty-three percent rated it at least 
somewhat important. Participants noted that control over the budget agenda in the 
legislature affects budget results. In Mississippi, Democrat Ronnie Musgrove could only 
make recommendations for the budget; it is written by the legislature. In Maryland, at the 
other extreme, the legislature is not allowed to increase the budget or redirect funding, so 
it had to negotiate with Democratic Governor Parris Glendening. 
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Survey respondents believed that aspects of the executive budget office were less 
important to the governor’s budget success than the legislature’s budget process, but 
more important than either formal or fiscal powers. Budget offices and staffs have come 
“…to exercise significant influence in state policy making” (Gosling 1987, 63). The 
strength of the executive  budget office was the second most important institutional 
variable, with 77 percent rating it very or somewhat important. One chief of staff said 
“The budget office is a key resource to the governor. The governor requires the depth to 
ensure that the budget is a coordinated policy document.”  The amount of control the 
governor exerted over a budget office was considered only slightly less important—70 
percent rated it at least somewhat important. The movement toward governor control 
over budget offices has been once of the most important state reforms in the last three 
decades,  but is not complete  (Weber and Brace 1999, Thurmaier and Willoughby 2001). 
 
Table 16.—Factors Affecting Governor’s Success (Percent) 
Variable 
Not 
Important 
at All 
 
Not Very 
Important 
 
Somewhat 
Important 
 
Very 
Important 
Institutional Factors
Governor’s formal 
 power  6 27 44 24
Governor’s fiscal 
 power  6 35 25 34
Strength of budget 
 office  9 14 40 37
Control over budget 
 office  9 20 36 34
Strength of legislative 
 fiscal office(s)  6 28 34 31
Legislature’s budget 
 process  5 12 41 42
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Economic conditions 1 4 25 70
Political factors
Governor’s popularity   2 19 52 27 
Election mandate 19 41 28 13 
Party support in 
 legislature 13 16 22 49 
Personal factors
Clearly state and 
 advocate agenda  3 10 25 62 
Popularity of programs  1   3 41 55 
Because of the interest in control over the budget office in the literature and among 
practitioners, budget office respondents alone were asked to rate the governor’s influence 
over their office in several key activities of the budget office. Results, summarized in 
Appendix C, Table 41, suggest that governors are influential in budget development, but 
not in budget office operations.    
Governors’ formal and fiscal powers were considered less important to success by 
survey respondents, though the majority believe that powers make a difference. Sixty-
eight percent of survey respondents regarded formal powers as very or somewhat 
important to governors’ success. Budget participants rated fiscal powers slightly less 
important to a governor than formal powers. Fifty-nine percent rated these powers at least 
somewhat important to the governor’s budget success. More participants, however, 
viewed fiscal powers as very important to the budget outcome (34 percent) than did 
formal powers (24 percent).  
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Survey respondents indicated legislative fiscal offices also were important to 
budget results, but less than most other institutional factors. Sixty-five percent rated this 
office at least somewhat important, making it less important than its counterpart in the 
executive branch. 
Responses to the open-ended question about other important factors addressed 
legislative institutions beyond those addressed by survey questions. Several states were 
affected by legislative term limits. One governor matched his years of experience in 
budgeting against a house where term limits meant many “members had little or no 
budgetary experience, especially with declining revenues.”  This experience has been 
noticed in other term limit states as well (Brace and Ward 1999, Rose 2002). Legislative 
professionalism also came into play; one governor benefited from the limitation of 
legislative sessions to 80 days, so “it is difficult for them to grasp the state budget and 
make significant changes.”   
 
Economic Factors
Economic conditions are among the two most important factors in a governor’s 
budget success, measured by the total of somewhat and very important responses. This is 
not surprising, given that most states faced their most serious economic outlook in a 
decade in the 2001 session. Many states faced shortfalls for the budget adopted the 
previous session. For the current year budget, most states faced slowing revenue growth 
and large increases in costs of entitlement programs. Many states tapped rainy day funds 
to make ends meet, while others raised taxes or reduced appropriations (Eckl and Perez 
2001). Ninety-five percent of survey respondents considered economic conditions very or 
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somewhat important to the governor’s ability to achieve budget goals. More respondents 
thought economic conditions was very important (70 percent) than any other factor.  
The scholarly work on the effect of the economy on budgeting is large in 
magnitude but mixed in direction. Several researchers found that a strong economy 
helped the governor while a weak one hurt (Hartmark 1975). Others argued that the 
governor was stronger in a budget process when the economy was weak (Clynch and 
Lauth 1991b). Alt and Lowry (1994) theorized that an economic shock in either direction 
gave the legislature an advantage in budget negotiations, while Dometrius (1991) 
suggested that deviations toward either a deficit or a surplus favored the governor.  
Responses to an open-ended survey question indicate that practitioners are just as divided 
as political scientists on the role of economic conditions in budget outcomes. Several 
thought the strong economy helped the governor, like one who said “availability of 
revenues made legislative/governor conflicts less intense.”   Some participants thought 
declining revenues hurt the governor because he could not garner support for new 
funding initiatives. Others said the governor was very successful in part due to revenue 
shortfalls or limited revenue growth. Thus, while virtually all survey respondents agreed 
that economic conditions were important to the governor’s budget success, they did not 
agree on how or why. 
 
Political Factors
The survey asked respondents to consider the importance of three political factors 
to the governor’s budget success. Popular support for a governor was judged the most 
important of the three, with 79 percent rating it somewhat or very important. Partisan 
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support in the legislature was considered nearly as important. More respondents—49 
percent--rated it a very important factor—than popular support (27 percent), but the total 
of 71 percent combined very and somewhat important responses was less. The budget 
participants’ response regarding legislative support confirms the data in Table 12, which 
showed party support to be important in explaining ratings of governors’ overall success. 
It also agrees with a substantial amount of literature on the importance of party support in 
the legislature to budget outcomes. (Patterson 1983, Muchmore and Beyle 1983, Alt and 
Lowry 1994, Thurmaier and Willoughby 2001).   
Having an election mandate was not a major factor in budget outcomes, according 
to survey respondents—just 13 percent rated it “very important” and 41 percent thought it 
was at least somewhat important. This was the lowest rating of the 12 factors included in 
the survey. This finding confirms recent scholarly opinion that mandates may be mythical 
(Jones 1994, Steger 2000).  
 
Personal Factors
Respondents agreed that personal factors—budget choices within the control of 
the governor—were important to the governor’s budget outcome.  “Governor’s ability to 
clearly state and advocate for budget agenda” was second among the 12 factors for very 
important responses (62 percent) and third in the proportion of combined somewhat and 
very important responses (87 percent). Participants gave many examples of this factor in 
action.  One governor was viewed as successful in part because he “’sold’ his budget 
across the state via community meetings. Another   achieved his budget goals because he 
was “on message and persistent.”  Patience was a virtue for at least one governor, whose 
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“willingness to endure criticism for holding up budget enactment in order to achieve key 
budget objectives” ultimately led to victory. Consistency was important; one observer 
attributed the failure of a tax increase proposal to the governor’s decision to introduce it 
late in the legislative session.  
Making popular programs a priority also was considered a very important factor 
in budget success. While the 55 percent who considered content of agenda a very 
important factor was less than for how the agenda was stated and supported, almost all 
respondents—96 percent—thought popularity of programs was at least somewhat 
important to budget success. This was higher than for any other variable in the survey. 
Responses to an open-ended question about other factors that affected budget success 
helps shed some additional light in the characteristics of a successful agenda. One 
governor achieved passage of his initiative in higher education because it had strong 
bipartisan support. This could be particularly important for a governor facing a split 
legislature, as in this case. Several respondents noted that a governor does better when his 
agenda is modest; “frugal” spending proposals were accepted by one legislature without 
controversy. Other governors succeeded by offering  “nothing very controversial” or 
proposing  “a continuation budget. These findings confirm much of the budgeting 
literature on both federal and state levels (Schick 2000). At least two governors were 
doomed, on the other hand, in choosing controversial issues as their top priority. One 
governor’s school voucher program was called a “non-starter,” because it was not very 
popular even in his own party and faced constitutional problems. Another concentrated 
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on massive tax reform and could not achieve a legislative majority for any option through 
several regular and special legislative sessions. 
The survey also asked respondents to list any other factors they thought were 
important to budget outcomes. The results generally confirmed those of the closed-end 
responses discussed above. More responses related to economic conditions and 
availability or lack of revenue than any other factor. As noted previously, opinion was 
mixed as to how economic conditions affect the governor’s budget outcome. Many 
agenda issues also were raised in response to the open-ended questions.  These responses 
indicated that the governor gained or lost not just from what issues he advanced, but how 
he advanced them. Governors who stayed on message and strongly and consistently 
pushed their programs generally were viewed to be more successful. Several responses 
mentioned institutional factors that were unique to one or two states. The open-ended 
responses, however, served mainly to complement and elaborate upon the factors listed in 
the closed-ended questions rather than to raise additional factors that can affect 
gubernatorial budget success.  
 
Conclusions on Participants’ Views
As noted, more than half of survey respondents rated 11 of the 12 variables at 
least somewhat important to the governor’s budget success. Of these eleven, three stood 
out as the most important. Economic conditions were rated very important by seventy 
percent of respondents, followed by clearly stating and advocating an agenda (62 percent) 
and offering popular programs (55 percent). In combined very important and somewhat 
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important ratings, popular programs finished first (96 percent), followed by economic 
conditions (94 percent) and a clear agenda (87 percent). These results suggest that the 
governor has some control over factors that can lead to budget success, but must exert 
that control within limits imposed by economic conditions. Institutional arrangements 
and political characteristics, while important, seem to be less so than the three variables 
discussed above. 
As with evaluations of the governor’s budget success, there were differences in 
what factors were considered important to success based on the office held by the 
respondent. Table 17 shows variations in executive and legislative branch participants’ 
rating of the 12 explanatory variables. These differences suggest that executive branch 
staff see factors that are within the governor’s control as more important to budget 
success than do legislators and their staffs. Conversely, legislative respondents placed 
more importance on legislative factors. There is general agreement, however, on the 
importance of economic conditions and that a governor’s formal powers, fiscal powers,  
 
Table 17.—Factors Affecting Governor’s Success, by Branch of Government 
 
% Rating Factor as Somewhat 
or Very Important to Success 
Variable 
Executive 
Branch 
Legislative 
Branch 
Difference 
(Executive – 
Legislative) 
(%) 
Institutional factors:
Governor’s formal 
 powers  72 64 8
Governor’s fiscal 
 powers  63 56 7
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Strength of  budget 
 office  94 61 33
Control over budget 
 office  81 61 20
Strength of  legislative 
 fiscal office (s)  58 72 - 14
Legislature’s   
 budget process  81 85 - 4
Economic conditions 97           92              5 
Political factors
Governor’s 
 popularity  91 69 22
Election mandate           50           31            19 
Party support in 
 legislature  69 72 - 3
Personal factors
Clearly state and 
 advocate agenda 100 76             24 
Popularity of 
 programs  97 95               2 
and election mandate are less important. Note again that each group has less than 40 
respondents, limiting the reliability of these conclusions. 
Executive branch participants rated five factors considerably higher than those 
from the legislative branch. The clearest difference was in the importance of a strong 
budget office to the governor’s success. Ninety-four percent of chiefs of staff and budget 
directors considered it to be at least somewhat important. Legislative branch participants, 
on the other hand, rated this near the bottom of the twelve factors; 61 percent thought it 
was important to budget success. Other differences were in the governor’s effort to 
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clearly state and advocate his agenda (with all executive branch participants considering 
this at least somewhat important, compared to 76 percent of legislative branch 
representatives) and the governor’s popularity (important to 91 percent of executive 
branch respondents but 69 percent of their legislative counterparts). There were smaller 
but still notable differences in the importance of control over the budget office (81 
percent executive vs. 61 percent legislative) and an election mandate (50 percent 
executive vs. 31 percent legislative.) 
Of the seven remaining factors, legislative participants saw only one as more 
important than executive branch respondents and there were only minor differences in 
six. Seventy-two percent of legislative participants said the legislative fiscal office was 
somewhat or very important, as compared to 58 percent in the executive branch. The 
remaining items—governor’s formal and fiscal powers, the legislature’s budget process, 
economic conditions, legislative party support, and popularity of programs—were 
considered equally important across the branches of government. 
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Conclusion
The survey of budget participants used in this study can help us understand what 
budget participants believe is important to budgetary outcomes. This question has not 
been asked in previous budgeting surveys. Answers are not definitive, however, limited 
as they are by the low response rate. Nevertheless, for the purpose of this study, the first 
multi-method evaluation of executive budget success, the survey results help illustrate 
possible explanations for budget success.  
Budget process participants generally agreed that governors achieved their goals 
in the 2001 budget process—seventy-six percent of respondents rated governors at least 
somewhat successful. Executive branch participants—in governor’s offices and budget 
offices—were more likely to rate the governor a success than were their legislative 
counterparts.  Governors were more likely to be successful if they were elected (or re-
elected) recently and considerably more likely to achieve their objectives in a biennial 
budget process than in an annual one, but no more likely to succeed in states with 
legislative term limits than those without. As expected, governors with party majorities in 
both houses were more successful than those whose party was a minority in both houses. 
Partisan support was much more important for Republican governors than for Democrats. 
Somewhat surprisingly, every governor working in a state with split control of the 
legislature was successful in budgeting.  
Survey respondents identified many factors that are important to the governor’s 
budget outcome. Three stood out as most important. These were the governor’s ability to 
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clearly state and advocate an agenda, the governor’s choice of popular programs to 
advance, and economic conditions. Survey respondents agreed with scholars who note 
the importance of economic conditions to budget outcomes, but were equally mixed on 
how specific conditions affected the governor’s changes of success. Several other factors 
were just below these first three in importance. Two were institutional—the legislative 
budget process and the strength of the executive budget office. The third was political—
the governor’s popularity. Factors often thought to strengthen a governor, such as formal 
powers, fiscal powers, and an election mandate, were considered important, but less so 
than most other factors.  
As with their opinions of success, respondents from the two branches of 
government differed on what they thought contributed most to budget outcomes. While 
all agreed on the importance of economic conditions, executive branch respondents 
thought the governor’s popularity and ability to clearly state and advocate their programs, 
along with a executive control over a strong budget office, were more important than did 
their legislative counterparts. Legislative participants thought the legislative fiscal office 
was a more important factor to success than did executive respondents. 
The survey results generally agree with the expectations stated in the scholarly 
literature on budgeting. One important factor that is not well-covered in the literature is 
the role of timing in budget success. Survey responses indicated that governors were most 
successful in the first year of their terms and that chances of success fell quickly 
thereafter. Two other general findings of the survey are noted in the literature, but often 
get lost in other, more measurable, concepts. First, the survey respondents remind us that 
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informal aspects of politics are as important or more important than formal ones. They 
suggest that personal popularity, choosing popular programs, and consistently stating and 
“selling” an agenda are more important than structural variables such as appointment and 
veto powers. Second, survey results serve as a reminder that budgeting is an activity 
involving two separate branches of government. While party serves as one bridge 
between branches, it is not a guarantee that a governor will be successful in budgeting. 
Abney and Lauth concluded that “…state budgeting will inevitably be as much about 
inter-branch politics as it is about administrative process” (1989, 839). The survey of 
budget outcomes in 2001 suggests that budgeting remains a multiple branch process, 
whose outcome depends on economic and personal factors more than on political and 
institutional variables. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
GOVERNORS’ OVERALL SUCCESS: 
AGENCY AND ISSUE METHODS  
 
This chapter describes the results of two quantitative approaches for assessing 
executive budget success and identifies the reasons for the success. It begins by applying 
new methods for assessing the success of each governor in accomplishing budgetary 
goals in the 2001 budget process. It evaluates successful governors by a number of key 
indicators such as political party and gender. It identifies those governors who were 
among the very most and very least successful governors, both by a raw score and by a 
score adjusted for the variables that affect budget success. It then seeks to explain success 
in five different ways. First, it determines if executive budget success depends on the 
issues raised by the executive. Second, it compares the most and least successful 
governors in terms of the independent variables described in Chapter 2 6 . Third, it 
identifies bivariate relationships between executive budget success and these same 
independent variables. Fourth, it describes a series of regression analyses in which the 
success measures are regressed in turn on the institutional, economic, political, and 
personal variables expected to influence success. Fifth, it reports on the results of an OLS 
regression of the two success measures on the independent variables that best explain 
executive budgeting success. The chapter concludes with a brief assessment of the results 
of all of these measures. Chapter 5 restates and compares these findings with the results 
 
6 These 21 institutional, economic, political, and personal variables and their expected relationships to 
budget success are summarized in Table 5, Chapter 2. 
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of the survey research discussed in Chapter 3. Readers should be aware that the survey 
results do not represent all 50 states, nor are survey responses equal among the states. 
Further, survey responses are from interested budget process participants, in contrast to 
the document-based agency and issue methods. Comparisons between the different 
methods may be instructive but must be made with these differences in mind. 
 
Governors’ Overall Success
As described in Chapter 2, the analysis uses two methods for determining how 
successful each governor was in accomplishing budgetary goals in the 2001 budget 
process. The agency method compares the governor’s budget recommendation and the 
legislature’s appropriation for each of the ten largest agencies.  The issue method is based 
on the four budget issues that captured the most attention off the governor, legislature, 
and press. However, these issues might not have been the governor’s highest priority or 
most successful issues. Both measures compare the marginal budget change 
recommended by the governor to the marginal appropriations change adopted by the 
legislature. The correlation coefficient of the two measures (Pearson’s r) is .21, indicating 
a minimal relationship. 
Both the agency and issue methods determine differences between the governor’s 
proposal and the legislature’s appropriation. Both advance the study of budgeting by 
measuring the overall budget success of the chief executive instead of success by agency. 
The issue method defines success in a completely new way that reflects the way budget 
participants and citizens measure political outcomes. The same governor may have quite 
different results on the two methods, however, since they look at different portions of the 
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budget and at a different level of detail. The agency method examines the lion’s share of 
state spending and reflects many individual program decisions. The issue method looks at 
a small part of spending—sometimes less than one percent—but the part that is most 
controversial and most likely to find differences between the legislature and governor. 
The issue measure is at the same time narrower and broader than the agency measure. It 
is narrower because it looks only at four issues raised by each governor during the budget 
process. It is broader because it considers revenues as well as expenditures and because it 
considers major program changes that do not result in large changes in agency budgets, 
such as revamping the school funding formula or converting public school funding to 
vouchers. Governors who propose controversial issues, particularly those affecting the 
revenue side of the budget, likely will be less successful on the issue method. A governor 
will receive a lower agency success score, on the other hand, by trying to reduce the 
budget or limit its growth or by reallocating funds between programs and agencies. These 
proposals require the legislature to limit or reduce existing programs, which it will do 
reluctantly if at all. How the two methods can result in much different scores for the same 
budget process can be illustrated by examining two governors whose scores differed in 
opposite ways. 
Louisiana Republican Mike Foster was among the most successful governors on 
the issue method (96.0) and one of the least successful on the agency method (29.4). For 
the most part the legislature agreed with his recommendations on four major issues, 
which involved teacher and faculty pay increases and a reduction in taxes on land-based 
casinos. 
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Foster’s success with these four issues was in stark contrast to problems achieving 
his budgetary goals for major state agencies. The most dramatic differences between the 
governor’s proposal and legislature’s appropriations resulted from Foster’s proposed 
reductions in Medicaid and social services. The legislature approved a $75 million 
increase in the Department of Social Services where Foster had recommended a $25 
million cut and a $600 million increase for Health and Hospitals as compared to Foster’s 
standstill budget. The legislature paid for its social services spending through a 
combination of cutting Corrections, where the governor wanted an increase, and by 
raising spending by $600 million more than Foster proposed. The poor agency score thus 
resulted from fundamental differences between the governor and legislature regarding the 
size and priorities of government. The governor failed in achieving his more global goal 
of limiting the growth in government, particularly social services, while achieving more 
narrow, and less ideologically charged, goals of raising educator pay and cutting casino 
taxes. Other governors who, like Foster, had much higher issue than agency scores 
offered no major tax increases and supported increases to education and other programs 
with broad support, but many tried to limit or reallocate spending. 
New Hampshire Democrat Jeanne Shaheen had the opposite results of Foster’s—
low issue success (30.1) and high agency success (83.9). She received legislative support 
for only two of her top four initiatives. The legislature agreed to her increase in education 
funding to comply with a court order and approved part of her recommended property tax 
relief. Her two other initiatives, a sales tax increase and an offsetting cut in business 
taxes, were defeated. In fact, the legislature raised the business tax by 50 percent in order 
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to avoid the sales tax. Shaheen’s issue success score was thus relatively low because of 
disagreements about how government should be funded.  
Shaheen’s high agency success score, on the other hand, reflected that her 
proposals did not radically change the size or division of the expenditure pie. Further, 
there was little room for disagreement. Medicaid and related health costs required 60 
percent of all available new money and neither the governor nor the legislature wanted to 
tackle any cost-cutting initiatives. Both branches were constricted by the court order to 
increase school funding. Other governors who, like Shaheen, had high agency scores and 
low issue success made controversial programs such as school vouchers, school funding 
formula changes, employee pay restraint, tax increases or reform, and major program 
expansions their highest priority issues. Most of them also proposed large spending 
increases. Their recommendations thus took the pressure off legislators to examine 
existing programs and increased their likelihood of budget success.   
Table 18 summarizes the success scores for all governors and compares average 
success scores for a variety of indicators. On scales that ranged from 0 for high 
disagreement between the governor and legislature to 100 for perfect agreement, the 
mean score for governors under each of the two methods was between 60 and 70. 
Republican governors were more successful than Democrats or others by both measures, 
though the difference was small by the agency measure. The five female governors were 
as successful as males by the issue method,  but less successful under the agency method.  
 
Table 18.—Governors’ Overall Budget Success, Total and for Selected 
Indicators 
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Mean Success 
(Standard Deviation) 
Indicator Agency Method Issue Method 
All governors (N=50) 
 
65.1 
 (16.6) 
61.6 
(21.9) 
Governor’s party
Democrat (N=20) 
 
64.1 
 (17.5) 
57.5 
(25.1) 
Republican (N=28) 
 
65.8 
 (16.5) 
65.0 
(19.7) 
Other (N=2) 
 
63.9 
(15.0) 
55.4 
(17.4) 
Governor’s gender
Female (N=5) 62.2  (18.2) 
61.7 
(25.9) 
Male (N=45) 65.4  (16.6) 
61.6 
(21.7) 
Method of becoming   
Governor
Elected (N=47) 
 
65.8 
 (16.6) 
60.9 
(21.7) 
Succeeded (N=3) 
 
53.5 
(65.1) 
72.3 
(27.7) 
Year of budget
2001 (N=46) 
 
64.6 
 (16.9) 
61.6 
(21.6) 
2002 (N=4) 
 
70.5 
 (12.4) 
62.5 
(28.5) 
Elected governors were considerably more successful under the agency method than 
those who succeeded to office to complete a term. By the issue method, however, the 
relationship was reversed. This may be due to the succeeding governors’ limited time to 
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gain command of budget details; they naturally would concentrate on advocating major 
issue positions, which may come at the expense of supporting detailed agency budgets. 
The four governors in 2002 budget processes were more successful by both measures 
than those in 2001 budgets. The differences were small enough, however, to suggest that 
the different year made no difference in overall executive budget success, in spite of the 
worsening economic situation. It is important, however, not to rely too greatly on any 
differences by gender, means of attaining office, or year of budget due to the very small 
numbers of females, governors who succeeded to office, and 2002 budgets in the study. 
 
Most and Least Successful Governors
The issue and agency measures provide relatively objective ways to compare 
budget outcomes in order to identify “winners” and “losers” among the governors. Table 
19 shows the highest and lowest ranking governors by the two measures. See Appendix 
D, Table 44 for a complete listing of success scores. Only one governor, Georgia’s Roy 
Barnes, ranked among the five most successful by both methods of measurement. Two 
others, however, ranked in the top 10 in both methods. Seven of the nine most successful 
governors listed in the table ranked in the top half of governors by both methods. There 
was less consistency among the ranks of the least successful governors than the most 
successful. None were among the 10 least successful on both indices. Four of the 10 least 
successful governors were among the 25 most successful by one of the success measures. 
Table 19.—Highest and Lowest Ranking Governors 
State Governor Party 
Success 
Score Rank 
Rank on 
Opposite 
Success 
Measure* 
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Five Highest by Agency Success
CT John Rowland R 96.0  1 30 
ID Dirk Kempthorne R 91.6  2 22 
GA Roy Barnes D 91.5  3   1 
KS Bill Graves R 90.9  4 14 
SD William Janklow R 89.5  5 16 
Five Highest by Issue Success
GA Roy Barnes D 100.0  1   3 
OR John Kitzhaber D   97.1  2   9 
NJ James McGreevey D   96.2  3   6 
LA Mike Foster R   96.0  4 49 
WI Scott McCallum R   94.2  5 20 
Five Lowest by Agency Success
IA Tom Vilsack D 27.7 50 32 
LA Mike Foster R 29.4 49   4 
CA Gray Davis D 38.4 48 45 
AK Tony Knowles D 40.9 47 21 
MS Ronnie Musgrove D 43.1 46 34 
Five Lowest by Issue Success
HI Benjamin Cayetano D 22.3 50 14 
TN James Sundquist R 29.0 49 40 
NY George Pataki R 29.1 48 29 
SC Jim Hodges D 30.1 47 28 
NH Jeanne Shaheen D 30.9 46         8 
*For rankings by agency success, this column shows the governor’s ranking by  
 issue success. For rankings by issue success, it shows the governor’s ranking by  
 agency success. 
Another way to look at individual governors’ budget success is to control for the 
factors outside the governor’s control that contribute to success. A later section of this 
chapter describes regression models that best explain variation in each of the measures of 
budget success. Much variation, however, remains unexplained. The best models allow 
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creation of residual success scores for each governor. The residual success score is the 
raw agency or issue success score less the success scores the best model for each measure 
would predict. A positive residual success score means a governor met with more success  
than would be expected from the setting and from the governor’s personal characteristics 
and budget choices. A negative residual score means the governor was less successful 
than expected. 
The residuals incorporate many factors that were not included in the models. 
These factors include minor impact of variables that were discarded in the process of 
identifying the best model, errors in measuring concepts and variables, and factors unique 
to a state or the budget process in a given year. For example, the models did not measure 
the impact of the energy shortage that plagued Democrat Gray Davis in California, nor 
the time Massachusetts Republican Jane Swift lost to maternity leave. Most importantly, 
the models did not incorporate the combination of luck and skill that any executive needs 
to successfully achieve any political objective. The residuals from the models can, thus, 
be viewed as the best measure of governors’ budget success, because they show what the 
governor personally did with the situation at hand. 
Table 20 shows the most and least successful governors in residual scores and 
may be compared to the similar rankings for raw scores shown in Table 19.  Appendix D, 
Table 20.—Highest and Lowest Ranking Governors in Residual Budget Success 
State Governor Party 
Residual 
Success Score Rank 
Rank on 
Opposite 
Success 
Measure* 
Five Highest by Agency Success
CT John Rowland R 33.6 1 16 
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NJ James McGreevey D         31.1 2 18 
KS Bill Graves R 26.0 3 22 
GA Roy Barnes D 21.6 4   1 
IL George Ryan R         18.2      5          15 
Five Highest by Issue Success
GA Roy Barnes D 40.5 1   4 
PA Tom Ridge R 37.1 2 25 
OR John Kitzhaber D 24.7 3 10 
DE Ruth Ann Minner R 19.3 4 42 
MT Judy Martz R 18.6 5 35 
Five Lowest by Agency Success
IA Tom Vilsack D   -    31.7 50 35 
LA Mike Foster R   -    27.3 49   8 
TX Rick Perry R   -    22.2 48   21 
AK Tony Knowles D   -    21.3 47   7 
MS Ronnie Musgrove D   -    17.1 46 30 
Five Lowest by Issue Success
TN James Sundquist R   -    41.0 50 37 
CA Gray Davis D   -    38.5 49 40 
KY Paul Patton D   -    29.9 48 23 
OH Bob Taft R   -    29.4    47 32 
AL Don Siegelman D   -    28.5 46 34 
*For rankings by agency success, this column shows the governor’s ranking by 
 issue success. For rankings by issue success, it shows the governor’s ranking  
 by agency success. 
Table 45, shows all governors’ residual success scores. Many of the most successful 
governors on raw success scores were also among the most successful by the residual 
measure. Of the nine governors who were among the highest five in either measure of 
overall success, five were among the highest in one of the residual success scores. As 
with the earlier measure, Georgia Democrat Roy Barnes was the only governor among 
the top five in both measures of budget success.  
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Three of the highest five governors measured by raw agency success—Barnes 
Connecticut Republican John Rowland, and Kansas Republican Bill Graves—also were 
among the highest five by residual agency success. Republicans Dirk Kempthorne of 
Idaho and William Janklow of South Dakota fell from the top five once the budget setting 
was considered. These governors apparently were among the most successful in raw 
scores because they proposed budgets in a friendly environment. After considering the 
environment, two governors—New Jersey Democrat James McGreevey and Illinois 
Republican James Ryan moved up to the five most successful as measured by the residual 
agency success score.  
Just two of the five highest governors measured by raw issue success were also 
among the top five by residual issue success—Barnes and Oregon Democrat John 
Kitzhaber. Three other governors fell from the top five once the context of their budget 
processes was considered. They were McGreevey, Foster, and Scott McCallum of 
Wisconsin. Three other governors were among the five most successful by the residual 
issue method but not the raw one, suggesting they were more skilled politically than most 
of their peers. They were Republicans Tom Ridge of Pennsylvania, Ruth Ann Minner of 
Delaware, and Montana’s Judy Martz. 
As with the most successful governors, there were both similarities and 
differences among the lists of least successful governors on raw success scores and least 
successful on residual success scores. Of the nine who were among the least successful 
governors on raw measures of success, five were also among the least successful as 
109
measured by residual success. Gray Davis (D-Cal.) was no longer among the least 
successful on the residual agency  measure, as he had been on  raw agency  success.  This  
suggests his relatively low budget achievement was due in part to political, economic, 
and institutional factors that may have been beyond his control. Rick Perry (R-Tex.) 
replaced Davis as one of the five least successful governors on the residual agency 
success measure. Republicans Tom Vilsack of Iowa and Mike Foster of Louisiana, along 
with Democrats Tony Knowles of Alaska and Ronnie Musgrove of Mississippi, were 
among the five least successful governors by both the raw and residual agency measures.  
There were more changes among the least successful by issue success. Davis was 
among the least successful on residual issue success while he had not been on raw 
success, the opposite of his movement on the agency method. Like Davis, Democrats 
Paul Patton of Kentucky and Don Siegelman of Alabama, along with Ohio Republican 
Bob Taft, joined the least successful governors once the environment was taken into 
account. James Sundquist (R-Tenn.) was the only governor among the five least 
successful on both the raw and residual agency scores. He was the least successful by the 
residual method. Four governors who were among the least successful by the raw issue 
score—Benjamin Cayetano (D-Haw.), George Pataki (R-N.Y.), Jim Hodges (D-S.C.), 
and Jeanne Shaheen (D-N.H.)—did not fare so poorly once the scores were adjusted for 
environmental factors. 
There were few differences between the least and most successful governors by 
the residual success measures. Democrats were slightly more likely to be among the least 
successful (six of ten) than the most successful (four of nine). Women were more 
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successful than men—two of the five women governors were among the most successful 
and none were among the least.  The most successful governors may have benefited from 
legislative support in the legislature. Four of the least successful governors faced divided 
government, compared to only two of the most successful. The most successful governors 
were helped by time, too. Three of nine most successful governors were proposing the 
first budget of their term, compared to one of ten least successful. As a group, the most 
successful governors were earlier both in their current term and in their tenure. The most 
successful governors likely made wise budget choices as well; they proposed larger 
increases, advanced more issues, and were more consistent in advocating their issues. 
There appeared to be a regional factor making governors very unsuccessful, as six 
of the nine least successful were southerners. This suggests that southern governors, who 
were among the last to gain executive budgeting powers, still suffer from weaker 
budgeting powers. Still, the diversity among the most and least successful governors 
suggests the importance of political skill and unique factors in accomplishing—or failing 
to accomplish—budgetary objectives. Governors who faced divided legislatures can be 
found among the most and least successful, as can members of both parties, governors in 
a variety of economic circumstances, and governors with both strong and weak 
institutional powers. These results suggest that governors have the potential to achieve 
budgetary goals in any environment; political skill remains the most important factor in 
budget success. 
 
Explaining Executive Budget Success
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The small universe of cases—50 state budget processes for one year—makes it 
unlikely that any single analysis will result in a definitive explanation of why some 
governors achieved most of their budgetary goals and some did not. Instead, this chapter 
attempts to explain the budgetary outcomes in five different ways.  Each method of 
explanation should help identify key variables and their relationships to success. All of 
the methods together can be more effective in providing an overall explanation of success 
than any single method. 
 
Budget Success by Type of Issue
The issue success method provides insight into what types of budget issues led to 
budget success for governors. Table 21 shows the 200 issues identified (four top issues 
for each governor) by issue type and shows how issue success scores varied by issue 
type. It is important to note that the issue types are broad and that issues within a type 
may be contradictory. For example, common education issues include both proposals to 
raise funding for public schools and proposals to cut funding by implementing a private 
school voucher program. The main value to this data, then, is to illustrate the issues 
chosen by governors in their budgets and to seek broad patterns of success.  
The table shows that common education (40 percent) and taxation (16.5 percent) 
were the major issues most likely to be raised by governors. Social services, finance, and 
higher education followed. Governors made very few major proposals affecting criminal 
justice, state administration, economic development, or infrastructure. Criminal justice 
initiatives, most commonly drug law reform or enforcement, were the most successful for 
governors. This success may have resulted from a relative lack of disagreement over 
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apprehending and jailing drug offenders. Social service issues were second most 
successful. Many of these issues related to increasing Medicaid funding; legislatures may 
have had little choice but to provide most of the funding governors proposed. There is no 
“Other” category in the table since all major issues raised by governors fit into the nine 
listed categories. 
 
Table 21.—Governor’s Issues by Type and Mean Success Score 
 by Issue Type, in Descending Order of Success 
Percent of Total 
Issues 
Mean Issue 
Success Score  
Criminal justice  3.0 88.8
Social services           11.5            73.6  
Common education           40.0            66.1  
State administration             4.5            60.2  
Economic  
 development  2.5 59.5
Finance           10.5            58.1  
Infrastructure             3.5            55.7  
Higher education             8.0            53.0  
Taxation           16.5            46.0  
Total         100.0            61.6  
N=200  
Other issue types fared worse than criminal justice and social service proposals. 
Issue scores for common education and state administration were very close to the 
average score for all issues. The most common education initiatives were additional 
funding, teacher pay, and teacher recruitment and retention, while employee pay was the 
major administrative issue. It is interesting to note that governors met with only average 
success in advancing issues that were often supported by strong lobbies such as teachers 
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and state employees. Three types of issues (economic development, finance and 
infrastructure), were slightly less successful than average. Many of these issues were 
controversial ones, such as the expansion of gambling, use of one-time revenues to 
balance the budget, broad transportation funding initiatives, and growth management 
programs.  
Higher education and taxation issues were clearly the least successful for 
governors. Most higher education initiatives—scholarships, increased funding, and 
faculty pay—involved significant spending increases in a year where many states had 
little additional money to spend. Taxation issues, the least successful of all, included 
proposals to lower property and business taxes, which were controversial in times of little 
revenue growth, as well as even more difficult proposals to increase or reform taxes.  
Table 21 indicates that governor’s choice of issues may have affected their budget 
success, but it is far from definitive. The issue data can be analyzed in more detail, such 
as determining if some independent variables are more important to the governor’s 
success for a given type of issue, and determining success for specific initiatives within 
each type, in a future study. 
Comparing the Most and Least Successful Governors
The eight most successful and nine least successful governors identified in Table 
20 shared many characteristics but varied on others. Appendix D, Table 46 compares 
these two groups on all independent variables listed in Chapter 2. Table 22 shows only 
114
those variables that showed meaningful differences between the two groups7. The table 
suggests only a few relationships of value, all of which should be taken as suggestive 
rather than definitive. Among institutional variables, the most successful governors faced 
less professional legislatures, legislatures with term limits, and worked in biennial budget 
states. There were, however, no differences in the most and least successful governors’ 
formal or fiscal powers, control over or strength of the executive budget office, or veto 
points in the legislative process. Among economic factors, the most successful governors 
faced weaker economies, but had no difference in size of budget per capita from the least 
successful governors.  
Legislative support and popular support for the governor may have helped the 
most successful governors. They had higher proportions of their partisans in both houses 
of the legislature than the least successful. More of the most successful worked within a 
framework of unified government, and fewer of the most successful faced divided 
government. The most successful governors had higher election margins and higher 
public approval ratings during the legislative session. Political time entered into the 
success picture as well; the most successful governors were earlier in their tenure. There  
Table 22.—Dependent Variable with Differences for Most and Least Successful   
 Governors 
 Mean Value by Governor Group* 
Variable 
Most Successful 
Governors 
 (n=8) 
Least Successful 
Governors 
 (n=9) 
Institutional
7 Differences are considered important in continuous variables if the value for the least and most successful 
governors differs by 10 percent or more. Differences for dichotomous variables are considered important if 
there is a 15 percent difference in the percentage of most and least successful with the given characteristic. 
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Legislative  
 professionalism# 143.5 157.7 
Legislative term limits   
In effect in 2001+    25%   11% 
In effect at all+    38%   11% 
Biennial budget+    38%   23% 
Economic 
Economic growth^         -     0.64      0.56 
Political
Legislative party support   
House proportion held by  
 governor’s party  0.59 0.47
Senate proportion held by 
 governor’s party  0.59 0.54
Unified government+             50%              33% 
Divided government+             25%              56% 
Governor popularity   
Election proportion             62.8              53.8 
Popularity poll proportion**             67.7              53.9 
Year in Service   
Year in tenure              4.0                4.9 
Personal
Political experience (years)            19.4              16.7 
Limited agenda¤         -    3.1                3.0 
Popular issues              0.8                1.2 
% increase in proposed budget              7.9                6.4 
Table 22.—Continued.
*Louisiana governor Mike Foster was among the five least successful governors 
 by the agency method and was among the five most successful governors by 
 the issue method. He is omitted from both groups. 
#Legislative professionalism is the square root of the annual salary of legislators. 
+For dichotomous variables, the percentage of governors in each group with the 
 characteristic is listed 
^Economic growth is the sum of standardized scores of growth in per capita 
income  
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and decline in unemployment in the calendar year prior to the budget cycle. 
¤Limited agenda is the total of issue scores for the top four issues as a proportion 
 of the total of issue scores for all issues, adjusted for the number of issues 
 raised.  
**Due to limited poll availability, data are reported for 4 of the most successful 
 and 8 of the least successful governors 
 
were no differences between the most and least successful governors in interest group 
strength in the state.  
Personal factors also were related to the success of the most and least successful 
governors. Two of these four factors suggest that the most successful governors were 
more aggressive than the least successful. First, they advocated a wide range of issues 
during the budget process, rather than concentrating on just a few. Second, they proposed 
budgets with more growth than those proposed by the least successful. In addition, the 
most successful governors had more political experience than their less successful 
counterparts. The most successful were also less likely to advocate popular issues such as 
tax cuts and teacher pay raises. 
In conclusion, a comparison among the least and most successful governors 
indicates that the most successful benefited to some extent from less professional 
legislatures, legislative term limits, biennial budgeting, a weaker economy, party support 
in the legislature, popular support, political experience, and an aggressive program. The 
reader is cautioned again that this review considers only 17 cases. Whether these 
variables should be considered meaningful depends on comparisons to the survey data 
presented in Chapter 3 and on the results of the additional tests in this chapter. 
 
Bivariate Relationships
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Returning to the entire set of 50 governors and examining relationships between 
governors’ budget success and each independent variable in turn can provide further 
insight into the predictors of executive budget success, though correlation does not 
establish a cause-and-effect relationship. Table 47, Appendix D, shows correlations 
between the two measures of success and each continuous independent variable. Table 23 
below shows only those relationships are that worthy of note.8
Table 48, Appendix D, shows differences of means for both success scores for the 
five independent variables that have only two or three possible values. Table 24 shows 
that four of the five showed clear relationships (defined as more than a 10 percent 
difference in means). 
 Taking the results of Tables 23 and 24 together suggests only a few factors were 
related to governors’ budget success. Term limits and biennial budgets, among 
institutional factors, were associated with governors’ success by one measure but not by 
the other. Higher legislative professionalism was associated with lower agency success 
but was not related to issue success.  Governors’ issue success scores rose as economic 
growth fell, but there was no relationship between the economy and agency success. 
 
Table 23.—Largest Correlations Between Budget Success and Independent      
 Variables 
 Correlation (Pearson’s r) With 
Variable Agency Success Issue Success 
Institutional
8 Correlations (Pearson’s r) between an independent variable and either success variable of 0.25 or greater 
are considered noteworthy. 
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Legislative professionalism         -  .26             .05 
Economic
Economic growth            .00         -   .27 
Political
Governor popularity   
Election proportion            .14             .28 
Approval poll proportion+            .08             .33 
Time in service   
Year in tenure            .02         -   .31 
Personal
% increase in proposed budget            .33         -  .02 
*N=36.  For all other variables, N=50. 
Political variables had the clearest bivariate relationships with budget success. Time in 
service was the most important variable; the first budget resulted in greater success under 
both methods. Issue success fell as time passed in the governor’s tenure, but this variable 
was not related to agency success. Governors did better if they had public if their party 
controlled at least one house of the legislature. Governors with split legislatures had the 
highest success and with divided government the least success under both methods. 
Differences were more pronounced for issue success.  Appendix D,  Table 47,  shows that  
Table 24.—Largest Differences in Mean Budget Success for Discrete  
 Independent  Variables 
 Mean Success Score 
Variable Agency Method Issue Method 
Institutional
Term limits in effect in 2001?   
Yes (N=11) 65.5 68.2 
No (N=39) 64.9 59.8 
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Term limits in effect at all?   
Yes (N=18) 66.3 69.0 
No (N=32) 64.4 57.5 
Biennial budget?   
Yes (N=21) 69.6 62.7 
No (N=29) 61.7 60.8 
Political
Legislative control   
Unified government (N=18) 65.9 62.6 
Split legislature (N=15) 67.5 65.9 
Divided government (N=17) 62.0 56.8 
Republican governor with divided 
 government  
Yes (N=8) 61.0 56.6 
No (N=42) 65.9 62.6 
Upcoming election with unified gov’t.?   
Yes (N=3) 67.5 34.7 
No (N=47) 64.9 63.3 
First budget of term?   
Yes (N=16) 69.8 67.9 
No (N=34) 62.8 58.7 
both measures of budget success were positively but weakly associated with the 
proportion of partisans in each house of the legislature. Governors also were more 
successful under both measures if they had election mandates and if they remained 
popular. Like legislative support, popularity made more difference in issue success than 
in agency success.   Among the personal factors, which are the only ones directly within 
the governor’s control, governors were more successful by the agency method (but not 
the issue method) if they proposed large budget increases. 
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The bivariate results are just as important for what they do not show as for what 
they do. Many institutional factors that are thought to improve executive budgeting 
power, such as formal powers, fiscal powers, and control over a strong budget office, 
showed no relationship to budget success. Economic factors, including economic growth 
and budget size, were not consistently related to success either. Most political variables 
were somewhat related to success and relationships were in the expected direction. The 
only exception was interest group strength, which was not related to success.  Among 
personal variables, issue consistency, limiting the agenda, and advancing popular issues 
were not closely related to budget success. 
 
Regression Analysis by Variable Type
Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression can illuminate budget success results, 
but, like the previous forms of analysis, has limitations. A regression analysis of 50 cases 
with 21 variables would be so compromised as to be useless. In order to adequately 
explain budget success, the regression analysis is broken up into several stages. First, 
variables are broken down into the four types—institutional, economic, political, and 
personal—discussed throughout the study. Each measure of success first is regressed on 
all variables within each of the four types. From each of these variable type regressions, 
the variables that most closely affect success are included in a smaller “best” model9.
After each type of variable is analyzed in this fashion, a final model measures budget 
success against the variables from the four “best” models. The variable type models 
 
9 Variables were included in the “best” model if their regression coefficient was at least as large as its 
standard error in the full model and again in a reduced model. All models were tested for heteroskedasticity 
through the Goldfield-Quandt test and for autocorrelation through the Durbin-Watson d statistic. Unless 
indicated otherwise, there was less than a five percent chance that either condition was present. 
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should not be considered complete by themselves. By definition, they are missing 
variables that are important to the explanation of budget success. Estimates of the 
coefficients for each variable may thus be biased by their interaction with one or more 
missing variables. Models also lack some explanatory power, as some variables of other 
types, which are excluded from the model, have meaningful impacts on budget success. 
The type regressions are, thus, not the most valid models to explain budget success, but 
steps toward valid models.  
 
Institutional Variables 
 
Table 25 shows the results of the regressions of two measures of executive budget 
success on seven institutional variables. The regressions reveal important patterns that 
suggest institutional arrangements did affect budget outcomes. Of the three executive 
institutions, control over a strong executive budget office showed the greatest 
importance. It was positively related to both success measures, as hypothesized, and the 
relationship was strong enough to include in the best institutional model for agency 
success. The other two executive institutions were not consistently related to success. 
Agency success increased with formal power while issue success decreased, and neither 
variable was part of the best model.  Fiscal power was an important factor affecting issue  
Table 25. Regression Models of Executive Budget Success and Institutional  
 Variables 
 
Agency Success 
Non-standardized 
Coefficient 
(Standard Error) 
Issue Success 
Non-standardized 
Coefficient 
(Standard Error) 
Independent Variable Full Model* Best Model* 
Full 
Model+ Best Model 
Governor’s formal  0.85 --   -    0.61 -- 
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power   (1.21)  (1.52) 
Governor’s fiscal  
 power 
 0.17
(0.89) -- 
 54.77**
(27.94) 
1.72 
(0.93) 
Executive budget 
 office power and 
 control 
 0.23 
 (0.20) 
0.24 
(0.18) 
 0.17 
 (0.26) -- 
Legislative 
 professionalism 
 - 0.05 
 (0.05) 
 -    0.04 
(0.04) 
 0.07 
 (0.06) -- 
Legislative term 
 limits exist at all 
 2.61 
 (5.40) -- 
 13.19
(6.71) 
 15.45
(6.39) 
Legislative veto 
 points (square 
 root) 
 - 2.07 
 (6.36) -- 
 - 0.79
(8.38) -- 
Biennial budget  5.41 
 (5.29) 
 6.03 
 (4.77) 
1.12 
(6.85) -- 
Intercept      60.50 
 (23.85) 
 68.32 
 (7.57)  -- 
 28.22
(16.71) 
F (degrees of freedom) 0.78 
 (7, 39) 
1.57 
 (3, 43) 
 1.05
(6, 40) 
 3.82
(2, 44) 
R2 0.12       0.10       0.14      0.15 
Adjusted R2 - 0.03 0.04       0.01      0.11 
N 47 47 47 47
Notes:  All models omit California, which is an outlier on legislative 
 professionalism, Minnesota, which is an outlier on veto points, and 
 Massachusetts, which is an outlier on fiscal power. 
*The Durbin-Watson d statistic is in the indeterminate zone, so autocorrelation 
 can be neither rejected nor accepted. 
+Due to autocorrelation in the OLS model, this is a weighted least squares 
 (WLS) model, weighted by the inverse square root of fiscal power. 
**Coefficient is on the inverse of the square root of fiscal power. 
 
success—governors were more successful with high fiscal powers—but had only a very 
weak but positive effect on agency success. Taken together, the results suggest that 
efforts to strengthen governors as fiscal leaders—control over revenue forecasts, ability 
to introduce the appropriation bills, line-item veto power, and ability to cut budgets 
during the year, as well as the budget office power--are effective. The data do not support 
such a conclusion regarding formal powers, including tenure and appointment. 
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Legislative institutions also affected executive budget success. As expected, 
legislative term limits helped the governor achieve budget goals, though the relationship 
was strongest for issue success. The models in Table 25 consider a state to have 
legislative term limits if such limits had been adopted at all.   See Table 49, Appendix D, 
for alternate models that considered only states with term limits that would have ended 
actual legislators’ terms by 2001. Those alternate models produced similar but less robust 
results. Also as expected, more legislative veto points—budget committees and fiscal 
staffs—hurt the governor. These relationships were consistent between the measures but 
weak.  
Legislative professionalism, unlike other institutional variables, was strongly 
related to both measures of success, but in opposite directions. A more professional 
legislature increased the governor’s ability to have major issue positions adopted but 
decreased the governor’s ability to get agency budgets passed intact. One explanation is 
that a professional legislature—with better-paid members who are in the capitol more 
often and supported by strong staffs—may more carefully review the details of agency 
budgets and try harder to resist program changes that might affect constituents or interest 
groups. As noted earlier, agency success tended to be higher for governors who did not 
try to change the amount or distribution of expenditures. Those who did try apparently 
ran into problems from a professional legislature that protected the status quo. Legislative 
professionalism, on the other hand, tended to help governors achieve issue success. This 
could be because governors considered legislative preferences in deciding what issues 
they would advance, knowing they faced a formidable foe. 
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As expected, biennial budgets contributed to an executive’s budget success. The 
relationship with both measures of success was positive, though it was strong only for 
agency success. Some observers believe that a biennial budget increases the power of the 
executive by reducing legislative oversight and by making legislative decisions more 
cautious (Fisher 1997, Winters 1999). 
The best institutional models both support some hypotheses of this study. Agency 
success increased with the governor’s control over a strong budget office and with 
biennial budgeting, but decreased with legislative professionalism. Issue success 
increased with the governor’s fiscal power and with legislative term limits. Both models 
support the general idea that stronger executive institutions help the governor while 
stronger legislative institutions weaken the governor. 
 
Economic Variables 
 
Table 26 shows that economic variables do not consistently explain executive budget 
success. Agency success was higher in states with strong economies, while issue success 
was lower. Both relationships were fairly strong, though the economy had a much greater 
impact on issue success. It is likely that agency success was higher in a strong economy 
because the governor did not have to propose cuts in agency budgets or changes in the 
size of government. Weak economies also may have required downward adjustments in 
revenue estimates during the legislative session; this would have required the legislature 
to approve  lower appropriations for  most agencies than  the governor’s original budget.  
 
Table 26. Regression Models of Executive Budget Success and Economic Variables 
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Agency Success 
Non-standardized 
Coefficient 
(Standard Error) 
Issue Success 
Non-standardized 
Coefficient 
(Standard Error) 
Independent Variable Full Model Best Model* Full Model Best Model 
Economic growth 
(standardized score) 
 2.12 
 (2.38) -- 
 -  16.89+ 
 (12.13) 
 -  16.89+ 
 (12.13) 
Economic growth   
 squared 
 -     0.31 
 (1.62) --  **  ** 
Budget per capita (log)   -     8.69 
 (34.95) -- 
 -  71.31 
 (42.88) 
 -  71.31 
 (42.88) 
Intercept      97.16 
 (126.79) -- 
 357.24
(149.65) 
 357.24
(149.65) 
F (degrees of freedom)   0.27 
 (3, 40) -- 
3.30 
(2, 41) 
3.30 
(2, 41) 
R2 0.02 --       0.14       0.14 
Adjusted R2 - 0.05 --       0.10       0.10 
N 44 --     44     44 
Notes:  All models omit Colorado, Kentucky, Massachusetts, New Jersey, and  
 Virginia, which are outliers on economic growth, and Alaska, which is an outlier 
 on budget size. 
*No economic variables met the criteria for a best model. 
+Coefficient for economic growth is on square root, as indicated by examining the 
 functional form of the relationship between the economic growth and issue 
 success. 
**It was not possible to include this term in a model for issue success and meet all 
 of the assumptions of OLS regression. 
 
Weak economies may have induced the legislature to follow the governor’s lead on 
difficult decisions, thus boosting issue success. There was no evidence to support the 
hypothesis that governors would be most successful at the extremes of the continuum of 
economic growth.  
As hypothesized, governors were less successful in states with higher spending 
levels. The relationship between issue success was much stronger, but both measures of 
success declined with state budget size. This suggests that high spending limits the ability 
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of a governor to launch new initiatives. The best economic model for issue success 
indicates that governors were more successful in states with a weak economy and with 
relatively low spending, while no economic variables were important in explaining 
agency success. 
 
Political Variables 
 
Political variables had more consistent explanatory power than the institutional 
and economic variable types, as shown in Table 27. This table shows models selected 
from alternatives that use different measures of partisan legislative support, governor’s 
popular support, and time in the governor’s service. See Tables 50 and 51, Appendix D, 
for other models. The selected models provide weak support for the hypothesis that 
partisan legislative control would contribute to budget success. Governors with divided 
government were less successful by both measures of success than those with unified 
government, while governors in split legislature states were slightly more successful 
under both methods. None of the relationships were very strong, but they were consistent.  
As noted previously, the higher success with a split legislature probably results from the 
need to maintain partisan unity; as long as the governor’s party holds one house, the 
minority-controlled house is outnumbered. Full control of all three institutions can lead to  
Table 27.--Regression Models of Executive Budget Success and Political Variables 
 
Agency Success 
Non-standardized 
Coefficient 
(Standard Error) 
Issue Success 
Non-standardized 
Coefficient 
(Standard Error) 
Independent Variable Full Model Best Model* Full Model Best Model 
Legislative party support
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Divided government   -    3.82 (5.81) -- 
 - 2.58
(7.02) -- 
Split legislature  1.03(6.44) -- 
 2.65 
 (7.55) -- 
Governor’s election 
 proportion 
0.35 
(0.40) -- 
 1.17 
 (0.49) 
 1.15
(0.48) 
Interest group strength  -    3.70 (3.45) 
 -    4.23 
 (3.18) 
 -    2.15 
 (4.28) -- 
Time in term
Year in term  -    1.00   (2.80) -- -- -- 
Year in tenure -- --  -    3.00  (1.20) 
 -    3.03 
 (1.07) 
Intercept  62.59(25.36) 
 80.73
(11.83) 
 17.78 
 (30.83) 
 11.27
(26.37) 
F (degrees of freedom)  0.67 
 (5, 43) 
1.78 
(1, 47) 
 2.43 
 (5,43) 
 5.88
(2,46) 
R2 0.07  0.04       0.22       0.20 
Adjusted R2 - 0.04 0.04       0.13       0.17 
N 49 49 49 49
Notes:  All models omit Minnesota, an outlier on governor’s election proportion 
 and legislative party support. 
*The Durbin-Watson d statistic is in the indeterminate zone, so autocorrelation  
 can be neither rejected nor accepted. 
 
factionalism that threatens the governor’s budget proposals. Further, shifts in partisan 
ratios can be important in determining legislative outcomes (Davidson 1996). Party 
support in the legislature can also be measured as a proportion, regardless of partisan 
control. Table 50, Appendix D, shows that agency success increased with the proportion 
of partisans in the House of Representatives and the model was just as robust as the 
model shown in Table 27.10 Issue success, on the other hand, fell as support in the House 
rose, but the relationship was very weak.  
 
10 Proportion of partisans in the senate was not used in any models because it is too closely correlated to 
proportion in the house. 
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Popular support was important more important to executive budget success than 
legislative support. There was a clear positive relationship between proportion of votes 
won in the last election and both success measures. For issue success, this variable was in 
the best political model, with a one percent increase in election margin leading to a one-
point increase in the issue success score. Tables 50 and 51, Appendix D, show that both 
success scores also increased with governor’s approval proportions in polls taken before 
and during the budget process, but fewer states were represented in these models. 
As expected, governors were more successful when interest groups were weak 
and when early in their tenure. Many prior studies suggested that a strong interest group 
environment tilted the balance of power toward legislatures (Seligman and Covington 
1996, Thurber 1996a, Rubin 2000). Both measures of success fell as interest group 
strength rose. For the agency method, this was the most important political variable; 
moving interest groups up two units, from a “complementary” to a “dominant” role in the 
political process, lowered agency success by over 8 points on the 0 to 100 scale.  
The most striking results of the political regressions were the affect of time in 
service. Both measures indicated that governors were less successful with the passage of 
time. Tables 50 and 51, Appendix D, show models that incorporate four different ways of 
measuring time in service. Whether measured as year in the current term (or its square 
root), year in overall tenure, or the first budget of the term, time was important to both 
measures of budget success. Table 27 incorporates the most robust alternatives. Agency 
success decreased with the year in the term. Issue success showed a much stronger 
relationship with year in tenure, with success falling three points for each year the 
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governor had served. Measuring the time variable by the first budget of the term resulted 
in considerably less robust results than the models shown in Table 27. The models that 
incorporate the first budget, however, are provocative. They suggest that budget success 
is 5 points higher for the agency method and 10 points higher for the issue method in the 
first budget of the term than for any other budget. The results of all of the models 
incorporating time in term agree with survey results reported in Chapter 3, which found 
governors were most successful in the year immediately following election. Together, all 
three methods of analysis suggest a short budget “honeymoon” for governors. Those who 
wish to make significant policy changes through the budget should be prepared to do it 
immediately upon winning election or reelection.  
While the best political models for the two success measures employ different 
variables, they complement each other in interpreting the political aspects of budget 
success. Agency success was closely related to only one variable; success rose as interest 
group strength fell. Issue success rose with the governor’s election proportion and fell 
with year in tenure. As noted previously, relationships were consistent for both measures, 
even though they were not consistently strong relationships. These models thus provide 
some support for hypotheses that governors will be more successful with partisan support 
in the legislature, with popular support, with weak interest groups, and early in their 
service.  
Table 28 analyzes the impact of three political variables that were present in too 
few states to include in the regression analyses. The table compares residuals from the 
four political models of Table 27 to determine if any of these additional variables affected 
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executive budget success. The table suggests the variables may have affected success, but 
does not provide clear support for any of the three hypotheses.  Indeed, two of them 
appear to be contradicted.  It was hypothesized, for instance, that Republican governors 
with Democratic legislatures would be more successful, because the legislative tendency 
to reduce budgets would be tempered by the lower budget offered by a Republican. 
Residuals from all models were lower for this combination of partisan control, however. 
Apparently, divided government was a hindrance to governors regardless of party 
combination. Similarly, recent change in the partisan control of either the governor’s 
office or a house of the legislature was expected to reduce executive budget success. 
There was no support for this hypothesis; in fact, governors were much more successful 
as measured by the agency method if there had been a partisan change in the last election.  
Finally, it was hypothesized that governors would be more successful if their 
party controlled the legislature and an election followed this budget process. This 
provided a test of the theory that governments would manipulate the budget to increase 
their chances of reelection. Presumably such a manipulation requires close cooperation 
between the executive and legislative branches, resulting in a high success score for the 
governor. The results were mixed in this regard. Governors were more successful with 
unified government and an upcoming election by the agency method but less successful 
by the issue method. There were, however, only three governors in this position.  One can 
conclude that there was not clear support from this analysis for any of the three 
hypotheses. 
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Table 28.—Regression Residual Analysis for Selected Political Variables 
 Agency Models Issue Models 
Variable 
All Political 
Variables 
Best Political 
Model 
All Political 
Variables 
Best Political 
Model 
Republican governor with democratic legislature   
Yes (N=8)    -  2.28    -  5.15    -  0.26    -   2.57 
 No (N=41) 0.45       1.00       0.05        0.50 
Partisan change in last election   
 Yes (N=8)   4.38       3.87    -  0.36        0.39 
 No (N=41)    -  0.85    -  0.76       0.07    -   0.08 
Upcoming election with unified government  
 Yes (N=3)         3.86       2.26    - 17.85    - 17.82 
 No (N=46)    -  0.25    -  0.15        1.16        1.16 
Note: All models omit Minnesota, which is an outlier on election margin and  
 legislative party support. 
Personal Variables 
 
Table 29 suggests that personal variables were less clearly related to executive 
budget success than any of the other types. Only one variable was related consistently to 
both success measures and it defied expectations. Governors who limited their agenda 
(meaning more news and documentary coverage was concentrated on the governor’s top 
four issues) were less successful than those who pushed many issues. The relationship 
was much stronger for issue success than for agency success. Perhaps a governor with an 
aggressive budget agenda is able to trade some positions for success on the issues that are 
most important to the governor. 
The other four personal variables were positively related to one measure of 
success and negatively related to the other. Governors with more political experience 
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were more successful by the issue method but less successful by the agency method. Both 
relationships were of moderate strength. Governors who consistently advocated the same 
issues throughout the budget process were much more likely to be successful in achieving 
their budget issues, but slightly less likely to have their agency budgets adopted as 
proposed. Governors who proposed popular issues were somewhat less successful by the 
issue method but more successful by the agency method.  
Governors who proposed large increases were considerably more likely to 
succeed by the agency measure but somewhat less likely to succeed under the issue 
method. One possible explanation in the context of agency success is that, by proposing a 
large budget increase, the governor meets most agency budget needs and also reduces the 
chances the legislature will increase the total budget any further. If that is the case, 
agencies may be unlikely to seek additional funding from the legislature. Many final 
agency budgets will be similar to the governor’s proposal, with differences limited to 
major programs of interest to one or both branches of government. This interpretation is 
consistent with that of Clynch and Lauth (1991b) as to why governors achieve more 
budget success with high economic growth. One reason that proposing a large increase 
could hurt the issue score would be if the increase is supported by proposed increases in 
taxes or other revenues.  
 
Table 29.--Regression Models of Executive Budget Success and Personal Variables 
 
Agency Success 
Non-standardized 
Coefficient 
(Standard Error) 
Issue Success 
Non-standardized 
Coefficient 
(Standard Error) 
Independent Variable Full Model Best Model Full Model Best Model 
133
Political experience  -     0.18  (0.31) -- 
 0.32 
 (0.40) -- 
Limited agenda  -     0.05  (0.30) -- 
 -     0.39 
 (0.39) -- 
Consistency  -     3.53  (13.83) -- 
 36.22 
 (17.52) 
 22.73
(14.05) 
Popular issues  -     1.68  (1.70) -- 
 1.29 
 (2.15) -- 
Proposed budget growth  0.92(0.60) 
 0.85
(0.54) 
 -     0.72 
 (0.76) -
Intercept  66.40(10.60) 
 59.90
(3.99) 
 39.30 
 (13.44) 
 49.27
(7.95) 
F (degrees of freedom) 0.70 
 (5, 39) 
2.44 
 (1, 43) 
 0.99 
 (5, 39) 
 2.62
(1, 43) 
R2 0.08 0.05        0.11       0.06 
Adjusted R2 - 0.04 0.03        0.00       0.04 
N 45 45 45 45 
Note: All models omit Hawaii, Montana and Nevada, which are outliers on  
 proposed budget growth, and Delaware and Mississippi, which are outliers 
 on consistency. 
Governors who proposed large increases were considerably more likely to 
succeed by the agency measure but somewhat less likely to succeed under the issue 
method. One possible explanation in the context of agency success is that, by proposing a 
large budget increase, the governor meets most agency budget needs and also reduces the 
chances the legislature will increase the total budget any further. If that is the case, 
agencies may be unlikely to seek additional funding from the legislature. Many final 
agency budgets will be similar to the governor’s proposal, with differences limited to 
major programs of interest to one or both branches of government. This interpretation is 
consistent with that of Clynch and Lauth (1991b) as to why governors achieve more 
budget success with high economic growth. One reason that proposing a large increase 
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could hurt the issue score would be if the increase is supported by proposed increases in 
taxes or other revenues.  
There are no obvious explanations for the different directions of relationships for 
the political experience, consistency, and popular issues scores. One can only conclude 
from the unclear directions that none of the variables are consistently important to the 
governor’s budget success. This contrasts with clearer indications for the institutional, 
economic, and political variables. This overall picture also suggests that the best personal 
models, showing agency success dependent on proposing a large budget increase and 
issue success increasing with consistently advocating the same issue, have limited value. 
 
Regression Analysis on All Variable Types
Combined regression models shown in Table 30 help explain governors’ budget 
success by incorporating the best variables from the four variable type models already 
discussed. In order to create regression models using all variable types to explain 
executive budget success, two additional steps were necessary. First, a model was created 
for each measure of success that incorporated all dependent variables from the “best” 
models shown in Tables 25-29. After analyzing the results, a new model was created that  
Table 30.--Regression Models of Executive Budget Success and All Variable Types 
 
Agency Success 
Non-standardized 
Coefficient 
(Standard Error) 
Issue Success 
Non-standardized 
Coefficient 
(Standard Error) 
Independent Variable Full Model Best Model Full Model Best Model 
Political variables
Governor’s fiscal power --   -- 1.90 (0.83) 
1.90 
(0.83) 
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Executive budget office 
 power and control 
 0.24
(0.17) 
 0.24
(0.17) -- -- 
Legislative 
 professionalism 
 -  0.07 
 (0.04) 
 -   0.08 
 (0.03) -- -- 
Term limits are in 
 effect at all -- -- 
 11.97 
 (5.75) 
 11.97
(5.75) 
Biennial budget  2.33(4.73) -- -- -- 
Economic variables
Economic growth 
(standardized score) -- -- 
 -    1.92 
 (1.55) 
 -    1.92 
 (1.55) 
Budget per capita 
 (logarithm) -- -- 
 -  51.47 
 (39.23) 
 -  51.47 
 (39.23) 
Political variables
Governor’s election 
 proportion -- -- 
1.49 
(0.40) 
1.49 
(0.40) 
Interest group strength  -   4.24  (2.82) 
 -   4.32 
 (2.80) -- -- 
Year in tenure -- --  -    3.07 1.02 
 -    3.07 
1.02 
Personal variables
Consistency -- --  13.15  (10.69) 
 13.15
(10.69) 
Proposed budget growth  0.86(0.41) 
 0.93
(0.38) -- -- 
Intercept  79.85(13.35) 
 78.73
(13.05) 
 135.48 
 (141.91) 
 135.48
(141.91) 
F
(degrees of freedom) 
 2.96
(5, 44) 
 3.70
(4, 45) 
 5.73 
(7, 37) 
 5.73 
(7,37) 
R2 0.25      0.25       0.52  0.52 
Table 30.—Continued
Agency Success Issue Success 
Independent Variable Full Model Best Model Full Model Best Model 
Adjusted R2 0.17      0.18       0.43       0.43 
N 50 50 45* 45*
*Issue models exclude Alaska, an outlier on budget per capita, Massachusetts and  
 Vermont, outliers on fiscal power, and California and Tennessee, which are 
 outliers on issue success.  
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employed only the variables whose regression coefficients exceeded their standard errors 
in the first model.  
There are no common variables in the best models to explain the two different 
measures of budget success. This suggests that governors need different circumstances to 
have their major issues included in the final budget than they do to have their preferences 
for dividing money between state agencies adopted. None of the models, however, are 
contradictory as to individual variables and they provide support for some general 
interpretations of executive budget success. 
The best model for the measure of success by agency shows that four variables 
together explain one-fourth of the variation in the success measure. The coefficient of 
determination (R2) is .25, while the adjusted R2, which takes into account the number of 
variables in the model, is .18. Two institutional variables, one political, and one personal 
were included in this best model. All relationships were as expected and all but one was 
consistent with the results of issue success.  
Two institutional variables helped explain agency success. Control over a strong 
budget office was an important variable as indicated by the coefficient and standard error, 
but it did not have a large effect on agency budget success. Increasing this index by 13 
points (one standard deviation) increased issue success by 3 points. Legislative 
professionalism, as expected, worked against the governor. Again, however, the impact 
was small; moving up $99,000 from the lowest legislative salary (Alabama) to the highest 
(California) would decrease agency success by approximately 25 points.   
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One political variable and one personal variable also contributed to the best model 
of agency success. Interest group strength was important in predicting agency success. If 
the interest group environment moved up two levels on the five-point scale based on 
Thomas and Hrebenar (1999), agency success would be eight points lower. Like the 
previous two variables, this finding supports a hypothesis of this study. Proposed budget 
growth, the last variable in the model and the only personal variable, does not. Contrary 
to expectations, agency success could be expected to increase nearly one point for each 
percentage point increase in the governor’s budget.  That governors were more successful 
when they proposed larger budgets also contradicts the findings of earlier budget studies 
(Fenno 1966, Wildavsky 1975, Shull and Shaw 1999). An explanation for this 
phenomenon—that large increases satisfy agencies and legislatures and reduce conflict 
during the session, was advanced above. 
The best model for issue success is more successful in explaining variations than 
the model for agency success and includes more variables. The measures of fit--R2 of 
0.52 and adjusted R2 of 0.43—are considerably more impressive. This model explains 
approximately one-half of the variation in budget success among the governors. Seven 
variables—representing all four variable types—were important in explaining issue 
success. Two institutional variables were important and were consistent both with other 
findings of the study and with hypotheses. Fiscal power of the governor made the 
governor more successful. Increasing the fiscal power by one standard deviation 
increased issue success by seven points. Governors also were more successful—by 12 
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points on the scale from 0 to 100—if legislatures were limited in terms, even if the limits 
had not yet ended a specific member’s term.  
Two economic variables were important to the best model for issue success. 
Governors with weaker economies were more successful, though the effect was less than 
from either political variable. Economic growth was measured as a standardized score of 
growth in per capita income and in unemployment. If other factors were held constant, a 
decrease of one standard deviation in this measure increased the governor’s success score 
by four points. This contradicted expectations, which were that governors would be more 
successful in cases of extreme economic growth or decline. As hypothesized, governors 
were less successful in states with higher spending levels per capita, but this effect also 
was small. At the mean level of this indicator, increasing expenditures by $100 per 
person would lower issue success by just one-half of one point. 
Two political variables and one personal variable were important in explaining 
issue success. Governors did better when they had greater electoral support. A one 
percent increase in proportion of total votes resulted in a 1.5 point increase in success. 
Governors were more successful earlier in their service, with success declining three 
points for each year in tenure.  This result again points to the importance of a honeymoon 
period and the value to chief executives of developing and strongly advocating program 
changes as soon as they are elected. Consistency in advocating issues helped governors 
achieve their budget goals. The consistency measure is a correlation coefficient between 
issue scores early in the budget process and issue scores for the remainder of the 
legislative session. If this coefficient was 0.1 higher, issue success was 1.3 points higher.  
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Both models indicate that some institutional arrangements influenced governors’ 
budget success in the expected direction. Measures designed to strengthen the executive 
or weaken the legislative branch made governors more successful and vice versa. 
Economic variables affected only one of the two measures of success; governors did 
better with weak economies and comparatively lower spending. Some political variables 
were also influential in the expected direction. Governors were more successful where 
interest groups were weak, when they had strong election mandates, and earlier in their 
service. Personal variables were less important overall, as only one affected each success 
measure.  
The models also are important for what they do not say. Several variables thought 
to affect budget outcomes, such as formal power of the governor, partisan support in the 
legislature, personal experience, and selection of popular issues, did not have significant 
impacts on either measure of executive budget success.  This finding suggests that 
governors may have more ability than thought to achieve their budget goals. Governors 
were successful by both measures regardless of the lack of powers such as appointment 
and tenure, of opposition control of the legislature, and lack of political experience. The 
models suggest that other variables do explain a considerable amount of budget success, 
but that there is still room for the governor’s political skill to make a difference in budget 
outcomes. 
 
Conclusion
This chapter described the results of several quantitative analyses of executive 
budget success for 50 governors in one budget process. Because both the agency and 
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issues method differ from previous analyses of budget success and because there are only 
fifty cases, multiple methods were needed to confidently explain why some governors 
achieved their budget goals and others did not. These methods, including an analysis of 
success by type of issue, a comparison of the most and least successful governors, 
analysis of bivariate relationships of success with explanatory variables, and a series of 
regression analyses, offered several important insights. The clearest and most consistent 
results were that governors were more likely to accomplish their goals for the budget if 
they had relatively weaker legislatures and interest groups, if they had strong electoral 
support, and if they were early in their term. Additionally, there is some evidence that 
governors were more successful in biennial budgeting states, when controlling a strong 
budget office, when facing a weak economy, and when proposing larger budget 
increases. These results are explored in conjunction with the survey results in Chapter 5. 
The data described in this chapter also provided a rare opportunity to measure 
governors’ performance in accomplishing budgetary goals against that of their peers. One 
governor—Georgia’s Roy Barnes—stood out as the highest achiever, both by raw scores 
and after adjusting for environmental factors. A review of the most and least successful 
governors indicated that executives could succeed in a wide range of institutional, 
economic, and political settings. This provides support for a view that no governor is 
limited by the state’s legal environment or the current political situation, but that all 
governors have the capacity to achieve their goals by exercising political skills. Similarly, 
strong institutions and political support do not guarantee a governor will reach budget 
success. Some of the least successful governors had great formal and fiscal powers and 
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strong popular and legislative support, but performed below expectations. Just as luck, 
timing, and political skill can overcome obstacles that governors face in budgeting, lack 
of skill, or bad luck or timing, can squander the governor’s advantages. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
FINDINGS AND IMPLICATIONS 
 
This chapter concludes the study by combining the findings of the survey, agency 
and issue methods as to why governors were successful in achieving budget goals. From 
this evaluation, it draws overall conclusions as to what we can learn about executive 
budget success from this budget process across the United States. It then discusses these 
findings in the context of previous studies of executive budget success discussed in 
Chapter 1. Finally, it discusses limitations of the study and suggests future research 
directions. 
 
Summary of Findings
Table 31 summarizes the findings of seven complementary analyses of budget 
success from the 2001 budget. Two of these analyses were based on survey data and five 
on the agency and success scores obtained through documentary analysis. For each of the 
hypotheses described in Chapter 2 and summarized in Table 5, the table assesses the 
degree to which finding of each analysis supports or opposes the hypothesis. Note that 
survey results represent a small number of respondents from only 39 of the 50 states and 
that those states were not represented equally. Further, the survey results are the opinions 
and perceptions of people involved in the budget process, most with a bias in favor of one 
branch or the other. While the agency and issue methods both require a certain amount of 
subjective judgment on the part of the researcher, they are less likely to be biased; 
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further, these methods are applied uniformly in all states. Comparisons between these 
results and survey results, therefore, must be made with the knowledge that they 
represent different types of knowledge and apply to a different set of governors. The 
multiple-method design of this study, however, allows such comparisons for the first time 
and helps identify relationships that are common to the different sets of data. 
Several hypotheses regarding institutional variables were supported by the data, 
particularly those that suggest a weak legislature increased the governor’s budget 
success11. Legislative professionalism was among the strongest predictors of success, 
with  
a more professional legislature likely to reduce executive budget success. Four of the five 
analyses that tested this relationship confirmed it. The same number of analyses 
suggested that legislative term limits helped the governor. Legislative veto points also 
appear to have hurt executive budget success, though the evidence is not as strong as for 
the professionalism and term limits hypotheses. 
Among institutional factors in the executive branch, control over a strong budget 
office and fiscal powers--such as control over forecasts, line-item veto power, and power 
to reduce the budget during the year--were less important than several legislative factors, 
but still influenced budget success. There was very limited support for the contention that 
formal powers such as appointment, veto, and tenure helped a governor in the budgetary 
arena. A majority of survey respondents believed formal powers to be important, but 
most believed other factors were more important. The other analyses did not find 
 
11 The discussion of strength of support for relationships is based on the number of different analyses that 
lend support, and in the degree of relationship with success indicated by the analyses. 
144
relationships between formal powers and budget success. On the other hand, a biennial 
budget cycle did appear to help the governor. Every analysis except the final best 
regression models pointed to biennial budgeting as a factor in budget success. 
Table 31.—Summary of Findings Regarding Study Hypotheses 
Survey Method Agency and Issue Methods Hypothesis,  Variable, and 
 Expected 
 Relationship* Cross-tab 
Ques-
tion 
Issue 
Type 
Most/ 
Least 
Bi- 
variate
Regr. 
by 
Type 
Final 
Regr. 
Institutional
1. Governor’s 
 formal    
 power 
 (+) 
 1 0 0 0 0
2. Governor’s 
 fiscal power 
 (+) 
 1 0 0 1 1
3. Executive  
 budget 
 office 
 power and 
 control (+) 
 1 0 0 1 1
4. Legislative  
 professiona- 
 lism (-) 
 1§ 1 1 0 1
5. Legislative 
 term limits 
 (+) 
 0 1 1 1 1
6. Legislative 
 veto points 
 (-) 
 1[ 1 0 1 0
7. Biennial 
 budget (+)  1 1 1 1 0
Economic 
8. Economic 
 growth (**)  \ % % 0 %
9. Size of budget 
 (-)  0 0 1 1
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Political
10. Legislative 
 party  
 support (+) 
 1 1 1 1 1 0
Table 31.—Continued
Survey Method Agency and Issue Methods 
Hypothesis, 
 Variable, and 
 Expected 
 Relationship* 
Cross-
tab 
Ques-
tion 
Issue 
Type 
Most/ 
Least 
Bi- 
variate
Regr. 
by 
Type 
Final 
Regr. 
11. Republican 
 governor 
 with 
 Democratic 
 Legislature 
 (+) 
 - 1 0 - 1 - 1
12. Partisan 
 change (-)  - 1 0 0 0
13. Governor’s 
 popular 
 support (+) 
 ] 1 1 0 1
14. Interest 
 group 
 strength (-) 
 0 0 1 1
15. Year in 
 service (-)  1 1 1 1 1
16. Upcoming 
 election with 
 unified  
 government 
 (+) 
 0 0 0 0
Personal
17. Political 
 experience 
 (+) 
 1 0 0 0
18. Limited 
 agenda (+)  £ - 1 0 - 1 0
19. Consistency 
 (+)  £ 0 0 0 1
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20. Popular issues 
 (+)  0 1 1 - 1 0 0 0
21.Budget 
 increase (-)  - 1 - 1 0 - 1
Note: Cell entries are as follows: 
 1 indicates support for hypothesis 
 0 indicates no support for hypothesis 
 -1 indicates opposition to hypothesis 
Blank cell indicates the hypothesis was not tested 
Table 31.—Continued
An analysis is considered to support or oppose a hypothesis if: 
 Crosstabs—The difference between the percentage of survey respondents rating 
 governor somewhat or very successful for governors with the characteristic 
 is 10 percent higher or lower than the proportion for governors without the 
 characteristic. 
 Question—Over half of survey respondents rated the factor somewhat or very 
 important to the governor’s budget success. 
 Issue type—This was determined to support the hypothesis as discussed in 
 Chapter 4. 
 Most/Least—For continuous variables, the mean value of the variable differs 
 by 10 percent or more between the most and least successful governors. 
 For dichotomous variables, there is a difference of 15 percent or more in 
 the percentage of the most and least successful governors with the given 
 characteristic.  
 Bivariate —The absolute value of the correlation coefficient (Pearson’s r) 
 between the variable and either success measure is 0.25 or more. 
 Regression by type—The variable is related in a consistent direction with both  
 measures of budget success. 
 Final regression—The variable is in the best model for one measure of success.   
* + budget success is expected to increase as variable increases 
 - budget success is expected to decrease as variable increases 
 **   budget success is expected to increase as variable departs from the mean 
§ Question asked about importance of legislative fiscal office 
[ Question asked about importance of “Legislature’s budget process” 
\ Respondents agreed economy is important on success but did not agree 
 on direction of relationship 
 ] 79 percent of respondents rated “Governor’s popularity” very or somewhat 
 important to budget success, but 41 percent rated “Election mandate” very 
 or somewhat important. 
£ Question asked about “Clearly state and advocate agenda” 
% Results indicated that success increased with decreasing economic 
 conditions 
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Among economic variables, results were mixed. It seems certain that economic 
conditions made a difference in 2001 state budgets, though it was not as expected. Survey 
results indicated participants thought economic conditions were important to success but 
comments suggest a lack of agreement on direction of the relationship. Some quantitative 
analyses indicated that a weaker economy helped the governor in the budget process. 
There was evidence, albeit less clear, that a larger total budget, in relative terms, worked 
against the governor. Larger budgets may have constrained budget options, particularly in 
difficult economic conditions. This dynamic worked against governors who proposed 
new or expanded programs. 
 Among political variables, the finding regarding time in service is the clearest 
relationship identified by this study and is the study’s major contribution to the 
understanding of executive budget success. Governors were more likely to be successful 
early in their terms and tenure. This was confirmed by all five of the analyses that tested 
the relationship. Survey responses indicated governors were less successful with each 
passing year of the term. The most successful governors were earlier in their terms than 
the least successful. Both agency and issue success were correlated with every measure of 
time in service. Regression models explaining both types of success revealed strong 
relationships between year in service and executive budget success. Regardless of 
whether measuring by the first budget of the term, the year in the term, or the year in the 
tenure, success declined over time.  
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While studies of presidential budgeting and policy-making have revealed this 
relationship, no prior studies of state budgeting have found a link between time in service 
and governors’ budget success. These findings provide clear evidence of a honeymoon 
period for governors in the realm of budgeting. They suggest that chances of budget 
success are higher in the first year than any other time in the governor’s service. 
Governors, it appears, would benefit from being prepared to launch major budget 
initiatives immediately upon entering office, rather than waiting to get settled in. 
Agencies and interest groups also can learn from this result; they may be more likely to 
achieve their program goals working with gubernatorial candidates than with experienced 
governors. 
Legislative party support was equally important to executive budget success. All 
indicators suggested the governor was more likely to achieve success with unified 
government or a split legislature than with divided government. Only the final regression 
models did not confirm this relationship. Unlike the relationship with time in service, this 
result has been identified in many previous studies. 
The analyses to some extent confirmed the importance of popular support and to a 
lesser degree suggested that a strong interest group environment hurts the governor. 
Survey respondents rated popularity of the governor as an important factor but an 
election mandate as the least important. On the other hand, three of four quantitative 
analyses showed both election margin and current approval to be important to budget 
success. Half of the tests of interest group strength indicated that a stronger interest group 
environment hurts budget success and the other half did not. Finally, limited analysis did 
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not offer support for hypotheses that governors would be more successful if they were 
Republicans with a divided government, after a change in partisan control, or with 
unified government and an election coming up. Indeed, there was some evidence that 
Republicans with divided government had less success than other governors. 
 There was less support for hypotheses about personal variables than any other 
type. The most important finding was contradiction of the hypothesis that a small budget 
increase would promote executive budget success. If budget growth is sufficient, the 
governor’s issues can be funded along with the legislature’s priorities. Similarly, the 
evidence calls into question the expectation that limiting the budget agenda would help 
the governor. Two quantitative analyses suggested that broader agendas made governors 
more successful. Budget participants’ belief that governors who could “Clearly state and 
advocate an agenda” were more successful is compatible with the hypothesis but also 
with its opposite. Governors’ choice of budget issues appears to have made some 
difference in budget success. Issue success scores gave some indication that governors 
were more successful in proposing certain types of issues, but the nature of the data 
makes speculating dangerous. Survey respondents, however, agreed that proposing 
popular programs was important to success. Governors did not appear to benefit from 
consistently pushing their agendas, however, nor is there evidence that governors with 
more political experience were more successful. 
 A brief review of the strongest relationships provides insights on factors that help 
governors succeed in budgeting. These factors are listed below, in decreasing order of 
strength of the evidence. 
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• Governors were more successful early in their terms. 
• Governors benefited from partisan support in the legislature.  
• Governors facing institutionally weaker legislatures—those that were less 
professional and were limited in terms—were more likely to succeed in the 
budget process. 
 
• Governors did better in biennial budgets than in annual ones.   
• Governors were more likely to achieve their budget goals in a relatively weaker 
economy. This confirms that legislatures are likely to defer to the governor’s 
judgment in hard times.  
 
• Governors with greater popular support were more successful. Taken together 
with the finding on time in term, this suggests that budgeting is responsive to an 
election mandate; a governor is most likely to “win” at budgeting right after a 
strong election performance.  
 
• Executive branch institutions, including control over a strong executive budget 
office, and fiscal power, helped the governor succeed.  
 
• Governors were more successful if they proposed large budget increases. 
 
Several other factors, including proposing popular programs and working in a 
state with a relatively weak interest group system, helped explain executive budget 
success, though they were less important than the factors enumerated previously. This 
review suggests that a few key institutional, economic, and political factors help explain 
executive budget success, along with personal decisions made by the governor. Knowing 
the importance of these variables helps us better understand the dynamics of government 
budgeting.  
 The results of the study are equally important, however, for showing that 
budgeting outcomes are not ordained in advance. No institutional factors make a 
governor so strong or so weak as to guarantee budget achievement or doom. Similarly, no 
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economic conditions are a precondition to success or failure. Governors are helped by 
popular and legislative support and are more likely to achieve their goals early in their 
terms. Having these factors in the governor’s favor, however, does not mean a successful 
budget, nor does lacking them mean failure. The same is true of the governor’s selection 
of popular issues, consistent advocacy, and proposing a large increase. In other words, 
each budget process unfolds in a context that shapes, but does not determine, budget 
outcomes. Every governor has a chance to succeed or fail in any setting. The evaluation 
of most and least successful governors indicates that some governors do succeed in 
negative environments, just as others fail in positive one.  
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This Study in the Context of the Budgeting Literature
This work adds to the study of executive budgeting in four important ways. First, 
it explores the budget outcomes in every state for a full budget season. All previous 
studies have concentrated on subsets of states or of state or federal agencies. Second, it 
measures budget success in a number of ways. While most prior studies examined 
differences either in agency budgets or in budget totals, this work adds differences in 
important issues and includes the views of budget participants. Third, it offers new 
measures and methods for studying budget outcomes. While most previous studies have 
used individual agencies as the unit of analysis, this one uses the executive’s overall 
budget outcome. The few studies that have studied executive budget success have done 
so based on differences between the governor and legislature on agency budgets or on 
total budgets. This study refines the measurement of differences on agency budgets by 
limiting the analysis to major agencies that are likely to be the center of budget conflict. 
More importantly, it introduces a new measure of success based on differences between 
the governor and legislature on major budget issues. These issues—such as teacher pay 
raises, tax reductions, and increases in the highway patrol—are why governors got 
elected and how they want their accomplishments to be measured. The major issues also 
are responsible for generating legislative responses to the governor’s budget proposal. 
Further, they are what the public cares about in the budgetary process. This study is the 
first to attempt to measure budgetary success on the participants’—and the publics’—
own terms. Fourth, this study employs more explanatory variables than any prior 
examination of executive budget success. 
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Table 32 places the findings of this study in the context of the previous major 
studies of executive budget success. The findings of those studies were described in 
Chapter 1 and described in Table 2. This table reproduces those findings and shows how 
they are supported or contradicted by this study.  
On balance, this table suggests more similarities than differences between the 
results of the present study and its predecessors. More than one of the preceding studies 
identified legislative support and high expenditures as factors that contributed to 
executive budget success. This study offers support to those findings. It also supports 
conclusions from single studies that executives were more successful when they faced 
less professional legislatures, possessed fiscal powers, and in their first year.  
Results from this study contradict previous findings that proposing small budget 
increases contributed to the executive’s success. This contention was made only by 
Wildavsky (1975), who did not make his evidence clear. He argued that legislatures do 
not like to cut budgets and will do so only if a governor proposes an increase that is too 
high. It is possible that the dynamic of budgeting has changed in the thirty years since 
Wildavsky’s claim. States have become more sophisticated, offer more services, and have 
more  diverse and elastic revenue sources  than  they did  in 1975.  There may be less of a  
negative connotation to large budget increases than in the earlier times. In addition, 
legislatures have become more professional and more constituent-oriented. They may 
risk more political support in cutting funding than their predecessors. As noted above, if 
the governor is willing to take the lead by proposing a large budget, it seems likely that 
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legislatures will use the opportunity to fund their own priorities along with the 
governor’s. With a lot of money to spend, budget conflict is reduced.  
Table 32.—Previous Findings on Executive Budget Success Compared to  
 Results of this Study 
Authors Factors Making Executive 
 More Successful 
Relevant Results from  
This Study 
Anton 
(1966) 
Ability to reduce budget after 
adoption, control over strong 
executive budget office 
Moderate support 
Davis, 
Dempster 
and 
Wildavsky 
(1966) 
Continuity in partisan control of 
branches 
Limited contradiction 
Fenno 
(1966) 
Continuity in partisan control of 
branches, agencies without public 
support, peacetime 
Limited contradiction of 
continuity 
Sharkansky 
(1968) 
Tenure power of governor, few 
elected executives, high total 
expenditures 
Limited support for tenure 
or elected executives, 
limited support for high 
expenditures 
Wildavsky 
(1975) 
Tenure power of governor, veto 
power, few elected officials, 
partisan support in legislature, 
proposing small budget increases 
Limited support for tenure 
or veto power or for 
elected officials, support 
for party support, moderate 
contradiction of small 
budget increases 
Moncrief 
and 
Thompson 
(1980) 
Party support in legislature Support 
Kiewiet 
and 
McCubbins 
(1985) 
Party support in legislature, first 
year of administration 
Support for party support, 
strong support for first year 
Thompson 
(1987) 
Agency dependence on 
earmarked funds, less 
professional legislature 
Strong support for less 
professional legislature 
Clarke 
(1998) 
Higher formal power, party 
control of one or two houses in 
the legislature, large agency 
No support for formal 
power, support for party 
control of legislature 
Shull and 1974 budget reforms, popular Support for popular 
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Shaw 
(1999) 
approval, high total expenditures approval, limited support 
for high total expenditures. 
This study also contradicts earlier findings that executives were less successful 
immediately after changes in partisan control of either the executive or legislative branch. 
Those results were based on agency budgets at the federal level from the 1940s to the 
1960s (Davis, Dempster and Wildavsky 1966, Fenno 1966). These scholars reasoned that 
a partisan change would dramatically change budget preferences. A Democratic president 
would want to spend much more than his Republican predecessor and allocate the 
spending differently. It makes sense that there would be less budget agreement when the 
chief executive proposes dramatic change. Similarly, if the minority party took over 
Congress, one would expect less budget agreement with the President.  
There are two reasons to distinguish the results of this study from these earlier 
studies. First, states have less budget flexibility than the national government. With large 
shares of the budget driven by formulas for funding education and Medicaid, a governor 
does not have as much flexibility as a president to offer radical budget changes. Second, 
partisan differences in spending preferences have changed since the period examined by 
Fenno and Davis, Dempster, and Wildavsky. Republican President George W. Bush, for 
example, has presided over budgets with the largest deficits in history. Dwight D. 
Eisenhower would not have considered Bush’s budgets the work of a Republican. 
Governors’ budget proposals did not fall strictly along party lines in 2001. Five of the 
twelve governors who proposed budget increases of ten percent or more, for example, 
were Republicans. 
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This study adds to the literature by identifying contributing factors that were less 
prevalent in the previous studies, including the executive budget office, a biennial budget 
cycle, weak interest group structure, and consistency of agenda. All helped governors 
achieve their budget goals in 2001 and are worthy of additional study at the state and 
national levels. Finally and most importantly, this study is only the second among those 
listed in the table to identify time in service as an important—perhaps the most 
important—contributor to executive budget success. Further, the previous finding in this 
regard was for the president and not for governors. This suggests a relationship that 
should be more carefully examined, particularly in light of its implications for how policy 
change can be accomplished. 
 Another important contribution to the literature made by this study is the 
measurement of success by issue. This can advance the study of budgeting in several 
ways. First, it measures the executive’s agenda rather than agency budgets or budget 
totals that contain thousands of decisions that are of limited importance to the chief 
executive. Many governors had different levels of success as measured by the agency and 
issue methods. The two measures also were explained by different variables. This 
suggests that studies of why executives achieve their budget goals should look at more 
than government or agency budgets and should concentrate on issues that are the most 
important to the governor and the state. Second, it allows for future study as to which 
specific issues result in executive budget success or failure. Third, it measures outcomes 
in a way that is more likely to make sense to budget participants and observers. While 
evaluating executive budget success by issue is time-consuming and leaves more room 
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for error than other methods, it promises to provide better information as to why 
executives succeed in budgeting. 
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Limitations in this Analysis
The reader should consider several limitations to the methods used in this study. 
These include comparing measures from different types of data that cover different states 
in different proportions, several potential problems from limiting the study to one budget 
year, and threats to validity within the creation of the measures of executive budget 
success. 
Comparing survey responses with documentary evidence introduces some 
problems into the study. The survey responses do not represent all 50 states, nor do they 
represent states equally. Further, they are from budget process participants, not neutral 
observers. Additionally, it cannot be known if non-responders had different views of the 
budget process. The multi-pronged approach to analysis derives as much information as 
possible from the limited number of cases and makes up for some data and response 
issues by combining multiple types of data. However, reliability and validity questions 
remain. 
Second, the choice of one budget process as the venue of analysis means that 
different results could be derived by studying a different year.  As noted in Chapter 2, 
however, the study of a single budget year has many offsetting advantages. 
Third, the study does not measure the impact of strategic behavior by governors 
and legislatures. It is likely that executives make budget recommendations in anticipation 
of the action of legislatures and they may not make their actual choices known to the 
public or to other budget participants. Kiewiet and McCubbin (1985, 1991) found mixed 
results as to whether presidents acted in this strategic manner. The present study uses the 
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governor’s public documents to identify executive budget preferences for agencies and 
issues.  If a governor prefers an amount for an issue, say $100 million for teacher pay 
increases, but anticipates that the legislature will lower the recommended amount, the 
executive budget might include $125 million for teacher pay increases.  If the legislature 
indeed reduces the amount to $100 million, the governor will have achieved his goal, but 
the success score assigned in this study would be only 80 of a possible 100. If the 
legislature does not reduce the amount, the governor preferred a lower amount but the 
issued would be scored 100.  
Fourth, data from a single budget year fail to take into account the impact of 
previous budgets. In the national government, executive budget success appears to be 
related to success of the previous year (Shull and Shaw 1999). If a governor in this study 
had a high success score in part because of a cordial budget process the previous year, the 
score would not be fully explained by the independent variables used in the study. The 
results of the regression analysis could be biased by the omission of this variable.   
Finally, the creation of new measures requires a number of choices for which 
there is little or no guidance in the literature. The choices that are made in this study 
affect the outcome of the study to some degree. Just a few of the decisions made in 
creating the issue success score suggest that a different, yet equally valid score could be 
created.  For example: 
• Some issues that were excluded, including capital projects, bond-funded 
projects, small issues, and all status quo recommendations, could have been 
included. 
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• Issues could have been identified and ranked based only on information from 
the governor’s speeches and budget documents rather than legislative 
documents and news coverage. 
 
• Documents used to determine the major issues could have been weighted 
differently. 
 
• Differences between governors’ proposals and legislatures’ appropriations 
could have been weighted equally whether the legislature was above or below 
the governor. 
 
• Fewer or more issues could have been included in the overall success score. 
 
Any of these changes might have changed the issue success score, which might 
have changed the relationships between that score and the independent variables. 
Sensitivity analysis can be applied to the data of this study and in future studies that apply 
this method in other settings. By doing so, the study of budgeting will be advanced 
through the improvement of a measure that rates budget success in the terms understood 
by budget participants and observers and by the public at large. 
 
Additional Research
While this study adds to the understanding of the success executives can achieve 
through budgeting, it leaves much to be explained.  Some of the variation in governors’ 
budget success that is not captured by the methods used in this study can never be 
explained; it is specific to this governor, this legislature, and this budget year.   
There are many other avenues to understanding the questions raised by this study, 
all of which should be explored. As noted previously, data for this study could be used in 
a more detailed study of issues offered by governors, with two possible effects. One is to 
create better statistical models that can result from the analysis of 200 issues rather than 
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50 states. Another is to determine if some issue areas and some specific issue proposals 
are more likely to result in success for the governor. 
There are several ways to extend this study across other times and locations. One 
possibility is to study executive budget success over time in several states. Data on 
budget preferences and outcomes are readily available for five or more budget cycles in 
many states, thanks to the World Wide Web. Studying budget success over time in a 
single state can help determine the level of variability and start to ascribe it to 
characteristics of the state that are not identified in the present research, to the style and 
methods of different governors in the same institutional setting, and to more finely 
measured fiscal conditions.  It also could add to our understanding of why budget success 
falls during the governor’s term.  
Another extension of this study would be to reproduce it for another budget year. 
The agency method is simple and consumes relatively little time; it could be applied in 
several budget years in a relatively short time, as could a simplified version of the issue 
method (for example, tracking only the largest dollar amount issues, using only official 
documents to identify and weigh issues, or using a random sample of news articles 
instead of all available articles).   
Another promising approach would be more in-depth case study research in 
several of the states for the 2001 budget process.  Following Lieberman’s (2005) “nested 
analysis” strategy, a researcher could conduct model-testing case studies by selecting five 
to ten states for more intensive analysis based on variation in the key independent 
variables (such as legislative professionalism, legislative partisan support, popular 
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support for the governor, and year in service).  By tracing the budget from proposal 
through appropriation, one could expect to better understand why these variables help 
explain budget success and identify other variables that help understand those cases 
where the modeled relationships do not hold.  One could expect to understand better, with 
an eye toward better measurement, the role of negotiating tactics, sequence of legislative 
events, distribution of power within the legislature, tradeoffs between specific issue 
positions, and the deadlines that inevitably shape budget results.   
Finally, the study of executive budget success need not be limited to American 
states.  A longitudinal study of presidential budget success would be likely to capture 
impacts of institutional and political change better than a cross-sectional analysis.  Shull 
and Shaw’s 1999 study did so by examining total budgets. Applying the agency and issue 
methods could help illuminate the nature and environment of presidential budgeting. At 
the same time, executive budgeting is practiced in many of the democratic nations of the 
world.  Extending the analysis internationally would help identify new variables such as 
parliamentary systems and corruption. 
 
Conclusion
American governments are systems of separate and competing powers. One 
important function of the executive power over the last one hundred years has been to set 
the agenda for change by proposing a unified budget for the next fiscal period. After 
months of deliberation, debate, and revision, this proposal becomes a budget that directs 
the government’s policy, economic, financial, and administrative behavior for the year. 
Shortly after its adoption, deliberation begins for the coming year. 
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This study attempts to add to the understanding of the cycles of budget proposal, 
debate, and adoption. It shows that an executive’s budget proposal is more likely to 
become law if that executive is early in the term and supported by partisans in the 
legislature. It shows that strong legislative institutions reduce the chances that an 
executive’s proposal will be supported. It also shows that popular support for the 
governor is translated to budget success. It suggests that executives gain from proposing 
large budget increases but are constrained by the overall size of government. It shows 
that executive budgeting power is increased when the economy is weaker.  
By identifying institutional, economic, political, and personal factors that help 
determine if an executive is successful in the budgeting arena, this study adds definition 
to the basis and limits of executive budgeting powers. Understanding these powers is 
essential to understanding the role and power of the executive in our political system. 
This study uses new methods and new environments to add to that understanding. When 
these methods are otherwise tested and improved through further refinement and 
application, they promise to illuminate budget outcomes in new ways. This study, by 
incorporating new and multiple methods, further defines the important parameters of 
executive power, but it equally sheds light on how much still is to be discovered. 
164
REFERENCES 
 
Abney, Glenn and Thomas P. Lauth. 1989. The executive budgeting in the states: 
normative idea and empirical observation. Political Studies Journal 17 (Summer): 
829-40. 
 
_______. 1998. The end of executive dominance in state appropriations.  Public 
Administration Review 58 (September/October): 388-94. 
 
Alt, James E. and Robert C. Lowry. 1994. Divided government, fiscal institutions, and 
budget deficits: evidence from the states. American Political Science Review 88 
(December): 811-25. 
 
_______. 2000. A dynamic model of state budget outcomes under divided partisan 
government. Journal of Politics 62 (November): 1035-69. 
 
Anton, Thomas. 1966. The politics of state expenditure in Illinois. Urbana: University of 
Illinois Press. 
 
Auten, Gerald, Barry Bozeman, and Robert Klein.  1984.  A sequential model of 
Congressional appropriations.  American Journal of Political Science 28 (August): 
503-23. 
 
Bailey, John J. and Robert J. O’Connor. 1975. Operationalizing incrementalism and 
measuring the muddles. Public Administration Review 35 (Jan.-Feb.): 60-66.  
 
Baldez, Lisa and John M. Carey. 1999. Presidential agenda control and spending policy: 
Lessons from General Pinochet’s constitution. American Journal of Political 
Science 43 (January): 29-55. 
 
Balutis, Alan P. 1975. The budgetary process in New York state: the role of the 
legislative staff. In The political pursestrings: The role of the legislature in the 
budget process, ed. Alan P. Balutis and Daron K. Butler, 139-71. New York: John 
Wiley and Sons. 
 
Balutis, Alan P. and Daron K. Butler, 1975. Conclusion. In The political pursestrings: 
The role of the legislature in the budget process, ed. Alan P. Balutis and Daron K. 
Butler, 201-9. New York: John Wiley and Sons. 
 
Barone, Michael and Richard E. Cohen. 2000. Almanac of American politics 2000.
165
Washington: National Journal Group. 
 
_______. Almanac of American politics 2002. Washington: National Journal Group. 
 
_______. Almanac of American politics 2004. Washington: National Journal Group. 
 
Berman, Larry. 1978. OMB and the hazards of presidential staff work. Public 
Administration Review 38 (November/December): 520-4. 
 
Bernick, Ethan M. and E. Lee Bernick. 2001. After the veto: North Carolina legislators’ 
perception of executive-legislative relations. State and Local Government Review
33 (Fall): 166-72. 
 
Berry, William D.  1986.  Testing budgetary theories with budgetary data: Assessing the 
risks. American Journal of Political Science 30 (August): 597-627. 
 
Beyle, Thad L. 1983a.  Governors. In Politics in the American states: A comparative 
analysis, 4th ed., ed. Virginia Gray, Herbert Jacob, and Kenneth N. Vines, 180-
221. Boston: Little Brown and Company. 
 
_______. 1983b. Governor’s offices: Variations on common themes. In Being governor: 
the view from the office, ed. Thad L. Beyle and Lynn R. Muchmore, 158-73. 
Durham, NC: Duke University Press. 
 
_______. 2005a. Governors’ institutional powers, 2001. November 1, 2005.  
<http://www.unc.edu/~beyle/2001-GIP-101.doc.> 
 
_______. 2005b. State governors 1958-2005 data base.  November 1, 2005.   
<http://www.unc.edu/~beyle.jars.html>. 
 
Beyle, Thad L. and Lynn R. Muchmore. 1983. Governors in the American federal 
system. In Being governor: the view from the office, ed. Thad L. Beyle and Lynn 
R. Muchmore, 12-22. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. 
 
Blair, Diane K. 1983. The gubernatorial appointment power: Too much of a good thing?  
In Being governor: The view from the office, ed. Thad L Beyle and Lynn R. 
Muchmore, 116-21.  Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press. 
 
Brace, Paul and Daniel S. Ward. 1999. The institutionalized legislature and the rise of the 
antipolitics era.  In American state and local politics: Directions for the 21st 
century, ed. Ronald E. Weber and Paul Brace, 71-96. New York: Chatham House 
Publishers. 
 
166
Briffault, Richard. 1996. Balancing acts: The reality behind state balanced budget 
requirements. New York: The Twentieth Century Fund Press. 
 
Burke, John P. 1998. The institutional presidency.  In The presidency and the political 
system, 5th ed., ed. Michael Nelson, 411-36. Washington: CQ Press. 
 
Chadha, Anta, Ann Permaloff, and Robert A. Bernstein. 2001. The consequences of 
independence: Functions and resources of state legislative fiscal offices. State and 
Local Government Review 33(3): 202-7. 
 
Clarke, Wes. 1998. Divided government and budget conflict in the U.S. states. 
Legislative Studies Quarterly 23 (February): 5-22. 
 
Cleveland, Frederick A. and Arthur E. Buck. 1920. The budget and responsible 
government. New York: The Macmillan Co. 
 
Clynch, Edward J. and Thomas P. Lauth. 1991a. Budgeting in the American states: 
Important questions about an important activity.  In Governors, legislatures, and 
budgets: Diversity across the American states, ed. Edward J. Clynch and Thomas 
P. Lauth, 1-6. Contributions in Political Science Number 265.  New York: 
Greenwood Press. 
 
________. 1991b. Conclusions: Budgeting in the American states: Conflict and diversity. 
In Governors, legislatures, and budgets: Diversity across the American states, ed. 
Edward J. Clynch and Thomas P. Lauth, 149-56. Contributions in Political 
Science Number 265.  New York: Greenwood Press. 
 
Conant, James K. 2003.  Introduction: State budgeting in FY 2002:  Dealing with the bust 
phase of the boom and bust cycle, again!  Public Budgeting and Finance 23 
(Summer): 1-4. 
 
Cope, Glen H. 1991. Texas: Legislative budgeting in a post-oil-boom economy. In 
Governors, legislatures, and budgets: Diversity across the American states, ed. 
Edward J. Clynch and Thomas P. Lauth, 115-24. Contributions in Political 
Science Number 265.  New York: Greenwood Press. 
 
Corwin, Edward S. 1948. The President: Office and powers, 1787-1940. History and 
analysis of practice and opinion. 3rd ed., rev. New York: New York University 
Press. 
 
Council of State Governments. 1999. Book of the States 1988/99, vol. 32. Lexington, 
KY: Council of State Governments. 
 
_______. 2000. Book of the States 2000, vol. 33. Lexington, KY: Council of State 
167
Governments. 
 
_______. 2002. Book of the States 2002, vol. 34. Lexington, KY: Council of State 
Governments. 
 
Cox, James, Gregory Hager, and David Lowery. 1993. Regime change in presidential and 
congressional budgeting: Role discontinuity or role evolution? American Journal 
of Political Science 37 (February): 88-118. 
 
Davidson, Roger H. 1996. The presidency and congressional time. In Rivals for power: 
Presidential-congressional relations, ed. James A. Thurber, 19-44.  Washington: 
Congressional Quarterly Press. 
 
Davis, Otto A., M.A.H. Dempster, and Aaron Wildavsky. 1966. A theory of the 
budgetary process. American Political Science Review 60 (September): 529-47. 
 
Dometrius, Nelson C. 1991. The power of the (empty) purse.  In Gubernatorial leadership 
and state policy, ed. Eric B. Herzik and Brent W. Brown, 93-103. Contributions in 
Political Science Number 281.  New York: Greenwood Press. 
 
Dye, Thomas R. 1969.  Executive power and public policy in the states. Western Political 
Quarterly 22 (December): 926-39.  
 
Eckelbecker, Lisa. 2001. Lobbyist sees tough health issues on national agenda. Worcester 
Telegram and Gazette January 30, 2001, E1. 
 
Eckl, Corina. 2001. States adjust to changing economy. State Legislatures April, 2001, 
28-31. 
 
Eckl, Corina and Arturo Perez. 2001. State budget and tax actions preliminary report.
Denver: National Conference of State Legislatures. 
 
Epstein, Leon D. 1978. Old states in a new system. In Change and continuity in the 
modern presidency, ed. Anthony King, 45-85. Washington: American Enterprise 
Institute. 
 
Farnum, Eugene. 1975. The legislative fiscal staff’s role in the budgetary process in 
Michigan. In The political pursestrings: The role of the legislature in the budget 
process, ed. Alan P. Balutis and Daron K. Butler, 81-90. New York: John Wiley 
and Sons. 
 
Fenno, Richard. 1966. The power of the purse. Boston: Little, Brown and Company. 
 
Fisher, Louis. 1997. Biennial budgeting in the federal government. Public Budgeting and 
168
Finance 17 (Fall): 87-97. 
 
Gold, Steven D. 1995. Lessons for the future. In The fiscal crisis of the states: Lessons 
for the future, ed. Steven D. Gold, 367-82. Washington: Georgetown University 
Press. 
Gosling, James J. 1985. Patterns of influence and choice in the Wisconsin budgetary 
process. Legislative Studies Quarterly 10 (November): 457-82. 
 
_______. 1987. The state budget office and policy making. Public Budgeting and Finance
7 (Spring): 51-65. 
 
Greenstein, Fred I. 1978. Change and continuity in the modern Presidency. In The new 
American political system, ed. Anthony King, 45-86. Washington: American 
Enterprise Institute. 
 
Grizzle, Gloria A. 1991. Florida: Miles to go and promises to keep. In Governors, 
legislatures, and budgets: Diversity across the American states, ed. Edward J. 
Clynch and Thomas P. Lauth, 93-102. Contributions in Political Science Number 
265.  New York: Greenwood Press. 
 
Grooters, Jennifer and Corina Eckl. 1998. Legislative budget procedures: a guide to 
appropriations and budget processes in the states, commonwealths and territories.
Denver: National Conference of State Legislatures. 
 
Gross, Donald. 1991. The policy role of governors. In Gubernatorial leadership and state 
policy, ed. Eric B. Herzik and Brent W. Brown, 1-24. Contributions in Political 
Science Number 281.  New York: Greenwood Press. 
 
Guhde, Robert and Husain Mustafa. 1981. Partisan politics and legislative-gubernatorial 
competition in budgeting.  State and Local Government Review 13(3): 124-7. 
 
Hall, Thad E. 2002. Changes in legislative support for the governor’s program over time. 
Legislative Studies Quarterly 27 (February): 107-22. 
Hansen, Susan B. 1983. Extraction: The politics of state taxation. Politics in the 
American states: A comparative analysis, 4th ed., ed. Virginia Gray, Herbert 
Jacob, and Kenneth N. Vines, 180-221. Boston: Little Brown and Company. 
 
_______. 1999. Governor’s job performance ratings and state unemployment: the case of 
California.  State and Local Government Review 31 (Winter): 7-17. 
 
Hartmark, Leif S. 1975. The role of the legislative budget staff in the budgetary process 
of Wisconsin. In The political pursestrings: The role of the legislature in the 
169
budget process, ed. Alan P. Balutis and Daron K. Butler, 103-38. New York: John 
Wiley and Sons. 
 
Heclo, Hugh. 1984. Executive budget making. In Federal budget policy in the 1980's, ed. 
Gregory B. Mills and John L. Palmer, 255-91. Washington: The Urban Institute. 
 
Hedge, David M. 1983. Fiscal dependency and the state budget process.  The Journal of 
Politics 45 (February): 198-208.   
 
Hershey, William. 2001. Governor deserves non-pals’ respect. Dayton Daily News, 24 
June, 2001 3B.   
 
Jernberg, James E. 1991. Minnesota: Searching for stability.  In Governors, legislatures, 
and budgets: Diversity across the American states, ed. Edward J. Clynch and 
Thomas P. Lauth, 71-81. Contributions in Political Science Number 265.  New 
York: Greenwood Press. 
Jones, Bryan D., James L. True, and Frank R. Baumgartner. 1997. Does incrementalism 
stem from political consensus or from institutional gridlock? American Journal of 
Political Science 41 (October): 1319-39. 
 
Jones, Charles O. 1994. The Presidency in a separated system. Washington: Brookings 
Institution. 
 
Jordan, Meagan M. and Merl M. Hackbart. 1999. Performance budgeting and 
performance funding in the states: a status assessment. Public Budgeting and 
Finance 19 (Spring): 68-88. 
 
Joyce, Phillip. 1998. The federal line item veto experiment: After the Supreme Court 
ruling, what’s next? Public Budgeting and Finance 18 (Winter): 3-21. 
Kiewiet, D. Roderick and Matthew D. McCubbins. 1985. Appropriations decisions as a 
bilateral bargaining game between President and Congress. Legislative Studies 
Quarterly 10 (May): 181-201. 
 
_______.  1991.  The logic of delegation. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
 
Kleine, Robert J. 1995. Michigan: Rethinking fiscal priorities. In The fiscal crisis of the 
states: Lessons for the future, ed. Steven D. Gold, 296-325. Washington: 
Georgetown University Press. 
 
Lauth, Thomas P. 1984. Methods of agency head selection and gubernatorial influence 
over agency appropriations. Southern Review of Public Administration 7
(Winter): 397-409. 
170
_______. 1991. Georgia: Shared power and fiscal conservatives. In Governors, 
legislatures, and budgets: Diversity across the American states, ed. Edward J. Clynch and 
Thomas P. Lauth, 53-62. Contributions in Political Science Number 265.  New York: 
Greenwood Press. 
 
LeLoup, Lance T. 1978. The myth of incrementalism: Analytical choices in budgetary 
theory. Polity 10 (Summer): 488-509. 
 
LeLoup, Lance T. and William B. Moreland. 1978. Agency strategies and executive 
review: the hidden politics of budgeting. Public Administration Review 38 (May-
June): 232-9. 
 
LeLoup, Lance T., Carolyn N. Long, and James N. Giorgano. 1998. President Clinton’s 
fiscal 1998 budget: Political and constitutional paths to balance. Public Budgeting 
and Finance 18 (Spring): 3-32. 
 
Lessmann, Sabine. 1987. Budgetary politics and elections: An investigation of public 
expenditures in West Germany. The Future of Party Government, ed. Rudolf 
Wildenmann, vol. 4. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter. 
 
Lieberman, Evan S. 2005. Nested analysis as a mixed-method strategy for comparative 
research. American Political Science Review 99 (August): 435-52. 
Luce, Thomas F., Jr. 1995. Minnesota: Innovation in an era of constraint. In The fiscal 
crisis of the states: Lessons for the future, ed. Steven D. Gold, 326-63. 
Washington: Georgetown University Press. 
Lynch, Timothy B. 2001. Charter reform and finance organization in the City of Los 
Angeles. Government Finance Review (February): 38-9. 
 
MacManus, Susan A. 1995. Florida: Reinvention derailed. In The fiscal crisis of the 
states: Lessons for the future, ed. Steven D. Gold, 197-251. Washington: 
Georgetown University Press. 
 
McRae, C.D. 1977. A political model of the business cycle. Journal of Political Economy
85: 239-63. 
 
Mayer, Kenneth R. 1999. Executive orders and presidential power. Journal of Politics 61 
(May): 445-66. 
 
Moe, Terry M. 1982. Regulatory performance and Presidential administration. American 
Journal of Political Science 26 (May): 197-224. 
 
171
Moncrief, Gary F. and Joel A. Thompson. 1980. Partisanship and purse strings: a 
research note on Sharkansky.  Western Political Quarterly 33 (September): 336-
40. 
 
Moncrief, Gary F., Richard G. Niemi, and Lynda W. Powell. 2004. Time, term limits and 
turnover: Trends in membership stability in U.S. state legislatures. Legislative 
Studies Quarterly 29 (August): 357-82. 
 
Muchmore, Lynn R. and Thad L. Beyle. 1983. Governor as party leader. In Being 
Governor: the view from the office. ed. Thad L. Beyle and Lynn R. Muchmore, 
44-51. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. 
 
Mueller, John E. 1970. Presidential popularity from Truman to Johnson. American 
Political Science Review 64 (March): 18-34. 
 
National Association of State Budget Officers. 2001. Fiscal survey of the states.
December. Washington: National Governors Association. 
 
_______. 2002a. Budget processes in the states. Washington: National Association of 
State Budget Officers. 
 
_______. 2002b. Fiscal survey of the states. May. Washington: National Governors 
Association. 
 
_______. 2003. State expenditure report 2003. Washington: National Association of State 
Budget Officers. 
 
National Conference of State Legislatures. 1999.  NCSL studies the effects of term limits. 
State Legislatures (December): 23. 
 
_______. 2001a. State fiscal outlook for 2001: January. Denver: National Conference of 
State Legislatures. 
 
_______. 2001b. State fiscal outlook for 2001: February update. Denver: National 
Conference of State Legislatures. 
 
_______. 2002. Pressure on state budgets continues to build, according to NCSL report. 
NCSL News, February 7, 2002. 
 
Nelson, Michael. 1998. Evaluating the Presidency. Ch. 1 in The Presidency and the 
political system, 5th ed., 3-28. Washington: Congressional Quarterly Press. 
 
Nordhaus, W. M. 1975. The political business cycle. Review of Economic Studies 42: 
169-90. 
172
Ostrom, Charles W., Jr. 1978. A reactive linkage model of the U.S. defense expenditure 
policymaking process.  American Political Science Review 72 (September): 941-
57. 
 
Patashnik, Eric M. 1999. Ideas, inheritances and the dynamics of budgetary change. 
Governance: An International Journal of Policy and Administration 12 (April): 
147-74. 
 
Patterson, Samuel C. 1983. Legislators and legislatures in the American states.  In 
Politics in the American states: A comparative analysis, 4th ed., ed. Virginia 
Gray, Herbert Jacob and Kenneth N. Vines, 135-79. Boston: Little Brown and 
Company. 
 
Peery, George. 2000. Time line of term limits. In State and Local Government 2000-
2001, ed. Thad L. Beyle, 88-91. Washington: Congressional Quarterly Press. 
 
Peterson, Paul E. 1985. The new politics of deficits. In The new direction in American 
politics, ed. John E. Chubb and Paul E. Peterson, 365-97. Washington: Brookings 
Institution. 
Punnett, R.M. 1994. British government and politics, 6th ed. Aldershot, U.K.: Dartmouth 
Publishing Company, Ltd. 
 
Rieselbach, Leroy N. 1996. One vote at a time: Building Presidential coalitions in 
Congress.  In Rivals for power: Presidential-Congressional relations, ed. James A. 
Thurber, 86-102.  Washington: Congressional Quarterly Press. 
 
Rose, Gene. 2002. A fog of uncertainty. State Legislatures 28 (1): 12-16. 
Rosenthal, Alan. 1990. Governors and legislatures: Contending powers. Washington: 
Congressional Quarterly Press. 
 
Roubini, Nouriel and Jeffrey D. Sachs. 1989. Political and economic determinants of 
budget deficits in the industrial democracies. European Economic Review 33: 
903-38. 
 
Rubin, Irene S. 2000. The Politics of Public Budgeting, 4th ed. Washington: 
Congressional Quarterly Press 
 
Rubin, Irene S., Jack King, Steven C. Wagner, and Ellen M. Dran. 1991. Illinois: 
executive reform and fiscal condition. In Governors, legislatures, and budgets: 
Diversity across the American states, ed. Edward J. Clynch and Thomas P. Lauth, 
17-29. Contributions in Political Science Number 265.  New York: Greenwood 
173
Press. 
 
Salanick, Gerald R. and Jeffrey Pfeffer. 1977. Constraints on administrator discretion: the 
limited influence of mayors on city budgets. Urban Affairs Quarterly 12 (June): 
475-98. 
 
Schick, Allen. 1971. Budget innovation in the states. Washington: Brookings Institution 
Press. 
 
_______. 1988. Micro-budgetary adaptations to fiscal stress in industrialized 
democracies. Public Administration Review 48 (January-February): 523-33. 
 
_______. 1993. Governments versus budget deficits. In Do institutions matter?, ed. R. 
Kent Weaver and Bert A. Rockman. Washington: Brookings Institution Press 
 
_______. 2000. The federal budget. Washington: Brookings Institution Press. 
 
Seligman, Lester G. and Cary R. Covington. 1996. Presidential leadership with Congress: 
Change, coalitions and Congress. In Rivals for power: Presidential-Congressional 
relations, ed. James A. Thurber, 64-85. Washington: Congressional Quarterly 
Press. 
 
Sharkansky, Ira. 1968. Agency requests, gubernatorial support and budget success in 
state legislatures. American Political Science Review 62 (December): 1220-31. 
 
Sharkansky, Ira and Augustus B. Turnbull III. 1969. Budget-making in Georgia and 
Wisconsin: a test of a model. Midwest Journal of Political Science 13 
(November): 631-45. 
 
Shepsle, Kenneth A. and Berry R. Weingast. 1989. Legislative politics and budget 
outcomes. In Federal budget policy in the 1980's, ed. Gregory B. Mills and John 
L. Palmer, 343-67. Washington: The Urban Institute. 
 
Shull, Steven A. and Thomas C. Shaw. 1999. Explaining congressional-presidential 
relations. Albany, N.Y.: SUNY Press. 
 
Sigelman, Lee and Nelson Dometrius. 1988. Governors as chief administrators: the 
linkage between formal powers and informal influence. American Politics 
Quarterly 16(2): 157-70. 
 
Squire, Peverill. 1997. Another look at legislative professionalization and divided 
government in the states. Legislative Studies Quarterly 22(3): 417-32. 
 
Steger, Wayne P. 2000. The occurrence and consequences of electoral mandates in 
174
historical context. Congress and the Presidency 27 (Fall): 121-47. 
 
Sundquist, James L. 1981. The decline and resurgence of Congress. Washington: 
Brookings Institution. 
 
Tabachnick, Barbara G. and Linda S. Fidell. 1996. Using multivariate statistics, 3rd ed. 
New York:  HarperCollins College Publishers. 
 
Thomas, Clive S. and Ronald J. Herbenar. 1999.  Interest groups in the states.  In Politics 
in the American states: A comparative analysis, 7th ed., ed. Virginia Gray, 
Russell L. Hanson, and Herbert Jacob, 113-43.  Washington: Congressional 
Quarterly Press. 
 
Thompson, Joel A. 1987. Agency requests, gubernatorial support, and budget success in 
state legislatures revisited.  Journal of Politics 49 (August): 756-79. 
 
Thompson, Joel A. and Arthur A. Felts. 1992. Politicians and professionals: the influence 
of state agency heads in budgetary success. Western Political Quarterly 45 
(March): 153-68. 
 
Thurber, James A. 1996a.  An introduction to Presidential-Congressional rivalry. In 
Rivals for power: Presidential-Congressional relations, 1-18.  Washington: 
Congressional Quarterly Press.   
 
_______. 1996b. Congressional-Presidential battles to balance the budget. In Rivals for 
power: Presidential-congressional relations, 191-213. Washington: Congressional 
Quarterly Press.   
 
Thurmaier, Kurt and James J. Gosling. 1997. The shifting roles of state budget offices in 
the Midwest: Gosling revisited. Public Budgeting and Finance 17 (Winter): 48-70. 
 
Thurmaier, Kurt M. and Katherine G. Willoughby. 2001. Policy and politics in state 
budgeting and bureaucracies. Public Administration and Public Policy, series ed. 
Kenneth J. Meier. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe 
 
Tufte, Edward. R. 1975. Determinants of the outcomes of midterm Congressional 
elections. American Political Science Review 69 (September): 812-26. 
 
Tulis, Jeffrey K. 1998. The two constitutional Presidencies.  In The Presidency and the 
political system, 5th ed., ed. Michael Nelson, 91-123. Washington: Congressional 
Quarterly Press. 
 
United States. Department of Commerce. Bureau of Economic Analysis. 2005. SA1-3. 
Per capita personal income. March 27, 2005. <http://www.bea.gov/bea/ 
175
regional/spi/drill.cfm.> 
 
United States. Department of Labor. Bureau of Labor Statistics. 2005. Local area 
unemployment statistics. March 29, 2005. <http://data.bls.gov/PDQ/servlet/ 
SurveyOutputServlet.> 
Wallin, Bruce A. 1995. Massachusetts: Downsizing state government. In The fiscal crisis 
of the states: Lessons for the future, ed. Steven D. Gold, 252-95. Washington: 
Georgetown University Press. 
 
Weaver, R. Kent and Bert A. Rockman. 1993. Assessing the effects of institutions. In Do 
institutions matter?, 1-41. Washington: Brookings Institution. 
 
Weber, Ronald E. and Paul Brace. 1999. States and localities transformed. In American
state and local politics: Directions for the 21st Century, ed. Ronald E. Weber and 
Paul Brace, 1-20.  New York: Chatham House Publishers. 
 
Whicker, Marcia Lynn. 1991. South Carolina: The demise of legislative dominance. In 
Governors, legislatures, and budgets: Diversity across the American states, ed. 
Edward J. Clynch and Thomas P. Lauth, 137-48. Contributions in Political 
Science Number 265.  New York: Greenwood Press. 
 
Wiggins, Charles W. 1980. Executive vetoes and legislative overrides in the American 
states.  Journal of Politics 42 (November): 1110-7. 
 
Wildavsky, Aaron. 1961. Political implications of budget reform. Public Administration 
Review 21 (Autumn): 183-90. 
 
_______. 1964. The politics of the budgetary process. Boston: Little, Brown. 
 
_______. 1975. Budgeting: A comparative theory of budgetary processes. Boston: Little, 
Brown. 
 
Willoughby, William F. 1918. The movement for budgetary reform in the states. New 
York: Appleton and Co. 
 
Winters, Richard F. 1999. The politics of taxing and spending. In Politics in the 
American states: a comparative analysis, 7th ed., ed. Virginia Gray, Russel L. 
Hanson, and Herbert Jacob, 304-44.  Washington: Congressional Quarterly Press. 
 
Young, Liz. 1999. Minor parties and the legislative process in the Australian senate: a 
study of the 1993 budget. Australian Journal of Political Science 34: 7-27. 
 
176
APPENDIX A 
 
SURVEY INSTRUMENTS 
177
Gubernatorial Budgeting Survey 
Year 2001 Budget Process 
(NOTE: First three pages were common to all surveys) 
 
Name_________________________ Title_____________________________________ 
State_________________________ 
Note: Your name and title will not be available to anyone other than the researcher.  Survey 
responses will not be identified with a specific person or any combination of name, title, and  state 
that would identify the person answering. 
 
This survey asks for your opinion regarding the budget process for the 2001 legislative session 
(fiscal year 2001-02 or biennial budget for 2001-03, depending on the state.)  Please address 
your responses to only that single budget process except when instructions ask otherwise.  
Please include both the operating and capital budgets in considering your responses. 
 
$ Please list in the first column of the table below what, in your opinion, were the governor’s 
top four budget priorities in the 2001 budget process.  A budget priority would be any 
change in state program or level of service that required budgetary action such as an 
increase, decrease, or redirection in spending or taxation.  Priorities do not need to be 
listed in order. 
 
Once you have listed the priorities, please use the columns to the right to assess for each 
of the governor’s priorities how successful the governor was in securing support for this 
issue in the final appropriations approved by the legislature. 
 
Your assessment of the governor’s success in the final 
appropriations: 
Budget Issue 
Very 
unsuc-
cessful 
Very 
Unsuccess
-ful 
Somewhat 
Unsuccess
-ful 
Somewhat 
Successful 
Very 
Successful 
Don’t know 
(OVER) 
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Overall, how successful would you say the governor was in accomplishing his/her budget 
objectives?  (circle one) 
 
Very unsuccessful    Unsuccessful   Neutral   Successful   Very Successful   Don’t know 
 
How important was each of the following factors in determining the governor’s success in 
accomplishing budget objectives? 
 
Importance to the governor’s budget success: 
Not 
important 
at all 
Not very 
important 
Somewhat 
Important 
Very 
Important 
Don’t know 
Governor’s ability to clearly state and 
advocate for budget agenda 
 
Popularity of programs that Governor 
made budget priorities 
 
Governor’s formal powers (e.g. 
appointment power, veto power, etc.) 
 
Governor’s fiscal powers (e.g., line-
item veto, power to control revenue 
forecast, power to impound funds) 
 
Governor’s party support in 
legislature 
 
Governor’s popularity      
179
Governor’s election mandate      
The legislature’s budget process      
Governor’s  control over executive 
budget office 
 
Strength of executive budget office       
Strength of legislative fiscal office(s)      
Economic conditions      
4. Were there any other factors you think were important in the outcome of the budget 
process?  If so, what?:___________________________________________________ 
 _____________________________________________________________________ 
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(NOTE: These additional questions were included in survey of governors’ chiefs of staff) 
 
5. How would you characterize the relationship between the governor's office and the 
executive budget office?__________________________________________________ 
 _____________________________________________________________________ 
 _____________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. Do you believe the executive budget office should be more accountable to the 
governor?_______If yes, what changes do you think should be made? 
 _____________________________________________________________________ 
 _____________________________________________________________________ 
 _____________________________________________________________________ 
 
_____Please send me a copy of the summary of the survey results when it is available.  Send to: 
________________________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Please return survey to: 
 
Paul Shinn 
2716 Cashion Place 
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 73112 
 
Thank you for your help! 
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(NOTE: These additional questions were included in survey of legislative fiscal officers) 
 
5. Which of the following best describes the budget process in your legislature? 
 power is divided among many committees and members 
 power is concentrated in a few committee and subcommittee chairs 
 _____power is concentrated in the appropriations committee chairs 
 power is concentrated in the leadership of each house 
 
6. How many different legislative fiscal staffs are there (counting majority and minority as 
two if staffs are partisan)?  ______  _
7. How many legislative committees does each appropriation bill have to be approved by 
(e.g. one joint committee, one committee in each house for two total, one in each house 
and a conference committee for three total, etc)?____   __
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(NOTE:  These additional questions were included in the survey of executive budget directors.) 
 
5. Please complete the following information to help me understand the environment of the 
your office. 
 
Most budget offices have three levels of analytical and management staff: 
 
$ Budget Director: The highest-level person whose primary duty is formulating and 
tracking the progress of the proposed budget. 
$ Assistants and lead staff: Staff who report to the director, have substantial 
responsibility for budget development, and manage the work of other analytical staff. 
$ Analysts: First-line staff who evaluate and make recommendations on agency 
budgets, revenue estimates, etc. 
 
a. Please provide the following basic information for each of the three levels of staff 
 
Staff Level------------> Budget Director Assistants/Lead Staff Analysts 
What job titles fit this 
description? 
 
How many positions 
are authorized in this 
category? 
 
About what 
percentage of this 
staff level's annual 
time is spent directly 
on budget 
development (i.e., 
revenue estimation, 
instructions, 
evaluating agency 
requests, 
recommendations, 
tracking budget 
actions of 
legislature)? 
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b. Please provide information on the appointment process for each of the three staff levels 
as follows: 
 
Staff Level------------> Director Assistant/Lead Staff Analysts 
Who appoints a new 
employee to this 
position? 
 
Does the appointment 
require confirmation 
or approval by 
another party (e.g. 
governor, legislature, 
etc.)?  If so, whom? 
 
Is this position 
classified or included 
in a civil service 
system? 
 
c. Please provide information on termination of staff at each of the three levels as follows: 
 
Staff Level------------> Director Assistant/Lead Staff Analysts 
Who can dismiss a 
person from this 
position? 
 
Does the dismissal 
require the approval 
of another party?  If 
so, whom? 
 
Must the dismissal be 
for cause? 
 
Is there a hearing or 
other due process 
requirement for 
dismissal? 
 
Is it traditional for a 
person at this level to 
leave when the 
governor's term 
ends? 
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6. I am interested in examining the effects of the extent to which the governor’s influence 
over the budget office may influence the governor’s success in the budget process.  How 
influential would you say the governor is in each of the following? 
 
Influence of governor on budget 
office: 
None Low Mode
-rate 
High Very 
High 
Don't 
Know 
Developing budget instructions       
Shaping agency requests       
Reviewing agency requests       
Determining agency and program 
budgets 
 
Budget office staffing decisions       
Day-to-day operations of the budget 
office 
 
7. How would you characterize the relationship between your office and the governor and 
his/her top staff?_______________________________________________________ 
 ____________________________________________________________________ 
 ____________________________________________________________________ 
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APPENDIX B 
 
CALCULATION OF VARIABLES 
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Table 33.—Document Weighting for Issue Identification 
Document Description Weight 
Documents from governor:
State of the state address 5.0 
Budget address 4.5 
Written budget message and summaries 4.0 
Budget press release 4.0 
Budget document detail sections 3.5 
Press releases between proposal and adoption of budget 3.0 
Press releases after adoption of budget 2.5 
Documents from executive budget office:
Budget analyses after adoption of budget 2.0 
Documents from legislative fiscal office:
Analysis of governor’s proposal 4.0 
Analysis of adopted budget 3.0 
Newspaper and wire service articles:
Up to the month following governor’s proposal 3.0 
From the month following governor’s proposal to adoption 2.0 
Following adoption 1.0 
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Table 34.—Computation of Governor’s Formal Power Variable 
Indicator of Power 
Assigned 
Score 
Tenure Power 
 
Competing 
Elected 
Officials 
Appointment 
Power * 
Non-budget 
Veto  
Power + 
5
(Maximum 
governor 
power) 
 
4-year term 
without limit on 
terms 
 
Only governor 
elected or 
elected with 
lieutenant 
governor as 
team 
 
Governor 
appoints; no 
other approval 
needed  
 
2/3 of elected 
legislators 
must vote to 
override 
4 4-year term 
limited to two 
terms 
Team with Lt.  
governor and 
some process 
elected officials 
 
Governor 
appoints with 
board, council 
or legislative 
approval 
 
2/3 of present 
legislators 
must vote to 
override 
3 4-year term 
with no 
consecutive re-
election 
Team with Lt. 
governor and 
process elected 
officials or one 
major policy 
elected official 
 
Someone else 
appoints, 
governor 
approves or 
shares 
appointment 
3/5 of elected 
legislators 
must vote to 
override 
2 2-year term 
without limit on 
terms 
Governor and 
Lt. governor 
elected 
separately; 6 or 
fewer elected 
officials, incl. 
one major 
policy official 
 
Someone else 
appoints, 
governor and 
others approve 
3/5 of present 
legislators 
must override 
1 2-year term, 
one re-election 
permitted 
Same as 2 with 
seven or more 
elected 
officials, incl. 
major officials. 
 
Someone else 
appoints, no 
approval or 
confirmation 
needed 
Majority of 
elected 
legislators 
must vote to 
override 
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Table 34—Continued
Indicator of Power 
Assigned 
Score 
 
Tenure Power 
 
Competing 
Elected 
Officials 
 
Appointment 
Power * 
Non-budget 
Veto 
 Power + 
0
(Mini-
mum 
governor 
power) 
 
Separately 
elected or 
selected by the 
legislature 
 
Source:  Beyle 2005a, except + 
Formal power index is the sum of the four columns 
*Figures are averaged for appointment of executives in six major policy areas  
+Index adapted by author by excluding budget line-item veto power from Beyle’s  
 index.  Source:  Council of State Governments 2001 
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Table 35.—Computation of Governor’s Fiscal Power Variable 
Indicator of Power 
Assigned 
Score 
 
% of Budget 
Earmarked+ 
 
Revenue 
Forecasting 
Introduced 
Appropriation 
Bill* 
Line-item 
Veto 
5
(Maximum 
governor 
power) 
 
0-32% 
 
Budget office 
forecast 
binding on 
legislature 
 
Executive 
exclusively 
 
May veto line-
items, words, 
and meaning 
4 33-44% 
 
Other 
executive 
office forecast 
binding on 
legislature 
 
Executive with 
legislative 
participation 
 
May veto line-
items and 
words 
3 45-56% 
 
Commission 
or joint 
forecast 
binding on 
legislature 
 
Legislative 
with executive 
participation 
 
May veto line-
items and 
some words 
2 57-68% 
 
Executive 
forecast is not 
binding on 
legislature 
 
Legislative 
office outside 
control of the 
appropriations 
committees 
 
May veto line-
items 
1 68-100% 
 
Commission 
or joint 
forecast is not 
binding on 
legislature 
 
Legislative 
appropriations 
staff 
 
May veto 
limited line-
items 
0
(Minimum 
governor 
power) 
 
May veto 
entire bill only 
Source:  National Association of State Budget Officers 2002a, except + and * 
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Table 35--Continued
Fiscal power index is the sum of the four columns plus two additional measures  
calculated as follows: 
Balanced budget requirement
Add 1.5 points if governor must submit balanced budget by statute, 3 if by       
Constitution 
Add 0.5 points if legislature must pass balanced budget by statute, 1 if by  
Constitution 
Add 0.5 points if governor must sign balanced budget by statute, 1 if by    
 Constitution 
Preparation and implementation of budget
Add 1 point if governor gives agencies target funding request levels 
Subtract 1 point if agency budget requests are in executive budget 
Add 1 point if governor can reorganize agencies without legislative approval 
Add 1 point if governor can spend unanticipated federal funds without 
legislative approval 
Add 0.5-2 points if governor can reduce budget without legislative approval, 
depending on restrictions as to what budgets can be reduced and whether 
all must be reduced equally 
Add 0.5 points so that scale runs from 0 to 5 
+ All non-general fund spending as a percentage of total spending, fiscal year 2002 
 actual. Source: National Association of State Budget Officers 2003 
* Source:  Grooters and Eckl 1998 
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Table 36.—Computation of Executive Budget Office Variable 
Strength of Office Control Over Office 
Assigned 
Score 
Number of 
Office 
Functions* 
 
Budget 
Analysts per $1 
Billion Budget 
 
Office 
Location 
 
Control Over 
Staffing+ 
 
5
(Maximum 
governor 
power) 
12.5-15 
 
Over 4.8 Governor’s 
Office 
 
4 9.5-12 3.6-4.8 
 
Governor 
appoints 
budget 
director 
3 6.5-9 2.4-3.6 
 
Freestanding 
Agency 
Shared 
appointment 
power  
2 3.5-6 1.2-2.4 
 
Department 
head appoints 
director 
1
(Minimum 
governor 
power) 
0-3 0-1.2 
 
Agency Within 
A Department 
Independent 
board 
appoints 
director 
Source: National Association of State Budget Officers 2002a 
Variable is calculated by adding the two strength variables, adding the two control 
variables, and multiplying the products 
*Number of areas budget office is responsible for from a list of 15.  List includes  
 revenue estimating, fiscal notes, review legislation, accounting, pre-audit,  
 management analysis, contract approval, data processing, planning, program  
 evaluation, tax expenditure reporting, debt management, cash management,  
 economic analysis, demographic analysis.  Shared responsibility is counted  
 as one-half.   
+Add one point if budget office staff is not covered by civil service laws. 
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Table 37.--Computation of Limited Agenda Variable 
Step of 
calculation 
 Calculation 
Example 
(Colorado) 
1. 
 
Number of issues identified                         47 
2. 
 
Total issue scores for all issues 
(issue scores calculated as shown in 
Table 30) 
 826
3. 
 
Total issue scores for the four 
highest-scoring issues 
 249
4.(3/2)  
 
Issue score for the four-highest 
scoring issues as a proportion of the 
issue score for all issues (raw limited 
agenda score) 
 30.2%
5. 
 
Expected proportion of issue score 
for the four highest issues from the 
results of a regression in all 50 states 
(expected limited agenda score)* 
 30.2%
6. (4-5) 
 
Determine the difference between 
the actual and expected proportion 
of issue score for the four highest 
issues (adjusted limited agenda 
score)   
 0.0
*The proportion of issue scores in the top four issues is likely to be smaller the more 
total issues in the budget. Because the count of issues and scoring depends on the 
size of the state and the availability of documents, the raw proportion of issue scores 
in the top four issues, shown at step 4, is not the best measure of the governor’s 
ability to limit the agenda. To create a better measure, the raw scores were regressed 
on the total number of issues in each state. The resulting regression explained 58 
percent of variation in the raw score. That regression equation is used to calculate 
expected limited agenda in step 5 as follows: 
Expected limited agenda=32.9%-.058 * total number of issues 
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Table 38.—Descriptive Statistics for Independent Variables 
 
Variable 
 
Mean* 
 
Standard 
Deviation 
 
Minimum
Max-
imum 
 
Normal+ 
Institutional
Governor’s formal  
 power  14.1            2.4            8.2          17.5 Yes 
Governor’s fiscal 
 power  17.4            3.8          10.5          25.0 Yes 
Executive budget 
 office power and 
 control 
 29.4          12.9            6.0          60.0 Yes 
Legislative  
 professionalism 
 (average annual 
 salary) 
$24,944 $21,208 $         0 $99,000 No 
Legislative term  
 limits 
 (dummy  
 variables) 
 
In effect in 2001  
 
Exist at all 
 
11 
 
18 
 
N.A. 
 
N.A. 
 
0
0
1
1
N.A. 
 
N.A. 
Legislative veto  
 points  8.5            3.4            5.0          22.0 No 
Biennial budget          21         N.A.            0            1 N.A. 
Economic 
Economic growth 
 (standardized  
 score) 
 0.0            1.7 -          4.5 4.4      Yes 
Spending per capita $  4,370 $  1,225 $  3,027 $11,155 No 
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Table 38.—Continued
Variable 
 
Mean* 
 
Standard 
Deviation 
 
Minimum
Max-
imum 
 
Normal+ 
Political
Legislative party  
 support 
 
House 
 
Senate 
 
Legislative control 
 (dummy variables) 
 
Divided  
 government 
 
Split legislature 
 
0.49 
 
0.49 
 
17 
 
15 
 
0.19 
 
0.19 
 
N.A. 
 
N.A. 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 
 
0
0
0.87 
 
0.91 
 
1
1
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
N.A. 
 
N.A. 
Republican governor 
 with Democratic 
 legislature 
 8 N.A.         0          1 N.A. 
Partisan change 8 N.A.         0           1 N.A. 
Governor popularity      
Election margin      56.2       6.3       37.0       73.4 Yes 
Poll approval      61.5     13.5       32.8       89.9 Yes 
Interest group  
 strength  3.6 0.8 1.0 5.0 Yes 
Year in service      
Year in term        2.3       1.0         1.0          4.0 Yes 
Year in tenure        4.6       2.7         1.0       11.0 Yes 
First budget of term      16  N.A.         0.0         1.0 N.A. 
Upcoming election  
 with unified 
 government 
 3 N.A.         0         1 N.A. 
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Table 38.—Continued
Variable 
 
Mean* 
 
Standard 
Deviation 
 
Minimum
Max-
imum 
 
Normal+ 
Personal
Political experience    
 (years)  17.1 9.0 0.0 39.0 Yes 
Limited agenda 
 (regression  
 residual) 
 0.0 9.5 28.2 - 16.5 Yes 
Consistency         0.50    0.25 -     0.11       0.96 Yes 
Popular issues         1.2       1.4  -     3.0         4.0 Yes 
Proposed budget 
 growth  6.7% 5.7%  -     4.3%       23.0% Yes 
* For dummy variables, this column shows the number of states exhibiting this 
 characteristic 
 + A variable is considered to be normally distributed if there is less than .001 
 probability that it would be observed from a normal distribution, that is if  
 either the quotient of skewness over its standard error or the quotient of the  
 square root of kurtosis over its standard error results in a standardized score 
 greater than 3.29 (p<.001 under a Z distribution, 2-sided test) (Tabachnick  
 and Fidell 1996). 
 Three variables that are not normally distributed under this testwere transformed 
 By using their square roots in regression analysis.  Two of the three transformed   
variables—legislative professionalism and veto points—meet the test for  
 normality. 
 The third variable—budget per capita, was transformed by taking it logarithm. 
 The transformed variable does not meet the test for normality, although it more 
 closely resembles a normally distributed variable than does the original variable. 
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APPENDIX C 
 
SURVEY DATA 
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Table 39.—Surveys Mailed and Returned 
 
Office Held 
 
Chief of 
Staff 
Budget 
Director 
Legis. 
Fiscal 
Officer 
Approp. 
Chair 
 
Total 
Surveys  
 mailed 50 50   56 114 270 
Surveys 
 returned 11 22   18   20   69 
Percent 
 returned  22% 44% 32% 18% 26%
States 
 represented 11 21  17  20  39 
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Table 40.—Surveys Returned by State and Position 
Office Held 
State 
 
Chief of 
Staff 
Budget 
Director 
Legis. 
Fiscal 
Officer 
Approp. 
Chair 
 
None 
Returned 
Alabama  X
Alaska  X
Arizona  1
Arkansas  1 1
California  2 1
Colorado  1
Connecticut  1
Delaware  1 1
Florida  1
Georgia  1 2
Hawaii  1
Idaho  1 1
Illinois  1
Indiana 1 1
Iowa  1  1  
Kansas  X
Kentucky 1 1
Louisiana  X
Maine 1
Maryland  1 1
Massachusetts 1
Michigan  1 2
Minnesota  1 1
Mississippi  1 2
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Missouri  1
Table 40.—Continued
Chief of 
Staff 
Budget 
Director 
Legis. 
Fiscal 
Officer 
Approp.  
Chair 
None 
Returned 
Montana  1 1
Nebraska 1     
Nevada     X 
New  Hamp.     X 
New Jersey     X 
New Mexico   1 1  
New York  1    
North Carolina  1 1   
North Dakota 1 1    
Ohio     X 
Oklahoma   2   
Oregon     X 
Pennsylvania   1   
Rhode Island     X 
South Carolina    1  
South Dakota 1  1 1  
Tennessee  1  1  
Texas 1   1  
Utah   1 1  
Vermont   1   
Virginia     X 
Washington  1 1   
West Virginia 1     
Wisconsin 1 1    
Wyoming 1 1  1  
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Total 11 21 17 20 11 
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Table 41.—Influence of Governor and Staff on Budget Office  
Element of Budget Office 
Operations 
Very or 
Somewhat 
Influential 
(%) 
Not Very or Not At 
All Influential 
(%) 
Developing budget 
instructions 57 42 
Reviewing agency requests 81 19 
Determining agency and  
 program budgets 95   4 
Budget office staffing 
decisions 23 76 
Day-to-day operations of 
office 23 76 
202
 
Table 42.—Governor’s Budget Issues, by Branch of Survey Respondent 
Percent of Issues 
Mentioned by: Mean Success Rating by*: 
Issue Type 
Executive 
(N=122) 
Legislative 
(N=129) Executive Legislative 
Administration     4     2 3.2 2.7 
Criminal justice     6     4 3.0 3.2 
Economic  
 development  13 5 3.7 2.7
Education (K-12)   25   26 3.4 3.0 
Finance   20   18 3.1 2.9 
Higher education     7     9 3.0 3.1 
Infrastructure     7   13 2.4 2.0 
Social services   10   13 3.3 2.9 
Taxation     7     9 2.9 3.2 
Could not identify 0 1 -- 3.0 
Total 100 100 3.2 2.9 
*For each issue raised by a survey respondent that was one of the 
 governor’s top four issues, survey success values were assigned,  
 ranging from one (Governor was not very successful) to four 
 (Governor was very successful). 
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Table 43.—Comparison of Governors’ Issues—Survey Responses 
 and Issue Method 
Survey Respondents’ Branch 
Measure Executive Legislative 
Percent of survey issues 
 in governor’s top 4 
 issues by issue method 
 28% 32%
Mean issue method score 
 of survey issues  59.2 56.1
Correlation (Pearson’s r) 
 between survey rating 
 and issue method rating 
 of governor’s success* 
 0.48          0.57 
*For each issue raised by a survey respondent that was one of the 
 governor’s top four issues, survey success values were assigned,  
 ranging from one (Governor was not very successful) to four 
 (Governor was very successful). Resulting survey scores were 
 correlated with the issue success score, a continuous variable 
 ranging from 0 to 100. 
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APPENDIX D 
 
GOVERNORS’ OVERALL SUCCESS 
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Table 44.—Governor’s Budget Success by State 
 
State 
 
Governor Party 
Agency 
Success 
 (Rank) 
Issue 
Success 
 (Rank) 
Alabama Don Siegelman D 52.3  (38)  
 31.7
(44) 
Alaska Tony Knowles D 40.9  (47) 
 69.4
(21) 
Arizona Jane Dee Hull R 54.5  (35) 
 62.4
(28) 
Arkansas Mike Huckabee R  74.1(16) 
 88.0
(8) 
California Gray Davis D  38.4(48) 
 31.0
(45) 
Colorado Bill Owens R  75.1(13) 
 64.5
(26) 
Connecticut John Rowland R  96.0(1) 
 57.9
(30) 
Delaware Ruth Ann Minner D 50.2  (41) 
 83.4
(10) 
Florida Jeb  Bush R  47.6  (43) 
 71.1
(18) 
Georgia Roy Barnes D  91.5  (3) 
 100.0
(1) 
Hawaii Benjamin Cayetano D  74.6  (14) 
 22.3
(50) 
Idaho Dirk Kempthorne R  91.6  (2) 
 69.1
(22) 
Illinois George Ryan R  76.1  (12) 
 70.1
(20) 
Indiana Frank O’Bannon D  78.4  (11) 
 50.7
(33) 
Iowa Tom Vilsack D  27.7(50) 
 52.5
(32) 
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Table 44.—Continued
State 
 
Governor Party 
Agency 
Success 
 (Rank) 
Issue 
Success 
 (Rank) 
Kansas Bill Graves R  90.9 (4) 
 74.7
(14) 
Kentucky Paul Patton D  62.5  (31) 
 35.4
(42) 
Louisiana Mike Foster R  29.4  (49) 
 96.0
(4) 
Maine Angus King Ind.  74.5(15) 
 67.7
(23) 
Maryland Parris Glendening D  65.3  (27) 
 67.4
(24) 
Massachusetts Jane Swift D  43.3  (45) 
 41.2
(38) 
Michigan John Engler R  48.0  (42) 
 65.0
(23) 
Minnesota Jesse Ventura Reform  53.3  (37) 
 43.1
(36) 
Mississippi Ronnie Musgrove D  43.1  (46) 
 49.5
(34) 
Missouri Bob Holden D  74.0  (17) 
 75.9
(12) 
Montana Judy Martz R  79.3  (10) 
 90.8
(7) 
Nebraska Mike Johanns R  51.8  (39) 
 74.6
(15) 
Nevada Kenny Guinn R  86.7  (7) 
 85.8
(9) 
New 
Hampshire Jeanne Shaheen D 
 83.9 
 (8) 
 30.9
(46) 
New Jersey James McGreevey D  88.4  (6) 
 96.2
(3) 
New Mexico Gary Johnson R  66.3  (26) 
 41.1
(39) 
207
Table 44.—Continued
State 
 
Governor Party 
Agency 
Success 
 (Rank) 
Issue 
Success 
 (Rank) 
New York George Pataki R  63.5  (29) 
 29.1
(48) 
North Carolina Michael Easley D  70.8  (19) 
 34.9
(43) 
North Dakota John Hoeven R  71.4  (18) 
 71.7
(17) 
Ohio Bob Taft R  58.6  (33) 
 39.1
(41) 
Oklahoma Frank Keating R  53.9  (36) 
 59.4
(29) 
Oregon John Kitzhaber D  80.7  (9) 
97.1 
 (2) 
Pennsylvania Tom Ridge R  55.7  (34) 
 90.8
(6) 
Rhode Island Lincoln Almond R  67.7  (24) 
 40.1
(40) 
South Carolina Jim Hodges D  64.3  (28) 
 30.1
(47) 
South Dakota William Janklow R  89.5  (5) 
 73.1
(16) 
Tennessee Don Sundquist R  51.3  (40) 
 29.0
(49) 
Texas Rick Perry R  47.2  (44) 
 81.4
(11) 
Utah Michael Leavitt R  67.9  (23) 
 63.2
(27) 
Vermont Howard Dean D  69.2  (22) 
 45.4
(35) 
Virginia Mark Warner D  61.8  (32) 
75.6 
 (13) 
Washington Gary Locke D  63.1  (30) 
 70.7
(19) 
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Table 44.—Continued
State 
 
Governor Party 
Agency 
Success 
 (Rank) 
Issue 
Success 
 (Rank) 
West Virginia Bob Wise D  67.0  (25) 
54.4 
 (31) 
Wisconsin Scott McCallum R  69.9  (20) 
94.2 
 (5) 
Wyoming Jim Gehringer R  69.3  (21) 
42.6 
 (37) 
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Table 45.—Governor’s Budget Success by State, Based on Regression 
 Residuals 
 
State 
 
Governor 
Party 
 
Agency 
Success 
(Rank) 
Issue 
Success* 
(Rank) 
Alabama Don Siegelman D  - 7.7  (34) 
 -   28.5 
 (46) 
Alaska Tony Knowles D  -   21.3  (47) 
17.3 
 (7) 
Arizona Jane Dee Hull R  -   15.4  (44) 
 -     4.5 
 (29) 
Arkansas Mike Huckabee R  13.2(11) 
 12.1
(12) 
California Gray Davis D  -   10.7  (40) 
 -   38.5 
 (49) 
Colorado Bill Owens R  5.4(19) 
 10.6
(14) 
Connecticut John Rowland R  33.6  (1) 
10.0 
 (16) 
Delaware Ruth Ann Minner D  -   12.2  (42) 
19.3 
 (4) 
Florida Jeb  Bush R  -    3.3  (28) 
 0.8
(26) 
Georgia Roy Barnes D  21.6  (4) 
 40.5
(1) 
Hawaii Benjamin Cayetano D  -    4.4  (30) 
 -   19.8 
 (44) 
Idaho Dirk Kempthorne R  17.6  (6) 
 -   15.1 
 (41) 
Illinois George Ryan R  18.2  (5) 
 10.5
(15) 
Indiana Frank O’Bannon D  8.5(13) 
 -    0.3 
 (27) 
Iowa Tom Vilsack D  -  31.7  (50) 
 -    7.4 
 (35) 
Kansas Bill Graves R  26.0(3) 
 7.8
(22) 
Kentucky Paul Patton D  -    0.3  (23) 
 -   29.9 
 (48) 
Louisiana Mike Foster R  -  27.3  (49) 
 16.7
(8) 
Maine Angus King Ind.  17.3  (7) 
 -    6.2 
 (33) 
Maryland Parris Glendening D  3.9(20) 
 13.8
(10) 
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Table 45—Continued
State 
 
Governor 
Party 
 
Agency 
Success 
(Rank) 
Issue 
Success* 
(Rank) 
Massachusetts Jane Swift D  -  15.5  (45) 
 -     6.2 
 (32) 
Michigan John Engler R  -   2.8  (26) 
 9.6
(17) 
Minnesota Jesse Ventura Reform  - 10.7  (41) 
 -      4.7 
 (36) 
Mississippi Ronnie Musgrove D  - 17.1      (46) 
 -      4.7 
 (30) 
Missouri Bob Holden D  6.4(16) 
 -      1.8 
 (28) 
Montana Judy Martz R  -   8.8     (35) 
 18.6
(5) 
Nebraska Mike Johanns R - 12.7  (43) 
 15.6
(9) 
Nevada Kenny Guinn R  14.8(8) 
 12.7
(11) 
New 
Hampshire Jeanne Shaheen D 
 6.9
(15) 
 -     6.7 
 (34) 
New Jersey James McGreevey D  31.1(2) 
 8.8
(18) 
New Mexico Gary Johnson R  -   9.4  (38) 
 -   10.9 
 (38) 
New York George Pataki R  0.8(22) 
 -   15.5 
 (42) 
North Carolina Michael Easley D  - 10.0  (39) 
 -   13.0 
 (40) 
North Dakota John Hoeven R  5.4(18) 
 6.0
(24) 
Ohio Bob Taft R  -    5.1  (32) 
 -   29.4 
 (47) 
Oklahoma Frank Keating R  -   2.9  (27) 
 8.3
(20) 
Oregon John Kitzhaber D  14.0  (10) 
 24.7
(3) 
Pennsylvania Tom Ridge R  -   0.9        (25) 
 37.1
(2) 
Rhode Island Lincoln Almond R  -   3.4  (29) 
 -    6.0 
 (31) 
South Carolina Jim Hodges D  7.8(14) 
 -  26.6 
 (45) 
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Table 45—Continued
State 
 
Governor 
Party 
 
Agency 
Success 
(Rank) 
Issue 
Success* 
(Rank) 
South Dakota William Janklow R  14.5(9) 
 -    9.6 
 (37) 
Tennessee Don Sundquist R  -   9.4  (37) 
 -  41.0 
 (50) 
Texas Rick Perry R  - 22.2  (48) 
 8.2
(21) 
Utah Michael Leavitt R  -   9.0  (36) 
 6.8
(23) 
Vermont Howard Dean D  -   4.8  (31) 
 18.2
(6) 
Virginia Mark Warner D  1.3(21) 
 3.3
(25) 
Washington Gary Locke D  -   6.6  (33) 
 8.3
(19) 
West Virginia Bob Wise D  12.4(12) 
 -  12.3     
 (39) 
Wisconsin Scott McCallum R  5.7(17) 
 11.8
(13) 
Wyoming Jim Gehringer R  -   0.5  (24) 
 -  15.6 
 (43) 
*The best model issue model shown in Table 28 included only 45 states to omit 
outliers. This table shows residuals from the same model with 50 states in  
order to create a score for all governors. The residuals from the two models 
are correlated (Pearson’s r) at 0.93. 
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Table 46.—Independent Variables for Most and Least Successful Governors 
Mean Value by Governor Group* 
Variable 
Most Successful 
Governors 
 (n=8) 
Least Successful 
Governors 
 (n=9) 
Institutional
Governor’s formal power   14.6   14.8 
Governor’s fiscal power   18.4   17.1 
Executive budget office 
 power and control  29.4 28.9
Legislative  
 Professionalism 143.5 157.7 
Legislative term limits   
In effect in 2001+    25%   11% 
In effect at all+    38%   11% 
Legislative veto points      2.7     2.8 
Biennial budget+    38%   23% 
Economic 
Economic growth       -       0.64       0.56 
Size of budget     3.6     3.7 
Political
Legislative party support   
House proportion held by gov. party       0.59       0.47 
Senate proportion held by gov. party       0.59      0.54 
Unified government+             50%              33% 
Split legislature+             25%              11% 
Divided government+             25%              56% 
Republican governor with Democratic 
 Legislature+  13% 11%
Partisan change+   13%  11% 
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Table 46.—Continued
Mean Value by Governor Group 
Variable 
Most Successful 
Governors 
 (n=8) 
Least Successful 
Governors 
 (n=9) 
Governor popularity   
Election proportion             62.8             53.8 
Popularity poll proportion**             67.7             53.9 
Interest group strength    3.5 3.8 
Year in service   
Year in term              2.5              2.7 
Year in tenure              4.0              4.9 
First budget of term            25%             11% 
Upcoming election with 
 unified government+  0% 11%
Personal
Political experience            19.4            16.7 
Limited agenda       -      3.1              3.0 
Consistency              0.52              0.49 
Popular issues              0.8              1.2 
% increase in proposed budget              7.9              6.4 
*Louisiana governor Mike Foster was among the five least successful governors 
 by the agency method and was among the five most successful governors by 
 the issue method. He is omitted from both groups. 
+For dichotomous variables, the percentage of governors in each group with the 
 characteristic is listed 
**Due to limited poll availability, data are reported for 4 of the most successful 
 and 8 of the least successful governors 
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Table 47.—Correlations Between Budget Success and Continuous Independent 
 Variables 
 Correlation (Pearson’s r) With 
Variable Agency Success Issue Success 
Institutional
Governor’s formal power            .04            .03 
Governor’s fiscal power       -   .17            .04 
Executive budget office 
 power and control  .17 .10
Legislative  
 professionalism  - .26 .05
Legislative veto points       -   .20       -   .01 
Economic 
Economic growth            .00       -   .27 
Size of budget       -   .14       -   .20 
Political
Legislative party support   
House proportion held by gov. party            .13           .11 
Senate proportion held by gov. party            .20           .03 
Governor popularity   
Election proportion            .14           .28 
Approval poll proportion+            .08           .33 
Interest group strength       -   .15           .07 
Year in service         
Year in term       -   .12       -  .24      
Year in tenure            .02       -  .31 
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Table 47—Continued
Correlation (Pearson’s r) With 
Variable Agency Success Issue Success 
Personal
Political experience       -   .04   -      .08 
Limited agenda       -   .01   -      .10 
Consistency           .18           .17 
Popular issues       -   .13           .11 
% increase in proposed budget           .33   -      .02 
+N=36.  For all other variables, N=50. 
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Table 48.—Differences in Mean Budget Success for Discrete Independent 
 Variables 
 Mean Success Score 
Variable Agency Method Issue Method 
Institutional
Term limits in effect in 2001?   
Yes (N=11) 65.5 68.2 
No (N=39) 64.9 59.8 
Term limits in effect at all?   
Yes (N=18) 66.3 69.0 
No (N=32) 64.4 57.5 
Biennial budget?   
Yes (N=21) 69.6 62.7 
No (N=29) 61.7 60.8 
Political
Legislative control   
Unified government (N=18) 65.9 62.6 
Split legislature (N=15) 67.5 65.9 
Divided government (N=17) 62.0 56.8 
Change in partisan arrangement   
Yes (N=8) 69.3 63.1 
No (N=42) 64.2 61.3 
Republican governor with divided 
 government  
Yes (N=8) 61.0 56.6 
No (N=42) 65.9 62.6 
Upcoming election with unified gov’t.?   
Yes (N=3) 67.5 34.7 
No (N=47) 64.9 63.3 
First budget of term?   
Yes (N=16) 69.8 67.9 
No (N=34) 62.8 58.7 
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Table 49. Models of Executive Budget Success and Institutional Variables 
 With Alternate Term Limit Variables 
 
Agency Success 
Non-standardized 
Coefficient 
(Standard Error) 
Issue Success+ 
Non-standardized 
Coefficient 
(Standard Error) 
Independent Variable Selected Model* 
Alternate 
Model 
Selected 
Model 
Alternate 
Model 
Governor’s formal 
 power 
 0.85 
 (1.21) 
0.94 
(1.20) 
 - 0.61 
 (1.52) 
 - 0.38
(1.55) 
Governor’s fiscal power        0.17 
 (0.89) 
0.07 
(0.88) 
 54.77**
(27.94) 
 50.05** 
 (28.50) 
Executive budget office 
 power and control 
 0.23 
 (0.20) 
0.22 
(0.02) 
 0.17 
 (0.26) 
0.13 
(0.27) 
Legislative 
 professionalism 
 - 0.05
(0.05) 
 - 0.05
(0.05) 
 0.07 
 (0.06) 
0.06 
(0.06) 
Legislative term limits 
 in effect in 2001 -- 
1.05 
(6.27) -- 
 10.42 
 (8.12) 
Legislative term limits 
 exist at all 
 2.61 
 (5.40) -- 
 13.19
(6.71) -- 
Legislative veto points 
 (square root) 
 - 2.07
(6.36) 
 - 1.63
(6.30) 
 - 0.79 
(8.38) 
1.70 
(8.46) 
Biennial budget  5.41 
 (5.29) 
 5.50
5.38 
1.12 
(6.85) 
1.21 
(7.12) 
Intercept      60.50 
 (23.85) 
 60.57
(23.93)  -- -- 
F (degrees of freedom)        0.78 
 (7, 39) 
 0.75
(7, 39) 
 1.05
(6, 40) 
 0.66
(6, 40) 
R2 0.12       0.12  0.14      0.09 
Adjusted R2 - 0.03   -   0.04        0.01   -  0.05 
N 47 47 47 47
Notes:  All models omit California, which is an outlier on legislative 
professionalism, Minnesota, which is an outlier on veto points, and Massachusetts, 
which is an outlier on fiscal power. 
*The Durbin-Watson d statistic is in the indeterminate zone, so autocorrelation can 
be neither rejected nor accepted. 
+Due to autocorrelation in the OLS model, models are weighted least squares 
(WLS) model, weighted by the inverse square root of fiscal power. 
**Coefficient is on the square root of fiscal power. 
218
 
Table 50.—Alternate Regression Models of Agency Budget Success and Political  
 Variables 
 Model 
Independent 
Variable 1* 2 3 4 5 6 
Legislative party support
Party support 
 in house -- 
 11.00 
 14.12 -- -- -- -- 
 Divided 
 government  
- 3.82
(5.81) -- 
5.69 
6.37 
- 3.89
(5.80) 
- 3.29
(5.81) 
- 4.22
(5.74) 
 Split 
 legislature  
 1.03
(6.44) -- 
 6.79
(7.93) 
 0.87 
 (6.43) 
 1.43
(6.25) 
- 0.17
(6.39) 
Governor’s popularity
Election 
 proportion 
 0.35
(0.40) 
 0.32 
 (0.39) -- 
0.35 
 (0.40) 
 0.36 
 (0.40) 
0.36 
(0.39) 
 Approval poll  
 proportion  -- -- 
 0.08 
 (0.22) -- -- -- 
Interest group  
 strength 
- 3.70
(3.45) 
- 4.17
(3.39) 
 -  3.62 
 (3.80) 
- 3.61
(3.45) 
- 4.32
(3.54) 
- 3.11
(3.43) 
Time in term
Year in term - 1.00(2.80) 
- 1.32
(2.65) 
 -  0.06 
 3.64 -- -- -- 
 Year in term 
 (square 
 root) 
-- -- -- - 3.42(7.73) -- -- 
 Year in tenure -- -- -- -- - 0.25(1.00)  
First budget 
 of term -- -- -- -- -- 
 5.42 
 (5.70) 
Intercept  62.59(25.36) 
 59.78 
(24.53) 
 66.80 
 (25.00) 
 65.00 
 (26.34) 
 62.60 
(25.53) 
 56.14 
(25.64) 
F (degrees of  
 freedom) 
 0.67
(5, 43)
0.82 
 (4, 44) 
 0.56
(5, 29) 
 0.68 
 (5, 43) 
 0.66 
 (5, 43) 
 0.84 
 (5, 43) 
R2 0.07 0.07     0.09 0.07  0.07    0.09 
Adjusted R2 - 0.04 - 0.01 -   0.07 -   0.03 -  0.04 -  0.02 
N 49 49 34 49   49  49 
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Table 50.—Continued
Notes:  Entries in cells are nonstandardized coefficients, with standard errors in  
 parentheses. All models Minnesota, which is an outlier on legislative support  
 and governor’s election proportion. 
* This model is shown in Table 27, Chapter 4. 
220
 
Table 51.—Alternate Regression Models of Issue Budget Success and Political  
 Variables 
Model 
Independent 
Variable 1* 2 3 4 5 6 
Legislative party support
Party support in  
 house -- 
- 2.68
(17.25) --  -- -- 
 Divided 
 government  
- 2.58
(7.02) -- 
- 2.39 
 (8.83) 
- 7.19
(7.25) 
- 7.07 
 (7.26) 
- 6.57 
 (7.32) 
 Split legislature 2.65 (7.55) -- 
 11.96 
(10.93) 
1.91 
(8.03) 
2.02 
(8.05) 
2.62 
(8.15) 
Governor’s popularity
Election 
 proportion 
1.17 
(0.49) 
1.20 
(0.49)  --  
0.94 
(0.49) 
0.94 
(0.49) 
0.93 
(0.50) 
 Approval poll  
 proportion -- -- 
0.67 
(0.30) -- -- -- 
Interest group  
 strength 
- 2.15
(4.28) 
- 2.87
(4.09)  
9.52 
(6.83) 
 3.54
(4.30) 
3.51 
(4.32) 
 3.26 
 (4.37) 
Time in term
Year in term  -- -- -- - 6.21(3.49) -- -- 
 Year in term 
 (square 
 root) 
-- -- -- -- -16.71  (9.68) -- 
 Year in tenure - 3.00(1.20) 
- 3.28
(1.15) 
1.32 
(1.96) -- -- -- 
 First budget 
 of term -- -- -- -- -- 
 10.42 
(7.26) 
Intercept  17.78  (30.83) 
 20.96 
(30.05) 
-26.92 
(44.19) 
 12.13 
(31.66) 
 22.58 
(32.96) 
- 4.53 
(32.67) 
F (degrees of 
freedom) 
 2.43 
 (5, 43) 
 2.98 
 (4, 44) 
 1.34
(5, 29) 
 1.74
(5, 43) 
 1.70
(5, 43) 
 1.50
(5, 43) 
R2 0.22 0.21 0.19 0.17 0.17 0.15 
Adjusted R2 0.13 0.14 0.05 0.07 0.07 0.05 
N*   49  49  35  49  49  49 
Notes:  Entries in cells are nonstandardized coefficients, with standard errors in  
 parentheses. All models Minnesota, which is an outlier on legislative support  
 and governor’s election proportion. 
* This model is shown in Table 27, Chapter 4. 
 
